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EDITOR'S NOTE:
About the Consumer Protection Journal
Perhaps the term "consumer law" denotes a somewhat illusory concept. The issues arising in this area of the law are, for the most part,
?erived from other, more traditional, topical fields of legal study. For
Instance, many of the remedies presently available to the aggrieved
consumer are based on theories of tort (e.g., fraud, negligence in product design, etc.) or contract (e.g., breach of warranty, etc.). In a sense,
then, this notion of "consumer law" partakes of most aspects of modern
law and therefore would not seem to warrant treatment as a separate
field of concern.
Yet, the body of law relating to the interests of the consumer has
received widespread recognition as being a conceptually distinct legal
sub-species. Law schools now offer classes in consumer law, governmental agencies have created consumer protection departments, many
newly enacted statutes bear titles which include the word "consumer",
and a number of private law firms have begun to "specialize" in representing consumers. Indeed, consumer problems have received an unprecedented amount of attention in recent years, and the rights of the
consumer are currently undergoing a markedly rapid evolution. New
statutes are being enacted almost daily, new cases decided, and new
ad~inistrative procedures created which affect the legal status of this
~nique but pervasive class of persons. Thus, although the concepts
I~volved under the heading "consumer law" may have originated from
diverse legal doctrines, their concentrated application to the problems
?f the consumer certainly warrant their being considered in a specialIZed context.
·
A little over three years ago, while researching various consumerrelated issues, several students at this school discovered the apparent
lack of any legal publications dealing specifically with consumer problems on a regular basis. Contemplating the myriad legal questions
created by the accelerated development of this field, they recognized
~h~ .need for such a publication and began considering the possibility of
1
~Ihating a specialized "law review" devoted exclusively to the discusSion and treatment of consumer issues. After obtaining the school's
approval for their project, they commenced laying the foundation for
What eventually became the Loyola Consumer Protection Journal.
J,
After enduring a problematic two-year period of gestation, the
ournal was finally born in print during the summer of 1972. This issue
marks the Journal's second publication.
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The Journal was conceived with the notion that, due to the rapid
emergence of consumer law, some means was needed to apprise t he
legal community of current and prospective developments in this field.
In order to fulfill this need effectively, the Journal was designed to serve
a dual function:
1. As a tool for legal research, and
2. As a forum for the discussion of consumer-related issues.
As part of its first function, the Journal will publish articles, comments, and notes to provide sources of persuasive authority for those
researching consumer problems. To be of further use to the legal writer
and the practitioner, the Journal will also present works intended to
help clarify some of the more complex legal developments in the area of
consumer protection. Such topics will include discussions of analysis,
interpretation, and ultimate impact, of statutes and decisions of consumer importance.
The second function of the Journal is premised on the need for the
continued refinement of consumer law. The Journal will provide a platform from which writers can express their views on the legal, social,
and economic implications of consumer protection. Included will be
proposals for new and revised legislation, broad discussions of governmental priorities and policies, and suggested approaches to isolating
and alleviating various consumer problems.
The Journal will maintain an objective approach in the discussion of
all consumer issues. It will not endorse positions taken by any of its
. writers, and will accept qualified works espousing any point of view.
Readers of the Journal are to be found throughout the United
States, and in Australia and Canada. For the most part they are in
fields directly related to the law, such as law students and professors,
practicing attorneys, judges, legislators, governmental adm inistrators,
a nd legal organizations. So that this readership may best be served , the
Journal will only publish works which conform to the following standards:
1. Universal Significance: Articles treating consumer problems of
purely local interest will not be published . Discussions of local or state
issues may be deemed appropriate, but only if they can serve an exernplary purpose or otherwise be of interest to readers in other jurisdictions.
2. Substantial Consumer Impact: Due to the enormous number
and variety of consumer problems, the Journal will publish only topics
concerning consumer problems of substantial social or economic importance.

[
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3. Legal Interest: Works published in the Journal must relate to
the law, as it contemplates or affects the interests of the consumer.
Topics must have some bearing on the enforcement, administration,
interpretation, or creation of the law. Issues of a "quasi-legal" nature
(e.g., industry self-regulation, etc.) may also qualify for treatment in the
Journal.
4. Intellectual Standards: The Journal will include only works

~hich meet the requirement of originality; that is, they must raise new

Issues or provide novel insights into consumer problems. Furthermore,
all works must be adequately supported by recognized authority (where
appropriate), and must be written in a manner which most effectively
conveys the author's ideas.

The Journal is still a very young publication. In order to insure its
continued growth and refinement, the Journal welcomes comments and
criticisms from its readers. It is only by way of such response that the
Journal can be made to better serve the interests of the legal community. In addition, the Journal actively solicits manuscripts from readers,
for publication in future issues.
On behalf of the Journal, I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the students, faculty, and administration of Loyola University of
~os Angeles, School of Law for the tremendous support they have manI~e~ted in favor of this publication. I would especially like to give recognition to Assistant Dean Lola McAlpin-Grant, without whose dedicated
efforts the Journal could not have survived, and to Cary Medill and
~len Rabenn who are primarily responsible for the Journafs coming
Into being.
K .M.B.

I

5

I
r

(

'

l

I
I

A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO UNCONSCIONABLE SALES
CONTRACTS
Martin A. Frey*
Traditional contract law has provided the consumer with relief in
some of the more severe unconscionable contract situations ; for exam ple, usury, fraud and duress. Unfortunately for the consumer, not all
unconscionable contracts come within established doctrines. Some sym pathetic courts have strained to give the consumer relief by construing
the contract language adversely to the merchant, by manipulating the
rules of offer and acceptance, and by determining the unconscionable
clause to be contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract! The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have supplied
the consumer with relief; 2 under section 2-302, courts now can pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or on a particular clause
in that contrace
Section 2-302 expressly authorizes the trial court to make a finding
as a matter of law that a contract or a contract clause was unconscion ab le at the time it was made. Upon this finding, the court may tailor
the contract to avoid the unconscionable result; it may refuse to enforce
the contract; or it may delete the unconscionable clause and enforce the
remainder of the contract. 4 At face value, this section seems a very potent weapon in the consumer's arsenal when faced with a merchant

*

Pro fessor of Law, T exas Tec h University. B.S.M .E. 1962, Nort hweste rn University; J.D.
1965, W ashington University; LL.M. 1966, George Washington University. I wish to thank Ma rilyn
Shell , Juni or la w stud ent , T exas Tec h University, for her skilled assista nce in research.
I. UNIFORM COMM E RC IAL CO D E§ 2-302, Commen t I.
. . 2. T he un conscio na bility d octrin e o f 2-302 is broad enough to encompass t he traditiona l doc~nn es o f us ury, fraud a nd duress as we ll as th ose situ a tions which we re not within the estab li shed
oc tnn es . In app li cation . however , th e courts ha ve shown a tend ency to use the estab lished d octnne when the fac ts so indica te ra th er th a n strike off into the uncharted sph ere of 2-302. An ex amp le is Toker v. Perl. 103 N.J. Super. SOO, 247 A.2d 70 1 (L. Div. 1968), a.ff'd. 108 N.J. Super.
129, 260 A.2d 244 (App . Div. 1970). Tne tria! court held th e in sta llment sa les contract un enforcea bl e on two ground s: (I) fraud; and (2) uncon scionability. Th e appellate court affirmed holding
th a t the fraud ground wa s sufficient a nd th erefo re it was unn ecessa ry to ex press a n op inion on
unconsc ionab ility.
, 3. UNIFORM COMMERC IAL CODE§ 2-302, Commen t I. Unconscionability is a question
of l a~v and mu st be determin ed by the court and not by t he jury. Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Con trac ttn g Co .. 3 UCC. REP. SERV. 293. 296 (Pa . Ct. C.P., Butler Cou nty 1965), holding that it was
error for th e Tri a l Court to submit t he iss ue of unconsc ionability to the jury.
4. UN IFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-302 :
(I) If the court as a matter of law find s the contrac t or a ny clause of the contrac t to have
bee n un consc iona bl e a t the tim e it was m ade the court m ay refuse to enforce th e contract. or it
~l ay enforce th e rema ind er of the contract with out th e un conscionable cl a use. or it m ay so limit
1
lC a pp licat ion of a ny un co nsc io na ble c lause as to avoid a ny un conscionable resu lt.
(2) Wh en it is c laimed or a ppears to th e co urt that th e contract or a ny cl a use th ereo f
rn ay be un consciona bl e th e pa rties shall be afford ed a reasonable opportuni ty to prese nt ev id ence
as to It s commercia l settin g , purpose and effect to a id the court in makin g the d etermin ation.
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armed with a form contract. But is it? When can a contract be attacked
as unconscionable? Are consumers in California under a severe disability since their legislature deleted 2-302 from the California version of
the Code?
This article will not attempt to explore the history of 2-302; other
authors have labored at that task and their efforts are readily available.5
Nor will it prophesize on the future of this provision. Instead, this article is written for the consumer's attorney. It is intended to supply him
with a check-list and guidelines for testing whether his client has a
possible case of unconscionability. Before getting to the check-lists,
however, it is necessary to take a moment to isolate the type of contract
that will be dealt with and to put unconscionability in its factual setting.
The contracts under consideration involve the sale of goods by a
merchant to a consumer. Implicit is the fact that non-sale of goods
contracts will not be considered. This approach is consistent with the
formal scope of article 2 of the Code (Sales).6 The exclusion of non-sales
contracts does not mean that these contracts cannot be held unconscionable under 2-302; the Code's influence extends far beyond its formal
scope, and some non-sales contracts have been held unconscionable?
5. E.g .. Bra ucher, Th e Un conscionable Contract or Term , 31 U. PITI. L. REV. 337 (1970);
Davenport , Un conscionability and th e Umfo rm Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV . 121
(1 967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Un conscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969); Leff, Un conscionability and th e Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Leff, Un conscionability and th e Crowd--Consumers and th e Comm on Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT L. REV . 349
(1 970); Murray , Unconscionability: Un conscionability , 31 U. PITI. L. REV. I (1 969); Shulkin ,
Unconscionability-- Th e Code, The Court an d Th e Consum er, 9 B. C. IND. & COM . L. REV. 367
(1 968 ): Spanogle, Analyzing Un conscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969):
Speid el. Un conscionability. A ssent and Consum er Protection, 31 U. PITI. L. REV. 359 (1970).
6. "Unless th e contex t oth erwise req uires. this Article applies to tran sactions in goods . . .. "
UNIFORM COMMERC IAL COD E§ 2-102. "'Goods' mea ns all things (including speci ally ma nufac tured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . . ·: /d. §
2-105(1 ). "In thi s Article unless the context oth erwise requires 'contract' and 'agreem ent' are limited to th ose relating to the present or future sale of goods. 'Contract for sale' includes both a
present sa le of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A 'sa le' consists in the passing
of titl e from th e se ller to the buyer for a price (Secti on 2-401) . . . . " /d. § 2-106(1 ).
7. Contrac ts held unconsci onable : Fairfield Lease Corp . v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 278
A.2d 154 (1971) (l ease agreement); Am erican Home Improvement , Inc. v. Maci ver, 105 N.H. 435.
201 A. 2d 886 (1964) (home improve ment contract) ; Educational Benefici al, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324
N.Y.S. 2d 813 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (enrollm ent agreement between a school a nd a student); Dav id v. Manufacturers Hanover Tru st Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1145 (N .Y. Civ. Ct., Kin gs
County 1968) rev'd, 59 Misc . 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (App. T. 1969) (checking account con trac t): ~t: In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E. D. Pa . 1966) (contract to advance money
aga inst th e assignm ent of accounts receiva ble). Comra. In re Advance Printin g & Litho Co., 387
F. 2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967) (h oldin g tha t § 2-302 applies to sales but not to security tra nsactions);
Hern a ndez v. S.I.C. Fin . Co .. 79 N.M. 673. 448 P.2d 474 (1 968) (holding th a t~ 2-302 applies to
sa les but not to security transacti ons): c( Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189. 298 N.Y.S .
2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (in which a n attempt to make the sa les contract into a security agreement
failed). S ee also E. F. Lynch, Inc. v. Piccirilli , 28 Mass . App. Dec. 49 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1964) (l ease
agree ment : reversed beca use tri a l co urt failed to hold a hearing on un conscionability): United
States Leas in g Corp . v. Franklin Pl aza Apart ments , Inc .. 31 9 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County
197 1) (l ease agree ment : pl aintiffs motion for summ ary judgment deni ed beca use a hea rin g on th e
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Their exclusion from this article means only that the results in these
cases may or may not be dictated by factors relevant to 2-302 and this,
at least in the first instance, may be misleading when isolating the
indicators for unconscionability under 2-302.
Contracts involving sales between merchants also will not be considered except for the following discussion on how to determine whether
the contract concerns a "consumer" or a "between merchants" sale.
·The merchant is a person with special knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction. 8 The "between merchants" transaction occurs when both parties are chargeable with the
knowledge or skill of merchants.9 The indicators in a " between merchants" case, because of knowledge and skill of both contracting
parties,may be slightly different from those in the consumer-merchant
situation and may instill a possible source of distortion, and therefore
are excluded from consideration.10

un co nscionab ili ty issue was necessary); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella Co .. 8 UCC
REP. SERV. 184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement: reversed because trial court
fatled to hold a hearing on unconscionability); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC REP.
SERV. I 18 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement for coffee machines); Kaye v.
Coughlin, 443 S.W. 2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1969, no writ) (contract for sale of real es tate: no un consc ionable provision).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code§ 5.108 is similar to UCC § 2-302 but is applicable to
consu mer credit sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans. It provides:
(I) With respect to a consumer credit sa le, consumer lease, or consumer loa n. if
the court as a matter of law finds the agreement or any clause of th e agreement to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the agreement, or it may enforce the remainder of the agreement without the unconsc ionab le clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionab le result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the agreement or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a charge or practice expressly permitted by
thi s Act is not in itself unconscionable.

--

8. A "merchant" is defined by the Code to be "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by hi s occ upation hold s him self out as having knowledge or ski ll peculiar to the practices
?r goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employmen t of an agent or broker or other interm ediary who by his occ upation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or ski ll." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-104(1).
9. I d. § 2- I 04(3).
& 10. Several illustra ti ons of merchant-merchant cases are: County Asphalt. Inc. v. Lewis Welding
Eng'r Corp. , 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga.
~ Pp. 353, 160 S.E.2d 659 (1968); Architectual Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc. , 70 Misc. 2d 495,
3 N.Y .S.2d 8 18 (Sup. Ct .. N.Y. County 1972); Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil
~orp., 60 Misc. 2d 720,304 N.Y-S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1969); Whitestone Credit
orp ..~· Barbary Realty Corp., 5 UCC REP. SERV. 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens County 1968);
5 ln~olt Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co .. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct.,
~ uttolk County 1966); Central Ohio Co-op Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland. 29 Ohio App. 2d 236,
I N.E.2d 42 (1972).
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It is important to note at this juncture that the cases that have
raised the unconscionability argument fall into several factual patterns.
The most common involves a merchant who has sold goods to a
consumer on a time payment contract. The consumer makes a number
of payments and then fails to make the next payment when due. The
merchant brings a contract action against the consumer for the balance
due or to recover the goods. The consumer answers by raising the
unconscionability of the price term as a defense to the contract action. 11
Under these same facts, the consumer need not wait for the merchant to sue. The consumer may take the initiative. He could bring suit
against the merchant to reform the price term so that the contract sales
price (and service charges) would correlate to the price paid. By these
tactics, the consumer could retain the merchandise and free himself
from making further payments} 2 While these two illustrations refer to
the unconscionability of the price term, other terms, as will be discussed later, may be unconscionable as well.

I.

THE CHECK-LISTS

The text of the Code, by its silence in defining what are unconscionable contracts and clauses, has led to uncertainty and speculation concerning definition. A number of cases, by being merely conclusionary,
shed no light on the definition and its components.13 A few other cases
do refer to definitions. Two similar yet different formulations currently

J I. E.g., Tokerv. Westerman, J 13 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); Jefferson
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S .2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev 'd on the damage issue, 54 Misc.
2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
12. E.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp. , 59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1969).
13. E .g .. In re Jackson , Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152 (W.O. Mo. 1971) (title
retention provisions of a charge-all agreement for the entire amount was unconscionable); Dean v.
Universal C.l.T. Credit Corp., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1113 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1971) (dictum
stated that a clause not to assert defenses against an assignee and a clause providing a 5-day time
limit for claiming collateral in a repossessed automobile were unconscionable); Kosches v. Nichols.
327 N.Y.S .2d 968 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (dictum stated that clauses limiting the right of the
consumer to move, or perm iting the merchant to declare a default if the consumer dies or the merchant with reasonable cause determines the goods to be in jeopardy, or giving the merchant the
right to enter a consumer's residence and seize the goods without a court order, may be unconscionable) ; Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1971)(credit contract not unconscionable); Paragon Homes of New England, Inc., v. Langlois. 4 UCC REP . SERV. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (dictum stated that a clause specifying jurisdiction for litigation purposes would have been unconscionable were not the action dismissed on
other grounds).
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are developing: one emanates from the comments to the Code and the
other from the pre-Code case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. 14 In the following material these formulations will be isolated and
discussed separately and then brought together and compared for similarities and differences.
A.

The Comment 1 Formulation

The closest the Code comes to a definition for unconscionability is
in the comments to 2-302. Comment 1 provides the following circular
and somewhat obscure statement:
"The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
und er the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract ... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." 15
Based on this language and the cases which will be discussed subsequently, the following check-list for unconscionability can be developed:
1. Identify the one-sided clause. This will be a term for which the
merchant is bargaining.
2. Identify the general commercial background (also known as the
commercial setting) at the time of the contracting. Include facts about
this contract and related contracts and dealings between the parties.
3. Identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case at
the time of contracting. Include facts which explain or tend to justify
the merchant's position regarding the one-sided clause.
14. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Taker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct.l970), refers
to neither Comment l nor Walker-Thomas. Instead it refers to the following passage in Carter v.
Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 92 S.W.2d 647, 657 (1936), which appears in WORDS
AND PHRASES. An unconscionable contract has been defined as:
one such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. To what extent inadequacy of consideration must go to make a contract unconscion able is difficult to
state, except in abstract terms, which gives but little practical help. It has been said
that there must be an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at
the inequality of it.
In Toker, a price term with a price-value disparity of 2.2 or more to 1 was held to be unconscion able.
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. For criticism of this test , see 1.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 116 (1972).
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4. Evaluate the one-sided ness of the clause in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade or
case. Was the clause a product of the merchant's oppressive practices
and, if so, would the clause shock the conscience of the court?
Based on the limited number of consumer-merchant sales cases
which have discussed Comment 1,16 the following materials develop and
illustrate the check-list's rough guidelines. The first, and probably the
simplest step, is the identification of those clauses that the consumer
will claim to be one-sided in favor of the merchant. These are the clauses for which the merchant was bargaining. Illustrative are price terms,
conditions precedent to warranties, waivers of defenses, and title retention provisions.
Next, identify the general commercial background at the time of
contracting. The commercial background or commercial setting should
include the events leading up to the contracting, and will help to explain how and why the one-sided term found its way into the contract.
For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso: 7 the contract for the refrigerator-freezer was negotiated orally in Spanish between the
consumers and a Spanish speaking salesman representing the merchant. In that conversation the consumer husband told the salesman
that he had but one week left on his job and he could not afford to buy
the appliance. The salesman distracted and deluded the consumers by
advising them that the appliance would cost them nothing because they
would be paid bonuses or commissions of $25 each on the numerous
sales that would be made to their neighbors and friends. Thereafter the
consumers signed a retail installment contract entirely in English, which
was neither translated nor explained to them. In that contract there
was a cash sales price of $900 and a credit charge of $245.88, making a
total oJ $1145.88. The refrigerator-fre~zer cost the merchant $348.
The commercial background need not be limited to the one contract
in which the one-sided term appears. It may include related contracts
and dealings between the parties. If the consumer desires to go beyond
the one contract, then he must supply facts wh ich show that this extrin18
sic material is relevant. Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas presents an excellent illustration of the expansion of the scope of the general commercial background beyond the single contract in question. In Milford
.

16. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass . App. Div. 1970) (judgment fm
merchant's assignee reversed since the trial court erred in excluding evidence of commercial background relevant to the decision of unconscionability); Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522,
198 N.W.2d 57 (1972); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1%7).
17. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
18. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970).
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Finance the consumers (husband and wife), in response to a post card
informing them that they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for
two," called a telephone number to redeem the vacation. They were
subsequently visited by a salesman for Northeast Food Service. He
inquired how much they spent each week on meat for the family .and if
they might be interested in a frozen food plan. He stated that Northeast
would supply them with the finest choice of meats delivered to their
home for $12 per week, or 20f6 per week more than they had been paying. The consumers asked how often the meats were delivered and were
told every six months. When they said that the freezer section of their
refrigerator was not capable of holding such a large quantity of food,
the salesman said that if they agreed to purchase frozen meat from
Northeast for three years, they would be supplied a freezer at no extra
charge.
The salesman presented the consumers with a Northeast Food Service Membership Bond and Guarantee and then produced two documents which he requested the consumers to execute. One was entitled
"consumer note" and was in the amount of $195.24, payable in four
equal payments of $48.81. The other was the retail installment sales
agreement in the amount of $1,050.84 payable in 36 equal payments of
$29.19. When the consumers saw the latter they said it was too much to
pay for a freezer. The salesman said the freezer payments were included in the food payments and both amounted to $12 per week. The
~alesman said the only reason that they were required to sign the retail
Installment sales agreement was to insure that they purchased their
meats from Northeast for at least three years. The consumers subsequently paid $624 ($12 x 52 weeks) and received one year's supply of
meat. Northeast then went out of business and no further meat deliveries were made.
In the interim, the installment sales agreement had been assigned
from Northeast to Milford Finance. When the consumers did not receive deliveries, they refused to make any further payments and requested that Milford Finance remove the freezer. Milford, as assignee
of the freezer contract, brought action against the consumers for the
unpaid balance. The consumers contended that the total time sales
price of $1,050.84 was so excessively high as to make the entire retail
~~tallment sales agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. From
Liford Finance it may be seen that evidence is relevant to expand the
scope of the hearing from the one contract being challenged to include
other contracts and other dealings between the parties which comprise
a greater transaction.
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In Milford Finance, the following acts demonstrated that the scope
should be expanded. The post card which informed the consumers that
they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for two"; the subsequent
visit by a salesman for Northeast; the lead into the frozen food plan;
the signing of the note, bond and guarantee and the sales agreement,
all on the same day; and the fact that the food was a necessary requirement of the freezer contract, demonstrated that the contract for the
freezer was an integral part of the food contract. The evidence surrounding the manner in which the consumers were induced to sign up
for the food service and for the purchase of the freezer was admissible,
to show that the freezer payments were included in the food payments.
The evidence concerning the Northeast Food Service Membership Bond
and guarantee was introduced to show that Northeast's agent was not
merely selling a freezer unit to the consumers, but also that he had
made certain representations about a frozen food plan, upon which
representations the consumers had relied. Once the scope was
expanded, evidence surrounding the manner in which the consumers
were induced to become involved with any aspect of the whole transaction was relevant to show that the merchant had engaged in deceptive
practices during the negotiation of the freezer contract. Finally, the fact
that the consumers paid the monthly payments up until the time that
they were unable to procure any more food demonstrated their good
faith.
Next, identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case
at the time of contracting. These facts will be used to explain the merchant's position regarding the one-sided clause. Are there facts that
justify such a clause? Consider, for example, the commercial needs that
influence the setting of the ultimate price to the consumer. Included
are the net cost of the goods to the merchant, a reasonable profit, commissions to be paid to salesmen, possible collection and legal fees,
trucking and service charges necessarily incurred, reasonable finance
charges, and other matters of overhead.I 9
Finally, evaluate the one-sidedness of the clauses in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade
or case. Was the clause so one-sided at the time of contracting as to be
unconscionable? Comment 1 states that a finding of unconscionability
will lie only when it is necessary to prevent oppression and unfair surprise. While this language is conjunctive -- "oppression and unfair

19. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d %4 (App. T. 1%7).
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suprise" -- the cases refer only to oppression and thus treat the terms as
disjunctive?0
Most cases provide little help in evaluating whether a clause is so
one-sided as to be unconscionable~ Of the few that have referred to the
Comment 1 formulation, some have been cases where the trial court
has erroneously excluded evidence relevant to the unconscionability
finding, and therefore are of little help in pinpointing unconscionability.
Two cases, M elch er v. Boesch Motor Co~ and Frostifresh v. R eynoso, do
shed some light on the application of the Comment 1 formul ation. In
M elcher, a consumer purchased a new pickup truck from a dealer.
From the beginning, the truck used an abnormal amount of oil. When
it had been driven nearly 25,000 miles, it threw a connecting rod and
destroyed the engine. The consumer brought action against the dealer
and the manufacturer for damages for breach of the manufacturer's
express warranty that the vehicle was free from defects in material and
workmanship. The dealer and the manufacturer defended on the
ground that the consumer had failed to comply with the conditions precedent to the warranty -- that is , the service requirements and the required certification of such compliance. The consumer replied that he
had performed the required maintenance and that the requirement that
he obtain from the dealer a certification of compliance was unconscionable and unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.
After quoting the Comment 1 formulation , the court held that the
certification requirement was not unconscionable. It must be
emphasized that the court found the requirement not unconscionable,
not by discussing whether it was "oppressive" or led to "unfair sur- .
prise", but instead by whether it was "unreasonable." In finding the
basis for the certification clearly reasonable, the court noted that the
requirement of a consumer that he maintain the engine of his vehicle
properly, in exchange for a warranty that the vehicle be free of defect in
material and workmanship at time of delivery, go hand-in-hand. Also,
~he requ ired certification did not put the manufacturer and the dealer
In the position of sole arbiters as to what is sufficient maintenance. The
lllanufacturer and the dealer did not have the unqualified right under
the clause to refuse the certification and defeat the consumer's claim.
1

2

--

20. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). For a di s·
;u;ston of "unfair surprise" a nd "oppression," see D. DOBBS , HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
''c.MEDIES 710-12 (1973).
. 21. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970) (Based on the
dtscussion on appeal, the unconscionability decision would appear to hinge on the merch ant's decep2ttve practices versus the consumer's good faith).
2. Supra note 16.
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While the consumer must furnish the dealer with evidence of performance of the required maintenance services, the dealer may not unreasonably withhold the certification. If the · manufacturer and the dealer
could arbitrarily refuse to recognize the fact that the service was properly performed and thus deny the certification, the certification requirement would be unreasonable and the condition precedent that the
consumer obtain the certification would be waived. Thus construed, the
certification provision is not unreasonable.
While the Melcher contract was not unconscionable, the Frostifresh
contract was. Frostifresh provides the following clue to unconscionability: It is not oppression alone, according to the Comment 1 formulation, that causes a contract to be unconscionable. If it were, then the
problem would seem to revert to a reallocation of the risk, which Comment 1 expressly rejects. Instead, it is oppression that shocks the conscience of the court. In Frostifresh, the court noted that the service
charge ($245.88), which almost equalled the price of the refrigeratorfreezer ($348), was in and of itself indicative of the oppression which
was practiced on the consumers. In addition , the consumers were
handicapped by a lack of knowledge both as to the commercial situation and as to the nature and terms of the contract, which was submitted in a language foreign to them. These oppressive practices led the
court to conclude that the contract was "too hard a bargain". The sale
of the appliance at the contract price was shocking to the conscience of
the court. The conscience of the court would not permit the enforcement of the contract as writtenP
B. The Walker-Thomas Formulation
The more commonly cited formulation, emanating from the case of
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., defines unconscionability
as including an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party!4 The following check-list directs attention to the relevant factors:
1. The consumer must have had a meaningful choice at the time of
contracting.
a. The consumer must have had a reasonable opportunity to
understand the contract terms. An important term must not have been
hidden in a maze of fine print; nor must an important term have been
23. Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S .2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966); cf Star Credit
Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1%9) (consumer failed
to submit evidence of the freezer's actual value, which made a determination of the unconsCionability of the price term impossible).
24. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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obscured by deceptive sales practices; nor must the consumer have
been denied the opportunity to understand the term due to a lack of
education or some other disability.
'
b. In addition, the consumer must have had the power to bargain about the term. He must not have lacked the power to shop comparatively due to limited financial resources or because all merchants
dealing in the desired item uniformly use the same commercial form or
charge the same price.
c. If the consumer lacked a meaningful choice at the time of
contracting, then an inequality of bargaining power existed. However,
only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the requisite
absence of meaningful choice. Was the inequality of bargaining power
gross?
2. The merchant must not have taken advantage of the customer's
absence of meaningful choice by including a term unreasonably favorable to himself in the contract.
a. Identify the favorable term. This will be a term for which the
merchant is bargaining.
b. Identify the circumstances that existed at the time of contracting. Did these circumstances make the favorable term unreasonably favorable to the merchant? Specifically, did the merchant knowingly take advantage of the consumer's absence of meaningful choice?
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does this
advantage appear unreasonable? Were there commercial needs for the
particular trade or case that justified the merchant in including into the
contract what appeared to be an unreasonably favorable term? If the
advantage appears unreasonable and there are no commercial needs
that justify the merchant's position, then the term is unconscionable.
The following materials develop and illustrate the rough guidelines
of the check-list: (1) For unconscionability, the consumer must lack a
meaningful choice at the time of contracting. (2) Whether a meaningful
choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by considering all the circumstances surrounding the transaction:S (3) Meaning~ul choice is directly related to bargaining power, and bargaining power
ts a . composite of knowing what to bargain for and the ability to
bargain for it.

--

The consumer, when signing the contract, must at least have had a
reasonable opportunity to know and understand its terms. T his

Th25· I d. The consumer is entitled to a hearing to present evidence as to the commercial setting.
53 M:fore, the merchant is not entitled to a summary judgment. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,
Jsc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1967).
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opportunity may not exist if the important terms are hidden in a maze
of fine print, or if they are minimized or obscured by deceptive sales
practices. An example of the latter occurred in Toker v. Perl/ 6 where
the merchant's salesman arrived at the consumer's home for a prearranged appointment. For the first two and one-half hours of the three
hour interview, the discussion centered around food plans that could be
arranged by the merchant. No mention was made of a freezer. Sometime within the last one-half hour, when it became a pparent t hat the
plan called for the purchase of 18 weeks of food at a time, the
consumers mentioned that they had no facilities to store such a large
quantity of food . T he salesman replied that a freezer was included in
the food plan. Following the explanation of the food plan, the salesman
presented three forms for signing. He informed the consumers that the
docum ents were for 18 weeks of food. The form s were placed one on
top of the other, leaving visible only the signature line on the lower two
form s. The top page was the food plan contract. The next day when the
consumers examined the papers, they discovered that in addition to the
food plan they had signed a financing application and an installment
contract for a freezer.
The opportunity to understand the terms may not exist when the
consumer suffers from a lack of education or a language barrier. For
example, a Spanish-speaking consumer, with at best a sketchy knowledge of the English language, may neither know nor understand when
he signs a contract printed entirely in English that he is waiving all
implied warranties, despite the fact that the waiver is printed in the
contract in large black type?7 At times even a consumer with a sound
basic education and without language problems may be unable to
understand the contract even if he reads it, due to the drafting skill of
the merchant's form writer:8 In either case, the consumer who signs the
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, signs without choice.29
A "smart" consumer knows and understands what is in the contract. But what terms can this consumer get? Is the consumer free to
indulge in comparative shopping? The answer may be that he is
physically able but, due to his very limited financial resources 30 or the
fact that all merchants dealing in the desired items uniformly use
the same commercial form, or charge the same price,31 comparative
26. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), a.ffd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super.
129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
· 27. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138,302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
28. Urd ang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A. 2d 397 (1971).
29. Willi ams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
30. Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), Jones v. Star Credit
Corp ., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N. Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
31. Urd ang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971).
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shopping is not practiced. Or, the consumer may be physically able to
shop comparatively, but be psychologically unable to do so because the
merchant calls on the consumer in the consumer's own home.32 Without
the power to do effective comparison shopping, the consumer has little
bargaining power, little real choice.
Only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the requisite absence of meaningful choice!3 Although our research did not
uncover a case which defined the distinction between gross and
less-than-gross inequality of bargaining power, some guidance can be
gleaned from the ultimate conclusions of the courts on the unconscionability issue. It appears from these cases that only one of the factors
from the check-list is necessary for the inequality of bargaining power
~o be gross.34 If more than one factor is present at the time of contractIng, all the better: What is critical is the severity of the inequality developed within that factor. Showings of deceptive sales practices, language barriers, and limited financial resources have been sufficient to
support conclusions of unconscionability; but it appears that the psychological factor of being trapped by a salesman in one's own home is not
strong enough by itself to be relied upon to show gross inequality, and
should only be used in conjunction with another factor to strengthen
that other factor.
Absence of meaningful choice alone will not warrant a finding of
unconscionability. Absence of meaningful choice is only one-half of the
two-pronged Walker- Thomas test. For a clause to be unconscionable,
the merchant must knowingly have taken advantage of the consumer's
absence of meaningful choice by including in the contract a term
unreasonably favorable to the seller.
Was the term favorable to the merchant? Illustrative are such terms
as waiver of implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a
Particular purpose, acceleration clauses, and price terms. The merchan~_b!!nefits at the consumer's expense.
A term f~vorable to the merchant does not automatically make the
term unconscionable. Freedom to contract permits and encourages

--

?· See Jones v. Star Credit Corp .• 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Toker v.

p 3

2~Q AI03 N.J. Super. 500,247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), a.ffd on othergrounds,108 N.J. Super. 129,

.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
3
Cr ~ : Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1%5); Jones v. Star
~ tt Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N. Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1%9).
un 4 · I~ Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), the price term was found
v ~nsctonable since it had been obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Jefferson Credit Corp.
u.n arcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969), the waiver of warranties was found
du consctonable because the consumer was denied the opportunity to understand the waiver clause
2~ to a lack of education in English. In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S .2d
had (Sup. Ct. 1969), the price term was held unconscionable as the consumer, a welfare recipient,
only very limited financial resources.
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e.ach contracting party to bargain for terms most favorable to himself. ·
The limitation (in addition to good faith)Js is that circumstances must
not exist at the time of contracting which would make the favorable
term unreasonably favorable to the merchant. In determining reasonableness or fairness of the terms, the primary concern must be with the
terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing
when the contract was made. Existing circumstances encompass the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case!6 Did the merchant knowingly take advantage of the
consumer's absence of meaningful choice? 37 The merchant knowingly
takes advantage when he leads the consumer to believe that his signature to a contract is not for the purchase of merchandise, when in fact
it is?8 Knowingly taking advantage may be implied when a merchant,
dealing at arms length with the consumer who has a severe language
barrier, fails to explain the terms favorable to the merchant so the con sumer can understand . Or it may be implied from the price-value disparity when the merchant knows that the consumer's limited financial
resources make it impossible for him to buy from others.
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does
the advantage gained by the merchant appear unreasonable? In Jones
v. Star Credit Corp.; 9 a price-term case, the court considered whether
the mathematical price-value disparity was exhorbitant on its face and
concluded that it was oppressive. The court then used the language that
the price imposed on these consumers for this appliance shocked the
conscience of the court. This occurred when the price-value disparity
was in excess of 2.5 to 1.
Commercial needs provide the merchant with an opportunity to
justify the existence of favorable terms. When the challenged term is
price, the merchant's defense may be based on the necessity and even
the desirability of installment sales and the extension of credit. There
are many, including but not necessarily limited to the poorest members
35. The Code provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation· <?f
good faith in its performance or enforcement." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 1-203. ThiS
obligation of good faith underpins the entire Code. The consumer's obligation of good faith mean s
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned ." Jd. § 1-201(19). The merchant has a
higher obligation . "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." !d. § 2-103(1 Xb).
36. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37. Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59
Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S .2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1969).
38. Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds , 108
N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
39. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.~
78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (2.2-2.5 to 1); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. D1v.
1968) (2.7 to 1). Contra, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co.; 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971) (2.5 to 1 was not unconscionable).

1974]

UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

19

of the community, who would be deprived of even the most basic conveniences without the use of these de-yices. Similarly, the retail merchant selling on installment or extending credit is expected to establish
a pricing factor which will afford a degree of protection commensurate
with the risk of selling to those who might be default-prone:W In addition, mark-ups vary from industry to industry. A high mark-up in one
industry might be low in another.41 To be successful in his unconscionability claim, a consumer must know the mores and business practices
of the time and place or the merchan~ may readily justify his favorable
term.
C. A Comparison
The Comment 1 and the Walker-Thomas formulations are similar
in that both focus on the term favorable to the merchant. Under both,
the favorable term must be considered in light of the circumstances
existing at the time of contracting that would make the favorable term
so oppressive or unreasonably favorable to the merchant that the conscience of the court is shocked. In both, the merchant is given an opportunity to present evidence of the circumstances that would justify his
Inclusion into the contract of what appears to be an oppressive or unreasonably favorable term.

The difference between the formulations is that the Comment 1 test
appears to end with what already has been said. The Walker-Thomas
test adds a second area of consideration which must be considered even
before the favorable term: There must be an absence of meanin'gful
choice. The merchant, when including the unreasonably favorable term
must have done so in the spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the
consumer's lack of meaningful choice. Therefore, in comparison, the
Walker-Thomas test appears more restrictive.
. What significance does this have for the consumer who is attemptIng to raise a defense of unconscionability? Based on the limited num-

-v

'W·

Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1%9); accord, Toker

n~ hesterman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (less overhead due to door-to-door salesmen and

s owroom or store).

rn 4 1. Mo~ris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). Before a
ti~rchant IS required to divulge his pricing policies through interrogatories or through the produc-

W

v of records m court, the consumer must assert his claim with some degree of detail. Patterson
· alker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
giv
Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1972),
es some pointers in the warranty area:
There is obviously a point at which the warranty limitation must be considered unco_nscionable--for example if, due to defective manufacture or failure to repair by
fa11ing to place a 25 cent nut on the proper bolt, the brakes fail and a collision occurs resulting in heavy property damage and personal injury, courts might well be
loath to limit the manufacturer's or seller's liability to the sum of twenty five cents.
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ber of reported decisions, the choice of tests does not appear to be jurisdictional. The same courts have used both formulations on different
2
occasions~ Nor does the choice appear to be based on the type of term
being challenged. Both tests have been used for price terms 43 and for
non-price terms:"'
Does this mean that there is only one test -- a test which requires
the merchant to have included the unreasonably favorable term in the
spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the consumer's lack of meaningful choice? Based on the three cases that have used the Comment 1
test, all would come to the same result under Walker-Thomas. In
Milford Finance, the food plan/freezer case, the consumers lacked a
meaningful choice at the time of contracting since the price term was
obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Frostifresh Corp., the refrigerator-freezer case, the consumers lacked a meaningful choice at the time
of contracting since they could not understand the contract terms due
to a lack of education. In Melcher, the automobile warranty case, the
consumer lacked a meaningful choice since he did not have the power
to do comparison shopping, due to the fact that all merchants dealing
in the desired item uniformly used the same commercial form. Unlike
the other two cases, the advantage gained by the merchant in Melcher
was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The certification, which
was the condition precedent to the validity of the warranty, could not
be denied arbitrarily.
The consumer would be well advised to plead and prove both
absence of meaningful choice and unreasonable terms~5 This will avoid
the consumer's predicament in Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
42. New York Supreme Court, Nassau County: compare Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.
2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Comment 1 formulation) with Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,
59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Walker-Thomas formulation).
43. Comment 1 formu lation: Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App.
Div. 1970); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1%6). Waf·
ker-Thomas formulation : Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1%9); Toker
v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1%8).
44. Comment 1 formulation: Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522 (1972) (condition precedent to the validity of a warranty). Walker-Thomas formu lation : Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (waiver of implied warranty); Urdang v.
Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971) (acceleration clause).
45. Unconscionability, when used as an affirmative defense, must be pleaded by the defendent.
Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 293, 296 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Butler
County 1965). A sufficient factual predicate for the defense must be alleged before wholesale discovery will be allowed. An unsupported conclusory allegation in the answer that a contract is un·
enforceable as unconscionable is not enough. Sufficient facts which surround the commercial set·
ting of the contract at the time it was made should be alleged so that the court may form a judg·
ment as to the existence of a valid claim of unconscionability and the extent to which discovery of
evidence to support that claim should be allowed . Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277
A.2d 111, 114 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (the answer asserted the affirmative defense of unconscionability only on the basis of a stated conclusion that the price was excessive--held insufficient).
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Co.46 There the consumer alleged only the unreasonable term. The court
held that without alleging absence of meaningful choice, the allegations
were insufficient to state a claim of unconscionability.

II.

THE CONSUMER'S POSITION IN CALIFORNIA: CAN
THERE BE PROTECTION FROM UNCONSCIONABILITY
WITHOUT LEGISLATION?

Section 2-302 of the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code was omitted from the California version~ 7 A California State Bar
Committee explained that the decision to delete was based on the belief
that giving courts unqualified power to strike down terms they might
consider unconscionable could result in the renegotiation of contracts
in every case of disagreement with the fairness of the provisions the
parties had accepted.48
Are the California consumers severely hampered by the legislature's
rejection of 2-302 -- action which prevents the California courts from
ruling openly on unconscionability? Naturally, the deletion of 2-302
may dictate that the courts will proceed with caution when faced with a
situation which requires an expansion of their power. On the other
?and, the courts need not refrain from doing what they have been doIng, or from taking advantage of the provisions in the Code which have
not been deleted. Case law exists in California that indicates unconscionability, as a public policy doctrine, was a part of California's com mon law prior to the legislature's adoption of the Code~9

--

2846. 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); accord, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co.,
0 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), affd. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 321 (D.C. Gen Sess. 1970). It should
~noted that these cases are from the District· of Columbia, the same jurisdiction as Williams v.
alker-Thomas Furniture Co. This may explain the court's precision concerning the allegation
and proof of an absence of meaningful choice.
47 .. CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2302 (West 1964). North Carolina originally deleted§ 2-302
~NIts version of the UCC. N. CAR. GEN. STAT.§ 25-2-302 (1%5); Clifford, Article Two: Sales,
S ·CAR. L. REV. 539, 562-64 (1%6). In 1971, North Carolina added it back. N. CAR. GEN.
t '!AT.§ 25-2-302 (Supt. 1971). Louisiana has not enacted the Code. All other states and the Disnet of Columbia have 2-302.
C 48. California State ar Committee on the Commercial Code, A Special Report, The Uniform
t ornrnercial Code, 37 CAL. B. J. 117, 135-36 (1 %2). § 2-302 was defended on the ground that
torm contracts were not negotiated in any real sense and therefore the courts must have the power
ko prevent the merchant from overreaching when dealing with a consumer who has neither the
t nowledge nor the bargaining position to influence the contract terms. /d. at 135. A compromise
bo place s<;>me limitations on the court's power by requiring the contract to be a form contract and
/· e~cludtng the "between merchants" situations (since they presumably are of more equal bar(Wnmg power) f~iled. See CAL COMME_RCI~L CODE§ 2302, c.al. Code Commen~ .at 197-98
rn es~ 1964); ProJect, A Compar1son of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Come.[9lal Code, 10 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1087, 1130-32 (1%3).
no : S~anson v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407-08 (1964) (the evidence did
JUshfy a finding that the attorney's contingent fee contract was unconscionable); accord,
zer v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 2d 213, 368 P.2d 124, 18 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527 (1%2); Youngblood v.

se:
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While the legislature has expressly excluded 2-302, the fears that
premised its exclusion have not proven correct. The courts in other
states have not run roughshod over negotiated contract rights. This,
then, would give the courts some leeway to continue to follow their
common law unconscionability doctrine. In addition, there seems to be
no reason why the courts could not pattern their common law unconscionability doctrine after that emanating from 2-302. Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the leading case in the area, was itself a
pre-Code common law unconscionability case:x> The impact of the existence of the doctrine, while not dramatic under the restrictive WalkerThomas formulation, would be something that could be useful to the
consumer, at least in limited cases.
Besides this frontal attempt to incorporate 2-302. into California
law, there are more subtle approaches. For example, California courts
have, by construction and interpretation of contract terms, avoided .enforcement of harsh bargains~ 1 They also have manipulated the rules of
offer, acceptance and consideration to reach pro-consumer results:2 Another approach is the recognition of unconscionability as an aspect of
good faith -- a concept that has not been deleted in California and

Higgins, 146 Cal. App. 2d 3SO, 303 P.2d 637, 639 (1956). The Swanson case defined an "uncon_scionable contract" as one "such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Swanson v. Hempstead,
64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407 (1964). Authority exists for the premise that§ 2-302 codi·fies the common law doctrine of unconscionability. In re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC
REP. SERV. (W.O. Mo. 1971); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964) (construction contract); Unico v. Owen, SO N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967).

SO. Althou~h the Code (including§ 2-302) had been adopted in the District of Columbia at the
time of litigatiOn, it was not enacted until after Williams had contracted. This, the time of contracting, was the critical time for determining whether the Code applied. Therefore the Code did
not control the decision . The Walker-Thomas court looked to legislative history (i.e., Congress'
enactment of the Code and § 2-302) and held that this was the way it ought, at common law, to be.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3SO F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
51. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1954) (strict construe·
tion of a disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantable quality).
·
52. E.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (19SO) (estoppel); State Fin. Co. v.
Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941) (gross inequality of consideration was evidence of
fraud). Corbin stated:
There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress , misrepresentation, and
undue influence, not to mention differences in economic bargaining power, to enable
the courts to avoid enforcement of a barl;lain that is shown to be unconscion able by
reason of gross inadequacy of consideration accompanied by other relevant factors.
I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 128 (1963). (footnote omitted)
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which underpins the entire Code; 3 While achieving results by direction
rather than by indirection is desirable, . the legislature's rejection of
2-302 has left the consumer and the courts with little alternative.54

CONCLUSION
The consumer-merchant relationship in the sale of goods area has
not been greatly affected by 2-302. Only a few reported cases illustrate
that the consumer has been benefited by 2-302. Unconscionability,
under the Walker-Thomas formulation , works little magic for the
consumer. The Comment 1 formulation, while appearing to be more
readily available to the consumer, may in fact contain (although not
verbalized) the same considerations as those found in Walker-Thomas.
On the other hand, unconscionability does play an important role in
those cases which do not fit the established doctrine -- such as fraud,
duress and usury -- but which are still so oppressive as to shock the
conscience of the court.
One final point needs some reflection. For a consumer who can
establish that the contract or clause was unconscionable at the time of
contracting, some care must be taken in selecting his remedy. For example, where the price term is unconscionable, does the consumer want

--

te;/ .For a discussion of good faith , see note 35 su~ra. An unconscionable contract is inconsis M With good faith . ln re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152, 1158 (W.O.
gr~· !971). "While the uncon~cionabil_ity referred to in § 2-30_2 may be conduct w~rse i~ SOJ?e defa i e tha~ the lack of good fatth prohtbited by § 1-203, both tmpose the same baste obltgattons of
o 9r7 f~ahng in commercial transactions." Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J . Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397, 401

coo

California has not deleted all reference to unconscionability. S ee CAL. COMM ERCIAL
E § 2719(3) (West 1964).

de~· See CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2302, Cal. Code Comment 197 (West 1964). For furth er

u

atls concerning California see Comment A R eevaluation of the Decision Not To Adopt th e
? SAN. DI~GO L.
a d. · 289 0970). It should be noted that Califorma does have consumer protectton legtslatton. For
R.Ezycussion see Project, L egislative Regulation of R etail Installm ent Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L.
. 618 0960).

~EVnscionability Provision ~f the Uniform' Co1n;m ercial Code in California,
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to return the goods and get his money back, keep the goods and pay
what they are worth, or keep the goods and not pay any more (which ·
already may be more than the goods are worth)? Failure to position
himself properly before litigation may mean that a finding of unconscionability may not have the potency for the consumer that it could
have had. He will not get his full measure of relief. 55

55. In the price cases, if the consumer return s the goods, he may be able to get his money back.
On the other hand, if he keeps the goods, he may find himself paying what it was worth or possibly
more. This may depend on the amount already paid. For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,
54 Misc. 2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967), reversing on the damage issue, 52 Misc. 2d 26,
274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), the consumer had paid only the down payment of $32. He did
not attempt to return the refrigerator-freezer. The cost to the merchant was $348 and the cash
sales price was $900 plus charges bringing the total to $1145.88. The trial court held the price
term unconscionable and gave the merchant judgment for $348 (his cost) with interest, less the $32
(paid by consumer). The appeals court reversed the damage issue (still held unconscionable) but
permitted the merchant to recover more (merchant should recover his net cost for the appliance
plus a reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and service charges necessarily incurred and reasonable finance charges).
In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County
1969), the consumer did not ask for a set-off and thus paid more for his freezer than did the con·sumer in Frostifresh. The maximum retail value (including a reasonable profit margin) was $300.
The consumer had paid $619.88 on a contract which called for a cash sales price of $900 and a
total price of $1234.80. The court said that the merchant had already been amply compensated
and reformed the price term to coincide with the amount paid. Should the consumer have been
entitled to a refund of $319.88 (the difference between what he paid and the maximum retail value
including a reasonable profit margin) less a reasonable finance charge? The additional amount the
consumer paid ($319) was still more than the entire difference between total price and the cash
sales price. Accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); cf Urdang v. Muse,
114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971).
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THE PONTIAC PROSPECTUS

Arthur Allen Left*
I have just, for the first time in eight years, bought a car. It wasn't
a particularly ugly experience. I used Consumer Reports, word-ofmouth, pre-bargaining pep talks from my wife, and a great deal of
anxiety and time. Maybe I got the right brand and model for my
present needs, for about as good a price as I could expect. But I really
can't tell; despite my compulsive care I simply could not get enough information to make a fully-educated choice. What I do now know is that
the whole process of retail distribution of automobiles in America,
upon which a large chunk of this country's retail sales directly or
indirectly depend, could be easily, vastly, and inexpensively improved.
Carrying out the idea, however, would demand some governmental
coercion, and I've spent enough time looking at, say, welfare and public
housing, to think that by now such governmental intervention always
demands some justification, which I will presently try to supply. But let
me say first what I think ought to be done, before explaining why.
What I propose is this: Let the government require that there be
available each year, no later than the time when the new year's automobiles may be bought by the public, a "Prospectus" setting forth a
huge amount of data about every vehicle sold by a particular manufacturer. Whatever this data is (and I'm coming to that), it should be in
such form as to make it easily comparable with data about other
vehicles, both of the same manufacture and others. The Prospectus
should be available free in showrooms, and by mail for at most the cost
of postage from the manufacturers and an agency of government. They
should be so designed that a car shopper can gather a Prospectus from
each manufacturer, put them tog~ther on the same table, and find data
about the same thing on the same page of each.
I.

WHAT THE PROSPECTUS SHOULD CONTAIN
A. Mechanical Specifications and Performance Data

.

What should this Prospectus contain? Some things are easy. First,
contain the measurable physical and mechanical specifications of the car. That is so easy to do that it's already done by each

! should

1

-*

b

Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1956, Amherst College; LL.B. 1959, Harvard University.

I. An alternative scheme would have all the information gathered in one prospectus. But the
ulk of information involved, often about alternatives of no real interest to the particular buyer,
lllakes that move ostentatiously unattractive, at least on first shuddering contemplation.
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manufacturer, though generally model by model and at levels of completeness varying from the usual back-page box on the "ear-in-themeadow" brochure to Ford's send-for-it-specially big fat book. Consumer Reports does it pretty nicely for some proportion of all cars. All
that would be necessary to effect this proposed extension would be to
pick and standardize the categories and vocabulary of comparison. If
the Securities and Exchange Commission can try that for financial
statements (a harder job, by the way),2 our own little "Automotive Marketing Board" (God protect us, I'm pushing another agency) can do it
for the physical specs. The information is essentially free; it's a "byproduct" of the manufacturing process which is presently thrown away,
at least so far as consumers are concerned.3 But to what may be a large
number of consumers more engine-smart than me and my friends, such
information could be of critical interest.
Then, of course, there should be performance characteristics.
That's harder. A car is what it is. But it is also what it does, and it does
so many different things that you can't specify its dynamic reality over
the whole spectrum of potential possibility. It stops (or doesn't) on dry
pavement and wet, from 60 mph and from 10, with twenty miles on the
brakes and with twenty thousand. It corners at various speeds, tucks in
at some speeds and out at others, and at still others goes straight
through the guard rails. With you in the car it zaps; with you, your
kids, and your fat inlaws along, it may yaw and wiggle. All you can do
is choose some probabilities out of the welter of infinite possibility and
put tested numbers on those. "Fully loaded", "pulling a trailer", and
"just the driver" hardly describe all the states of being and becoming,
even of a car; and while extrapolating and interpolating may be hazardous, it can't be better to know nothing.4 If getting this information and
standardizing its presentation were difficult and expensive, one might
justly howl. But it isn't, so one can't.5

2. Observe the bulk and complexity of Regulation S-X, governing financial accounting under
the various securities acts, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 68,501 et. seq.
3. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCfiON--THEORY IN USE
308-10 (1969) on joint products with common costs.
4. That is not quite true. There is always the "Theory of the Second Best" which in broadest
form " ... takes the position that if some of the conditions needed for optimal resource allocation
are not being met, one cannot show that meeting the other conditions will be a good thing in terms
of resource allocation." G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 86 (1970).
That means that an action taken in the right direction is not necessarily the right action to
take. For instance, one does not improve his wealth position in swimming from a barren riverbank
toward a lush one unless one makes it all the way across. Thus, strictly speaking, it could be better
to know nothing; it just doesn't seem very likely in this instance.
5. The manufacturers not only do a great deal of product-testing already, they are set up to do
a great deal more. Competitors can therefore easily test each other's cars, as well as their own, just
to keep each other honest. And if Consumer Reports can afford to spot-check cars, the United
States government can manage it too. See text at note 15, infra.
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B. The "Contract" as a Purchased "Product"

f

l

I
I

(

I

i

So now we've got some cheap and useful information on the car as
a mechanical thing. But it isn't just a car you buy when you trade
money and promises to a smiling dealer; it's (not surprisingly) a deal
that you buy. That little old piece of paper that goes along with the
chunk of steel and technology, the "contract" (as it's laughingly labelled), is another purchased product. In fact, if one defines a "product" as "an immutable already-made object" and a "contract" as
"something created by both the parties", the piece of paper is more a
"product" than the car itself, for at least the latter has options.6 You
can, within limits, negotiate the presented reality of the car ("ok, roof
frescoes instead of disc brakes"), but if you try to modify any clause in
~he contract, you have your choice in seller response between giggling
lllcredulity and icy hostility. Well, if it's a product you're buying when
you "buy" the contract, why not have those "specifications" disclosed
too -- again in understandable and comparable form.
A typical contract might say:
It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or im-

plied, made by either the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor
vehicle, chassis, or parts furnished hereunder except as follows.
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires),
chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation
under this warranty being limited to making good at its factory any
part or parts thereof which shall, within one (1) year after delivery of
such vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been ·
driven 12,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur, be returned to
it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this
warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or
implied, including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose and all other obligations or liabilities
.
7
on tts part.

--

tne 6 : S.ee Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970) for a more extended developnt of these ideas.
N 1 \ The quoted disclaimer is based on the famous one in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32
rn~ · 58,367, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960). It would, by the way, satisfy, at least in form, the requirents of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-316 on disclaimers of warranty.
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Would it be so awful if the booklet said:
If you get problems with the car, for 12,000 miles or one year we'II
supply new parts and corkscrew some grudging labor out of your
dealer. But we'll decide if it's necessary. And if the car cracks up
and you get maimed or killed, we're still only responsible for the
parts and the labor; don't expect to recover from us for property
damage or personal injuries. We suggest you insure yourself, because
we sure aren't going to insure you.
Of course, put that way it does look a little nasty. But if that is the
way it is, 8 and if actually writing down the actual nastiness is too horrifying for the vice-president in charge of sales, he can get the actuality
changed rather than the language. He might, for instance, suggest as a
competitive device changing things so that his company does insure
you, if only for a year and for a special extra premium. And it would
not hurt if the Prospectus demystified a few other "mechanical" aspects
of this contract-product. For instance:
You know that bit about "repossession" in the contract? Well, that
means that if you miss a payment we can take back the car and reseii it, and if we do the chances are that you'II end up without the
car, without the money you already paid us, and maybe you'Il actually still owe us some.
C. Pedigree and Track Record
Thus far, our proposed Prospectus has carried current information
about the actual car-and -deal being bought. A trickier question involves
the relevance of the past. To pick a problem hardly at random, what of
defects in, and callbacks of, previous years' models? After all, you're
buying the current Tyrannosaurus, not last year's. What if all of the
earlier model had to be recalled to put the brake pedal into communication with the fluid and shoes? Does that have any bearing on this
year's model, in the making of which that particular jolly oversight was
not indulged?
The question is not, despite my tone, a simple one. It would seem
that you could learn what kind of outfit a company is by seeing a
longer-term pattern; if Company A for the past five years had had callbacks of many more cars with much more serious faults than Company
B, it is a natural inference that Company A is a "sloppier company"
than B. Certainly the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) seems to

8. With respect to personal injuries, any such language would by now most likely be insuffi ·
cient to preclude liability in the majority of jurisdictons. See W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF
TORTS 656-658 (4th ed . 1971). When that is the case, of course, it too ought accurately to be des·
cribed.
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think that a company's last five years' earnings are of justified interest
to a securities buyer.9
The trouble is, the idea that you can tell about this year by studying the past, no matter how logical it seems, may be twaddle. I have
very intelligent colleagues who tell me that reading five-year financials
to descry a "trend" is really concealed "chartism", the astrology of
financial analysis.10 Admittedly, a ballplayer who has hit .220 for five
seasons is less likely in the sixth suddenly to learn about curve balls;
and whatever that tells me about baseball and learning processess
carries over, some, into business.
But there may even be an inverse relationship between a naughty
past and a problematic present. The accumulation of prior failures may
eventually stimulate remedial action. 220 hitters eventually get fired.
The question is, even assuming that a company with a higher call-back
t?tal was less reliable during th at period, is it still so tod ay? My inclination would be to include prior call -back information insofar as that
data would act as a sanction against loose quality control, but such a
sanction may work by fostering irrational factual conclusions, and that
makes me exceedingly nervous.
D. Sticker Price and Terms
What else should go into the Prospectus? Certainly the sticker
price of every car and every option. That would help a lot to cope when
faced with the common salesman pitch : "You think that's too high?
You think you can't afford $4600? Tell you what I'm gonna do. I'm
going to throw in laser-beam headlights and a spring-gun for your glove
compartment (our 'aggression -- defense package') and take out the
~lectrical ego booster, and all for the same price." With the sticker
Information one would at least have a prayer of figuring out if you were
gaining or losing ground. (Of course, you'd know a lot more if you also
got the dealer's cost for each item, but I see no present reason to give
the sellers a corporate coronary by suggesting that.)

--

p 9. See Item 6 (Summary of Earnings) of Form S-1, the usual form governing the content of
rospectuses distributed pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.
(S 10. q: Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21(5) FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 55
lielpt.-Oct. 1965), reprinted in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE

2 0972).
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E. Other Things
I suppose I could imagine other cheap and relevant information
for this kind of Prospectus: 1 but it seems to me unnecessary to work out
further details now. What does seem to me to be critically important to
recognize from the beginning is that more information does not necessarily mean a better aggregate message. The danger in mandating a
new communications medium is that at any given moment it looks as if
every information addition to be carried on that channel has a nearly2
nil marginal cose But, in fact, too much information on a wavelength
causes static. The new messages not only fail to get through, but they
garble the intelligible and relevant messages already there; and one of
the normal results of sensory overload in a commercial context is im . 13
pu 1se b uymg.
Thus it would seem wise to be chary of too much. Specifically, one
should stick to the car as a car and play down (by exclusion) things like
emotional puffery (which by its nature is not set up for comparability
anyway) and data about matters like the social, moral and political
views of the manufacturers. Arguments in the form of."Don't buy those
14
commie carrots" aren't particularly attractive anyway.
II.

THE PROSPECTUS PRICE TAG; OR, WHAT PRICE KNOWLEDGE?

Much of the beauty of this proposed auto Prospectus requirement
lies in its cheapness and cost-effectiveness. The expense of information
is a function of the cost of getting it, the cost of rendering it communicable, the cost of disseminating it, and the cost of metering its accuracy.
In this case, most of the information will already exist, and will usually
already be in communicable and easily comparable form . As I said
earlier, the "messages" are cheap because they have for the most part
already arisen as "by-products" of the manufacturing and distribution
process.
As for printing cost, given all the informationless color gravure car
buyers already get, it's hard to weep over requiring a cheaper booklet to
sell a large-ticket item like a car. But much more important, the media
11. One of my students has indeed explored the question of includable information in greater
detail. G. Neigher, Automobile Merchandizing: Prospects For a Prospectus (1971). A copy of his
unpublished paper is in my possession.
12. See text at note I 5, infra.
13. See BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (J. Cohen
ed. 1972); and PERSPECTIVES IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (H. Kassarjian & T. Robertson
eds. 1968) for collections of recent essays devoted to the complexity of consumer choice, especially
its tendency not to be improved as a sole function of information bulk. Cf note 4, supra.
14. See. e.g .. Hampden-Turner, A Proposal For Political Marketing , I YALE REV. OF L. &
SOC. ACTION 93 (1970) for a typical suggestion that product-purchase decisions take account of
the morals of the makers.
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channels have already been bought. Having established at great
expense all those selling showrooms and already arranged to fill them
with "literature", the per unit marginal cost of distributing additional
or different information is close to nil. And since, by this distribution
technique, the information goes only to those interested in it, it is even
better as a cost-benefit matter: this is not like an abortion service advertised in The Diocesan Weekly, or even in Reader's Digest; this goes
right into Women's Freedom Now. In brief, it's getting the right channel that costs the most, but once you've bought it, it is very efficient to
fill the pipe.
The administration could also be very, very cheap. Our Automotive Marketing Board could be a little teeny agency, having only to set
standards of comparability of language and breadth of subject inclu siveness. After all, it's not like the SEC prospectus people trying to cope
with every "public" corporation. There are, after all, a maximum of
what-- a score of major auto manufacturers worldwide? And, the accu racy of the data furnished is easy to monitor. The agency might do spot
checks (the information is pretty objective and the tests replicatable)
~nd so could independent consumers and consumer groups. And most
Important, so could and would competitors.
.
For once the selling is done on comparative information, everyone
Is going to try to make sure no one else is fibbing, and in this case
e~eryone has the wherewithal to try. Just make the penalty for falsity
htg and economic --say, $1,000,000 per error and the duty to put a corrective label on the prospectus -- and people will be careful. Wellheeled enemies are watching, and they watch hard .
III. IS THIS TRIP NECESSARY?
Let us then say that this auto prospectus is a feasible proposition,
mechanically easy and relatively cheap. Still, why do it? After all, we do
hav~ a lot of ugly experience on what happens when the government
d~ctdes to coerce people to efficiency and/or virtue. Why should it be
dtfferent in this case? 15

--

15. At this point, it might as well be confessed that something similar to the Prospectus (and
not really ugly at all) already exists for airplanes. By Federal Regulation, every private plane must
cyme equtpped with a little manual filled with details as to both the physical characteristiCs of th e
fane ~~d proper operatingfrocedures. See 14 C.F.R. !\ 23, pts. 18-23 0972). The pilot is expected
famthart ze him or herse l with such information before flying the plane. 14 C.F.R. § 91.S(b)(l)
th9?2l. While the obstensible purpose of requiring these manuals is to insure that airplanes. and
s etr .Passengers, return to earth in substantially the same condition as when they took off, prole~tt.ve purchasers of aircraft are well advised to consult the manuals for various makes before
ti~Ctdtng which one to buy. Not only do the manuals contain information relevant to the buyer,
ey also demonstate the feasibility of their contents being regulated by a governmental agency.

(?
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As Nader knows (presumably God too), one of the critical pressure
points for optimizing the distribution of goods is information. If
information is defective, the "market" will be too, even if people can
and do act freely and rationally in "buying", and this is true whether
the "product" is a washing machine or a president. If the world were
gracious enough to accord with even elegant theories about it, the idea
of having the government coerce better information would be wholly
gratuitous and sublimely insane.
For THE THEORY says that everyone should always be getting
about what he wants (within the constraints of his wherewithal). THE
MARKET (so the argument goes) will handle it, by facilitating not only
the exchange of goods, but the exchange of information too. In this
market, as in the political "market", everyone "votes": but the economic voting is with an almost infinitely divisible medium -- money -- that
facilitates the expression not merely of preferences, but the intensity of
those preferences. If one can make safe goods as cheaply as dangerous
ones, one will capture the market by offering more utility for the same
outlay. If people will pay extra for safety, they will be serviced. The
mechanism is competition: if oaf-like X, a clumsy sort, won't respond
to his potential customers' desires for safety and quality, then clever Y
will make clear that he will, thereby taking X's customers away and
putting X (justly) out of business.
But even if X doesn't go out of business, that's all right too. He
may not, after all, be such a clod. His customers may prefer chrome to
safety, sexual innuendo to durability. That's not just all right, as THE
THEORY has it, that's superkeen. For at the wrist-bone of the whole
invisible-hand conception is the ethical belief that a man is entitled to
get from it whatever it is he wants, be it ("objectively") a pinch or a
tickle. The idea is that if everyone's individual desires are satisfied, the
result will be the highest valued use of all of the assets of the entire
The Federal Aviation Agency requires aircraft manufacturers to include in their "Airplane
Flight Manuals", among other things, the following information; airspeed limitations (i.e., how
fast the plane can be flown before it will part company with its wings), takeoff weight limitati~ns
(including temperature and altitude factors) and the methods used by the manufacturer in obtam·
ing such information , climb and landing configurations and performance figures, proper operating procedures, explanations of "significant or unusual flight or ground handling characteristics"
(one might hesitate to think what that could involve), and the location of the plane's center of g:a·
vity (so that it can be properly balanced when loaded). Certain emergency procedures are also tn·
eluded in the manuals, such as how to restart turbine engines in flight, and, one might suppose,
how to affix a spare propeller at 15,000 feet. Airplanes are even req_~ired to provide a space, acces·
sible to the pilot, in whtch the manual can be stowed. 42 C.F.R. §9 23 (pts. 18-23), 23.1581 · 89
(1972).
All of the required information can be neatly tucked into a surprisingly compact booklet
(available from dealers and also from rental agencies, who prefer that renters bring their planes
back as intact as possible). Aircraft manufacturers like to see people with copies of these booklets
because they make for safer flying, and also because the manufacturers could conceivably be held
civilly liable for failure to warn users of the airplane ade9uately as to its potential hazards. See
L.S. KREINDLER. AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, pt. 1, § 7.01, 7.02(3), and 7.02(4) (1972).
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community. That's known as "Pareto optimality",16 and for many economists that's a situation right up there with God and country, and
·
considerably ahead of Yale.
But information, of course, is not a free good. Nothing is. Someone
will have to pay to produce and distribute it, and no one is crazy
enough to pay for perfection in that or any other product. That still
does not mean the market mechanism could not, in theory, cope with
information production problems. If you make a car that goes from
0-60 in eight seconds and back again in four (in both cases without
killing the driver), lasts seventeen years, produces a pretty fair orgasm
(wh~ther you have a passenger or not), includes in its warranty total
protection against all the small disappointments of life, keeps you safe
In head-ons with cement trucks, and costs about as much as a steam
iron, you are competitively impelled to get the word across. You are
even impelled, if necessary, to bad-mouth your competitor's 8-cylinder
feh.
But the fact that information can be seen as a market commodity
~lso implies that it is subject, like any other, to market failure.17 And
In?eed, there are reasons why the supply of information is not optinuzed, even in a market unconstrained by regulation. First of all, ones
competitive product advantage is rarely as mouth-watering as the one
described above. The discriminations you will have to make and then
convey are likely to be demanding of far subtler selling speech. This is
e~pecially so because the nice things about a product tend to be contradictory: great heavy lunkers of sheet steel off of which large meteorites
bounce do not go so easily from 0 to 60; and if they do, they get about
~o miles per gallon. Thus, to advertise an advantage is frequently to
give screaming currency to a disadvantage.18 And if your actual advantages (and disadvantages) are slight (and that is likely, for there are
good technological reasons why the gap between competitive products
tends to be undramatic), it is hard to get any impact for them. So it's 0
to 60 in 10 seconds rather than 12. So your warranty covers rubber

---

221(~9 See, e.g., Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization , 47 AMER. ECON . REV .
57).

aJkDINGS
See. e.g., Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72
J. ECON. 351 (1958), reprinted in,
IN MICROECONOMICS 457 (W. Breit H. Hochman eds. 1968).
Q.

&

cl 18. This is particularly dramatic when there is one body of information about a good without
tl ose substitutes which is inca ndescently unpleasant to all producers thereof, e.g., the cunning lit·
SD~xtra costs of cigarette smoking. SeeR. WINTER, JR., THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE VERTHE CONSUMER 12-13 (1972).
on
The obverse situation involves information which benefits one's competitors as much as
cr eself. It is hard to get a property interest in information. Thus one is insufficiently motivated to
sea~ "public goods" at one's own expense if everyone gets the whole benefit of it along with you.
st:en · ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, op. ci!. sup!'a. note~· at 164-165 •. 251 -53. It is arguable, .for. i.nin ce, that there would be more safe-dnving mformat10n produced tf there were only one habthty
surer.
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parts as well as power trains. So what? -- especially if the extra goodies
cost extra.
Then there is the cost-of-learning problem.19 If one buys an automobile whose steering wheel is given to casual driver-evisceration, one
will learn . "I'm not going to buy that model again," say you, trying
neatly to refold and repack the last 17 feet of disheveled intestine. "If
those guys at Pterodactyl Motors aren't going to level with me, that's
the last time they see any of my money." Well, I suppose so, but that's
a pretty expensive bit of information to shove into your personal computer for future ref~rence. And though there are mechanisms beside
the market (warranty and tort law, for instance) which theoretically
should change the ultimate nesting place of that little information cost,
they have their own complexities, costs, and risks?0
In addition, there are the time-lag and "research" problems. As a
long-run competitive device, lying is most likely a bad idea. But not all
competition has as its most significant span any particularly long run.
The word that Hymie spits in his pickles might do in Hymie in favor of
Moe, even if Moe is actually the one who does the spitting and the lying. More than that, even if Moe spits but doesn't lie, how is Hymie to
get at Moe's barrel to know? Moe has an interest in keeping Hymie
from knowing that particular bacillus count. Fraud doth often prosper,
and over a long enough time-span to justify the existence of fraud law.
But most important, Moe has a strong interest in preventing
Hymie from coming up with a way to present his information in comparable form. When it comes to commerce, it is mostly the symbols we
manipulate, not the things themselves. The things are eventually
shipped out and variously transferred, but the deals are mostly over the
labels. Those labels, however, aren't worth a damn unless one can compare their messages. A badly situated seller has no interest in making
telling comparisons easy for his competitors; and it's not easy for his
competitors (who are, after all, each other's competitors too, and who
in addition have anti-trust laws to sweat about) to agree and combine
on an informational matrix that they can impose on him. That is, what ,
one needs is a stabilized comparable vocabulary, and even a reasonably
competitive market may not be able to supply it. Even in the absence of
"monopoly" it may be. more efficient to allow the government, as grand
lexiocographer, to supply the vocabulary of comparison and impose is
on the market.21 Indeed, the most unambiguously successful "consumer
19. Cf R. WINTER, JR., op cit. supra. note 18, at 12.
20. See G. CALABRESI, op. cit. supra. note 4, passim.
21. Let m
. e emphasize here that I am not justifying this proposed governmental incursion int_o
information marketing on the ground that the auto companies form a "shared monopoly" or "ohgopoly." It can be argued that since monopolists tend to res!rict production of goods, and
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protection" job ever done by government was its mandatory standardization, from a very early period, of. labels for weights, measures and
quantities; it is, after all, very tempting as a short-run competitive
device to sell eleven -ounce "pounds".

IV. PROSPECTUS PERSPECTIVE
Now, there are at least two things that should not be adduced from
the above. The first is the fantasy (as bizarre as the perfect-market one)
that the market doesn't work at all; either in general, or specifically
with respect to information. Without my wanting to get into a scream ing match with anyone, I suggest that it works pretty well, especially
considering the alternatives. The second unwarranted belief is that
since it works pretty well, it has to work worse if the government meddles with it. It frequently turns out this way, but sometimes it doesn't.
After all, the market imperfecting mechanisms described above are so
common in practical economic thought that they all even have pet
names, like "externality", "free-rider", "public goods under-investment", and "hold-out" Y What I'm asking is this: If, as I suspect the
case is here, the costs of all shapes of government intervention -- direct,
?ureaucratic, political, and spiritual -- are less than the value of repairtng the market mechanism, then why not make the necessary repairs?
For it might even work. -- Not to make cars, or the process of
shopping for them, "perfect" (whatever that might mean), but at a very
low cost (economic, psychic, and political) to make it very much more
nearly perfect in getting people what they want. This will not stop them
from wanting what you or I or Ralph Nader think they ought not to
want, but that really isn't so terrible. For a government to try to design
high -quality information is much cheaper than its trying to design highquality goods,and much better than its trying to design high-quality
people.
int:ormation is a good, oligopolists wil l also tend to restrict producti on of goods. including
Information, and that this suboptimal production req uires governmental repair. The trouble with
the argument is (a) monopoli sts don't always restrict production in order to maximize; (b)
ohgopol ists are not monopolists. Thus we have really no id ea what their inform ation-produc tion
Iu net ion is.
More important, however, I do not rely on any oligopoly theory to justify this lexicographic
governmental role because I think it is as much needed in competitive industries as in concentrated ones. Indeed it can be argued that it is more needed the less concentrated the industry. A few
firm s would seem to have less trouble, i.e., lower transaction costs, than many firms in reaching a
standardized linguistic product. because of their greater ease of collusion, and of their greater
probability of each guessing what each of the others would guess. See A. RAPOPORT, FIGHTS,
GAMES, AND DEBATES 213-25 (1960). One might, in fact, fairly describe my proposal as a suggestion that the government create and coordinate a limited cartel in the production of certain
standardized commercial language. But then again, isn't the creation and coordination of cartels
~hat regulatory agencies are all and always about? See, e.g.. Coase, The Federal Communications
~on, 21. LAW & ECON. I (1959).
22. See Bator, op. cit. supra . note 14.
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THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET:

An Examination of the Scope and lmpael
of the Fair Credit Reportin{{ Act
Albert A . Foer*
PREFACE
The literature of privacy was born in an 1890 Harvard Law
Review article by Warren and Brandeis. 1 For three-quarters of a
century it led a modest existence, characterized by a focus on the legal
status of the evolving tort of invasion of privacy.2 In the middle 1960's,
however, the production of privacy literature entered a take-off stage.
Fuelled by concern for the potential uses of computer telhnology and a
dramatic, if not apocalyptic, awareness of the approaching Orwellian
deadline, the new generation of privacy writers took aim on all manner
of privacy intrusions, from wiretaps to census forms, lie detectors to
computer data banks, junk mail to credit investigations. Much of the
writing was marked more by an unsystematic and heated concern with
the various manifestations of the "assault on privacy" than by dispassionate analysis of the complex public policy problems involved in
shaping institutions to protect privacy.4 Despite the literary clanging of
alarms, the only federal legislation to emerge with the specific purpose
of protecting privacy has been the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).5
Dissatisfied with the rather cosmic style of the new privacy literature
and hoping that a systematic empirical analysis of one area of the
assault on privacy would yield workable leads for privacy protection
legislation, the author approached the American Bar Foundation ·with
a proposal to study the personal information market in Chicago, in
order to evaluate the impact of the FCRA. A small grant was arranged
to cover the costs of information gathering.6

--

* A.B .. Brandeis University, 1966;

M.A., Washington University, 1967;
J.D., Ul!lverilly Qf Chicago, 1973.
I. Th e Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. See, e.g .. Prosser, Privacy. 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
Fn 3. See, e.g., V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
"EEDOM (1967); and A. MILLER. THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971).
AN 4. But sec the highly specific essays collected by Stanton Wheeler in ON RECORD: FILES
I D DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE (1969). Professor Westin's forthcoming DATA BANKS
N A FREE SOCIETY promises to add a new scientific dimension to privacy literature.
~ S. Title VI of Pub. L. 91 -508; 84 Stat. 1127; Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); [Hereinafter
re erred to as the FCRA].
th 6. The analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of
the ~oundation, its officers, directors or others associated with its work. A description of the Auor s methodology and approach in researching this project may be found in Appendix Ten.

38

Consumer Journal

[Vol. 11:37

The personal information market may be defined as an area of the
private sector of the economy within which financial, public record, and
reputational information about identifiable individuals is gathered and
disseminated on a regular basis for purposes of commercially-related
decision-making. The market includes credit bureaus, insurance inspection bureaus, insurance claims investigators, detective agencies, executive search organizations,7 mail list brokers,8 income tax preparation
firms,9 intercompany data banks used by insurance companies,10 and
perhaps others.11 The primary users of the personal information provided
by these agencies are insurance companies, retailers, financial institutions (including finance companies and small loan companies),
employers, landlords, and government agencies. Many of these entities
were consulted during the course of the study, but because the FCRA
was directed primarily at credit bureaus and inspection bureaus, these
were the primary subjects of study in this article.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act went into effect in April, 1971. In
essence, it provides that when a consumer is denied credit, insurance,
or employment in whole or in part because of information in a consumer report, the user of the consumer report must inform the consumer
of this fact, and must provide the consumer with the name and address
of the consumer reporting agency which furnished the report. The consumer (whether or not adverse action was taken against him) has the
right to obtain disclosure of the substance of the information in the
reporting agency's file. If he takes issue with the information, the
agency must reinvestigate and make any indicated changes. There are
other aspects to the FCRA dealing with permissible purposes ofreports,
investigative consumer reports, obsolete information, and confidentiality. These will be introduced at a later point. Two definitions are of
particular importance:
The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which,
for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
7. E.g. , Heidrick & Struggles, profiled in Appendix One.
B. Direct mail list brokers have lists which may include information on the publications a.n
individual reads, the charities to which he contributes, candidates he supports financially , and h1s
stand on political issues. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, DOLLAR POLITICS 5 (1971). See
Comment, Commercial Information Brokers, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 203,212
(1972).
9. The FTC alleged in 1971 that data obtained for tax returns was given by H & R Block to a
wholly-owned subsidiary which compiled mailing lists. Comment, Commercial Information Bro·
kers, 4 COLUM . HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 203,216 (1972).
10. E .g., the Medical Information Bureau, described below in text at note 138.
.
II. E.g., two organizations headquartered in the Chicago area, The American Security Counctl
and the Church League of America, are reported to maintain files on "peaceniks, draft-card burn·
ers, pseudo-intellectuals," and other troublesome individuals, which are allegedly at the service of
corporate hiring executives. AFL-CIO MARITIME TRADES DEPT., CREDIT BUREAUS: A
PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 33-34 (1971). Both organizations deny that they are
presently engaged in the alleged activities.
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engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers
for the purpose of furnishing consume'r reports to third parties, and
which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reportsP
This leads, in what will be seen to be circular fashion, to the statutory definition of ~·consumer report," which means,
.. . any written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general repu tation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose
of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1)
credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other purposes authorized under section 604. 13
In context, section 604 can be read to include the purpose of the government in determining the consumer's eligibility for a license or other
?enefit where the law requires that an applicant's financial responsibilIty or status be considered, and the purpose of anyone with a "legitimate business need" for the information in connection with a business
transaction involving the consumer.
A thorough study of the flow of personal information within a single
community or the nation at large has yet to be made. Even with the
results of the project here reported, only an educated guess can be
made as to the amount of consumer reporting taking place in Chicago
(where most of the research for this project was conducted). The· author's best estimate of the number of files kept by the approximately 20
cr~dit bureaus serving the 6. 7 million population of the Chicago, Illi~Ois /Northweste rn Indiana Urbanized Area is 20 million. This does not
Imply that 20 million individuals are on file in credit bureaus; there is
obviously much overlap, and the same individual may be covered by 5
or more credit bureaus.14 Moreover, some of these files go back many

--

: 2· FCRA, supra note 5, § 603(0.
irn 3· FCRA, supra note 5, § 603(d). The statutory definition also includes three exceptions, not
POrtant at this point.
a~ 4j qbviously some people are more likely to have files in credit bureau~ than others. For exMlNe, In 1970, 49o/o of American families had installment debts outstandmg. G. LATONA , L.
ca DELL, & J. SCHMIEDESKAMP, 1970 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 21. Credit
fa rds are used by SO% of American families. /d. at 32. Mortgages were held by 58% of all non nerrn hom eowning families, /d. at 44, and in 1969 approximately So/o of non-farm families bought
fa;· or used houses for their occupancy, 87% of which incurred mortgages. /d. at 35. All of these
lap?tlTtes wou ld be represented in the credit bureaus; but to what extent to the various groups over. he 6. 7 million population figure is taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 CENSUS
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years, and relate to individuals who no longer live in the area. The
author estimates the number of credit reports covered by the FCRA,
sold in 1972 in the same area, to be 7 million.
As for insurance inspections and employment investigations undertaken by the inspection bureaus, approximately 700,000 were made in
1972 in the Chicago, Illinois/Northwestern Indiana Urbanized Area.l 5 It
must be noted that some of these inspections are relatively abbreviated
and do not involve street investigations, some are made on commercial
enterprises rather than individuals, and some individuals are inspected
more than once during a year because they apply for more than one
type of insurance. Taking these factors into account, a rough estimate
of the number of individuals actually investigated in 1972 by insurance
inspectors in the Chicago area is about 400,000. 16
These figures-- 400,000 individuals investigated and 7 million credit
bureau reports prepared in a single metropolitan area in a single year -do not imply very much in themselves about the threat to privacy.
Because nearly all consumer reports (with some exceptions in the
personnel reporting area) are initiated by an individual 's application for
some benefit, it can be assumed that most individuals are at least
vaguely aware that they are reported on. Whether they are sensitive to
the nature and quantity of reporting affecting their lives, however,
remains an open question . Despite the fact that so many Americans are
profiled, and their records bought and sold, the personal information
market has barely been touched by researchers.
This article begins with a description of the market, giving both a
national overview and a more specific view of the market in the single
metropolis of Chicago. In a second section, the effectiveness of the
FCRA is evaluated in terms of the law's ability to cope with seven
particular abuses which Congress found to be present in the personal
information market prior to passage of the FCRA. A final section sets
out and weighs various suggested strategies for reform.

OF THE POPULATION, (Illinois) 15-33. Area includes parts of Cook, Du Page, Lake and Will
Counties in Illinois and parts of Lake and Porter Counties in Indi ana.
I 5. This figure is obtained by approximating the number of full-time inspectors working in the
area (including 20"7o of part-time inspectors), 215. and multiplying by an average of 15 reports a
day (a conservative figure), 5 days a week, SO weeks a year.
16. Retail Credit Co., the largest inspection bureau in Chicago and the nation, retains 400,000
files in Chicago, even though the majority of files are destroyed 13 months after an invest igatiOf!·
Interview with T . Linnen, Manager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan. 20, 1972. Retatl
Credit Co. a ll eged ly reported on 750,000 people in Los Angeles in 1971. Auerbach, Credit Probers,
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1972 at I, col. I. Nationally, Retail Credit produced approximately
40 million reports in 1970. Listing Application A-30695 to New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Mar.
1, 1971.
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I.

A PROFILE OF THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET
A. DIRECT REPORTING
The most frequent type of communication to be found in the personal information market is the so-called direct report, 17 which is also
referred to as a report of ledger experience. The direct report is exemplified by the response of a retailer when a local banker telephones him
for information about one of his customers, or when a potential employer asks a former employer about his experience with a present job
applicant. The essential element of the direct report is that the person
giving information has had dealings with the person reported on; there
is no intermediary. A direct report will rarely be made unless the subject of the report has initiated matters by seeking a benefit from a
decision-maker. Indeed, the direct reporter is usually identified for the
decision-maker by the subject himself.
.
For the most part, direct reporting is handled in an informal man~er, although where large numbers of reports are involved, special
Internal systems may be established.18 Most direct inquiries are made by
telephone. Identification procedures are uneven, with the majority of
direct reporters apparently willing to respond to any telephone inquiry
~hich appears on the surface to be legitimate. Records of direct inquirIes and responses are rarely maintained~
The most frequent use of direct reports appears to be for the purpose of learning whether a customer has an account with a particular
creditor and if that customer pays his bills on time. A second important
use is for verification of employmene0 or to obtain a former employer's
evaluation of a present employment applicant. Among the major users
of direct reports are credit bureaus (defined and discussed below)/'
9

17. Approximately 75o/o of credit grantors use credit bureaus in order to evalu ate appli~ations.
8 1% make their own direct inquiries . either to supplement the credit bureau report or in place of
such a report. Credit grantors with larger numbers of applications have a greater tendency to rely
on dtrect checking in addition to credit bureau reporting. ASSOCIATED CREDIT BUREAUS,
INC. , ATTITUDES OF LOCAL CREDIT GRANTERS TOWARD ACB MEMBER SERVICES,
1,3( 1971).

18. E.g., a Chicago appliance discount chain with 20 stores has 8 employees whose full-time
occupation is to a nswer the I ,500 to 2,000 direct inquiries received each week.
R 19. Information supplied by consumer report users supports a point made by Michael Baker in
Hecord Privacy as a Marginal Problem: Th e Limits of Consciousness and Concem, 4 COLUM.
U~AN RIGHTS L. REV. 88, 91 (1972): "[R]ecord-keeping is a means for most organizations
~nd tn some respects goes on in the background of the organization 's daily activities." As such ,.
aker says, much of the record-keeping which affects individuals goes on in the background of
soc1al hfe and is of low visibility to the individua ls concerned.
29. To reduce the amount of time consumed in the verification of employment. centra lized rePOSitories somet im es ex ist. See the profile of T he Consolidated Employee Index in Appendix One .
. 21. One respondent, a medium -sized womens wear shop in Chicago which handles about 20
dl~ect in quiries per month, est im ates the sources of inquiry to be: credit burea us, 25%; small re~llers, 25%; fin ance companies, SO%. Other respondents state that they receive many inquiries
· om banks, as well.
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which often need to up-date information for supplementation of what is
already on file. In fact, the primary source of credit bureau information
can be said to be direct reports, since most subscribers to credit bureaus
are contractually bound to transmit their credit accounts periodically to
the bureau.
Until the FCRA, the content of a direct report was limited only by
the sense of propriety of the reporter. The FCRA, however, has had an
indirect impact upon content. The term "consumer report" was defined
in the FCRA to exclude "any report containing information solely as to
transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person
making the report." "This exception," advises the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) staff, "was designed to cover so-called trade experience furnished by a creditor to other creditors of the consumer. It also
covers verification of past and present employers, salary, and other
items included by the consumer on his application for credit." 22
To report hearsay information regularly would bring the direct
reporter under the definition of a consumer reporting agency. This
would be undesirable for one not in the full-time business of consumer
reporting,23 and, consequently, most companies which give direct reports
on request are now taking care to limit the information they furnish.
It is difficult to believe that a direct reporter would be prosecuted
for failing to comply with the FCRA. The informal nature of this kind
of information exchange does not leave enough tracks 24 for the FTC or
an injured consumer to build the evidence necessary to prove that the
direct reporter "regularly engages" in the practice of assembling or
evaluating information on consumers "for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties." 25

22. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDES 11,312 at 59,804. [Hereinafter, CCH CCG.]
23. The consequences of being classified as a consumer reporting agency include: being permitted to provide consumer reports only under specified circumstances; having to disclose reports and
other fil e data to any file subject; having to re-investigate in case of disputed information; civil
liability for willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA; and criminal sanctions for unauth orized disclosures of information.
24. Under FCRA, supra note 5, § 615(b), when consumer credit is denied or the charge is increased because of information about the consumer obtained in a direct report. the user of the
report shall. upon written request by the consumer, disclose the nature of the information to the
consumer. The source of the information need not be disclosed. Note also that this requirement of
disclosure, minimal as it is, does not apply to direct reports made for insurance, rental, or employment purposes.
25. FCRA. supra note 5, § 603(f). The FCRA aside, a consumer who is wrongfully damaged by
a direct report may sue the direct reporter for libel, but because of the conditional privilege which
exists in most jurisdictions, he would have the difficult task of proving malice to recover. See
Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit R eporting Act: The Need f or Further
R eform, 17 V1LL. L. REV . 44 (1971); Comment, The Future of Common-Law Libel Actions Under
th e Fair Credit Reporting Act, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REV . 201 (1971).

1974]

PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET

43

B. FOUR TYPES OF CREDIT BUREAUS
The word " credit bureau" is often used imprecisely. Sometimes it is
confused with "inspection bureau, " 26 possibly because the dominant
inspection bureau bears the name Retail Credit Co., which hints of a
credit bureau? 7 Credit bureaus tend to have clients who are involved in
credit business; inspection bureaus generally work for insurance
companies. The main area of overlap involves employment reporting,
although here the two types of consumer reporting agencies may be
distinguished by their methods of gathering information. Credit bereaus generally rely on their files, supplemented by the telephone and
written correspondence. Inspection bureaus tend to use their files only
for leads, and build most of their information in personal interviews
carried out by investigators. This study will characterize four types of
credit bureaus: those which serve a limited purpose, full-service bureaus, credit agencies, and mercantile agencies. 28
1. Limited-Purpose Credit Bureaus
Many credit bureaus began life with a limited purpose. For instance,
what is now the largest full-service bureau in Chicago began as a
forma lized exchange of account information by the State Street merchants.29 TRW Credit Data, which is still classifiable as a limitedpurpose operation, may soon qualify as a full -service credit bureau.30 At
present, the bulk of the information TRW supplies is objective trade
experience data, turned over to the computer periodically from the
accounts of TRW's subscribers. However, as the relatively young TRW
Credit Data firm grows it will probably assemble more kinds of information, including public record data, and prepare a greater variety of
reports, thereby being able to serve a wider clientele.
A limited-purpose credit bureau is distinguished by the fact that it
serves only a particular seg~ent of the commercial community, or
serves many segments with only a relatively limited variety of information.

If TRW Credit Data appears to be approaching the border-line of
full service, two other credit bureau operations will give a clear idea of
26. See Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit R eporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550 (1972).
27. This is not to suggest that Reta il Credit Co. is hiding behind a fa lse name. The company
began life as a credit bureau in 1899 in Atlanta, Ga. It moved into inspection work for the insurance companies in 1901. Today it is the owner of the largest chain of credit bureaus in the country.
tncluding both full -service burea us an d credit agencies. In the Matter o Retail Credit Co .. FTC
Proposed Comp laint, 3 CCH TRADE REG . REP. , S 20.140 (Nov. 13, 1972). Not e, this complaint
was later issued formall y; 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP., S 20,268 (Mar. 9, 1973).
28. General sources on credit bureaus include : ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN
AMERICAN LIFE. ch . 5 (S. Wheeler, ed ., 1969); M. WARNER & M. STONE. THE DATA
BANK SOCIETY (1970); J. SHARP, CREDIT REPORTING AND PRIVACY (1970).
29. See Appendix One for profile of the Credit Information Corporation of Chicago.
30. For profile of TRW Credit Data see Appendix One.
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what is meant by limited purpose. The Chicago Lenders Exchange
serves only the small loan companies of the Chicago area, providing
them little more than a listing of other small loan companies with loans
outstanding to a particular borrower. The Hooper-Holmes Credit Inde,tl2
serves a broader public, though its subscribers tend to be national firms
such as oil companies with credit card programs. The Hooper-Holmes
computer contains only what is termed "derogatory" information~ 3
mainly records of bad debts, and cannot be used to establish good
credit. Businesses with large numbers of credit applications from all
over the country use the Hooper-Holmes Index to screen out bad credit
risks. Where no information is on file (80 to 85 per cent of the tim~\
the subscriber obtains a standard credit report from a local full-service
credit bureau. Both TRW Credit Data and the Hooper-Holmes Credit
Index are covered by the FCRA.
Controversy exists, however, as to whether a lenders' exchange
should be considered under the statute. Exchanges argue that if an exchange only identifies creditors with whom a consumer has outstanding
accounts and the prospective lender then contacts such creditors directly for more detailed information, the lenders exchange is not a consumer reporting agency. The FTC staff takes the position that when a
loan exchange furnishes the names of a consumer's current creditors
the exchange is making an FCRA consumer report. 35 If the staff interpretation is formally accepted by the Commission, the effect will be to
allow consumers who are denied a loan from a small loan company to
contact the lenders exchange and learn what is in their file. Since the
lenders exchanges commonly have a rule that a member must follow up
on information received from the exchange,36 calling the other loan
companies listed, the impact of applying the FCRA to lenders exchanges can be expected to be minimal. Only in the rare case where a
consumer is mistakenly listed for outstanding loans and the potential
lender is too little interested in placing a loan to attempt to verify the
listing will the FCRA be utilized.
31. For profile of the Chicago Lenders Exchange see Appendix One.
32. For profile of the Hooper-Holmes Credit Index , see Appendix One.
33. "Derogatory" is used to indicate that the data bank carries only negative types of information. The information itself is of an objective nature. Whether information is meaningfully derogatory, of course, depends upon the evaluation of the decision -maker. In some credit situations neutral information, such as length of employment, may be weighed against the applicant. On the
other hand, information that a consumer has recently been through bankruptcy proceedings is
considered positive by some creditors, because of the guarantee against further bankruptcy for six
years.
34. Interview with E. William Carney, Regional Manager, Hooper-Holmes Credit Index, Chicago. Jan . 28, 1972.
35. FTC News Release, June 16, 1972.
36. Interview (telephone) with R.W. Hahne, President, Chicago Lenders Exchange, Chicago,
Jan. 26, 1972.
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2. Full-Service Credit Bureaus
The full-service credit bureau serves the entire consumer credit community and provides a wider range of information than the limited purpose bureaus. In addition to trade experience data, filed information usually includes material culled from public records and newspapers. Reports may include reputational information occasionally, but
this will normally be obtained by use of the telephone or mail and will
not entail street investigations.
Some full-service bureaus have debt collection divisions 37 and "welcome wagon" operations38 ; some publish credit guides and protective
~ulletins.39 While the schedule of reporting services and prices of a particular credit bureau may list as many as 14 distinct services,40 credit
bureau reports generally fall into four fairly well-defined categories:

a. Consumer credit. The simple "credit report," or "infile clearance," contains trade experience information obtained from
the bureau's subscribers, plus public record information. Besides court
records and newspaper clippings, some credit. bureaus (and inspection
?ureaus) include criminal record and arrest record information obtained
Informally from police sources.41 A "developed" report might also in~lude employment verification and a telephone check to assure that all
Inform ation is up-to-date.

--

43~?Only two credit bureaus in Chicago have collection departments, but the national figure is
0
, . • Th e Credit Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopo(y, Com·
ir llt'!e of the Judicia ry. U.S. Senate, 90th Con g., 2d Sess. 45 (1968) [henceforth , H art Hgs.]. For
RCISive testimony concerning abuses in the credit bureau - debt collection tandem , see Fair eredit
C~~ort111g, Hearing Before the Subcommittee ,on Consum er Affairs. Committee on Banking and
rency on H.R. /6340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1970) [henceforth, Sullivan Hgs.] .
lh38: Over :JWoof credit grantors. nationally, utilize newcomer services. -ACB, note 17 supra, at 7.
a e 1 ~ea of a welcome wagon service seems to be twofold. The neighborly employee of the service
i~quaints the newcomer with the local merchants and at the same time makes notes on furnish68gs, mode of living, a nd consumer needs, for use by the merchants. N.Y. Times, May 21 , 1969, at
Cr"bcol, 7. As used herein, the term "welcome wagon" refers generally to the type of service des~ ed and does not refer to the company of the same name.
Cod 9· Th~ credit guide is usually an alphabetical listing of consumers in the community. with
sorned ratin gs. The protective bulletin lists consumers who have issued worthless checks or who for
iar e oth~r reason are not deemed credit worthy, or whose alleged personal characteristics or affilar Ions disqualify them from employment. Only one such publication was found in the Chicago
fo~a, a _credit bulletin of the Credit Bureau of East Chicago, Ind. The FTC is expected to issue a
M rna! Interpretation of the extent of coverage of these publications under the FCRA. FTC News,
:r. 8, 1972 and June 16, 1972.
4 Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. See Appendix One for profile.
qua t Typically, criminal and arrest records were obtained from file girls at Chicago police headare r ers for $2 - $5. This practice stopped in June, 1972, when the files went on computer; there
Wi!~ot enough people wandering around any more with access to the information. Interview with
arre Iarn Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Nov. 14, 1972. On the propriety of circulating
1\rr st records, not followed by conviction, see Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to
8a esr R ecords -- Private Rem edies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110 (1971); Note, Discrimination on the
sts qfArrest R ecords, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 470 (1971).

?·
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b. Mortgage. The "mortgage report", when prepared
for the Veterans Administration or the Federal Housing Authority: 2
generally includes information on the potential mortgagor's age, his
wife and children, residence, employment, assets, references, and litigation record .43 Some conventional mortgage reports may go into more
personal areas, such as reputation for marital stability. Mortgage reports are also prepared by credit agencies, especially where larger loans
are involved.
c. Tenant. "Tenant" (or "rental") reports, like others,
can be more or less probing, depending upon the needs and pocketbook
of the report user. Sometimes a tenant report is nothing more than a
consumer credit report, sold to a landlord. Often, however, it includes
information gained from previous landlords. The rental report sold by
the Credit Information Corporation of Chicago for $6 includes family
status, employment verification, trade clearances, character investigations, previous rental history, and court record review.44
d. Employment. The "employment" (or "personnel")
report also varies according to the practices of the particular bureau
and the desires of the particular employer requesting the report. The
more thorough employment investigations are usually handled by insurance inspection bureaus, personnel reporting bureaus, or detective
agencies. However, for a minimum of $5, the Chicago Credit Bureau
offers a report
designed to furnish information on an individual to determine his
or her desirability as an employee. It contains previous employment
records, personal history, character, integrity, credit record, and
health. 45
Appendix One provides profiles of many of the full-service credit
bureaus operating in metropolitan Chicago. The Chicago area (with two
regional full-service credit bureaus, a competitive limited-purpose
bureau, and a host of limited-area, full-service credit bureaus specializing in particular suburbs or areas of the city) has more competition
than is normal. The national trend of the credit reporting industry is
toward control by regional computer centers. 46 Many small credit
42. Interview with Ruth Studer, FHA attorn ey. Chicago, Feb. 17, 1972.
.
43. Th e Sc hedule of Reportin g Services a nd Prices for the Credit Information Corporation of
Chicago lists a co nventional mortgage report for $8, including family statu s. employment veriftca·
ti on. trade clea ra nces . verifica ti on of resources , and subject in terview. The FHA or VA mortgage
report contains th e sam e items, plus a court record review, and sell s for $10.
44. Schedul e of Reportin g Services and Prices, supplied Nov. 17, 1972.
45. Schedule of Rates and Services, supplied Ja n. I 9, 1972.
.
46. D.E. Ruth erford, th e pres id ent of Retail Credit Co.'s credit bureau affili ates, testified 10
depos ition th at th e automation or computeriza tion of credit fil es has caused an accelerated rate of
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bureaus have been selling out to national corporations which can afford
to computerize, and what was once a ' highly localized industry is beginning to be replaced by a series of national chains owned by large
corporations and conglomerates. The largest chain, the 114 credit bureaus owned by Retail Credit Co., is three times larger than any other,
but its growth appears to be temporarily halted by a couple of antitrust
actions~ 7 The credit bureaus are served by one trade association, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., which has over 2,000 members.48
3. Credit Agencies
The third type of credit bureau, called a credit agency, is distin~uished from the first two types by its emphasis on telephone investigation, rather than reliance on a pre-existing data bank. Several other
factors also serve to differentiate the credit agency. For example, where
the reports of other credit bureaus are often made orally or in a "common language" coded communication, the credit agency's reports tend
to be written out in narrative form. Where the bulk of reports of the
limited-purpose and full-service credit bureaus deal with matters of
consumer credit, many of the reports of credit agencies pertain to busi nesses primarily, and to individuals only incidentally. When the credit
agencies report on individuals, it is usually in relation to transactions
where relatively large amounts of money are involved, such that the
credit grantor would not be satisfied with the relatively shallow report
of a limited-purpose or full-service bureau.
The major credit agencies in Chicago are Hale-Prietsch, an indepe~dent firm which primarily serves banks and savings and loan insti-

tutions; and Retailers Commercial Agency, which has offices in over
100 metropolitan areas in the U.S.49 Retailers Commercial Agency_is a
Wholly-owned subsidiary of Retai~ Credit Co.
The FCRA does cover credit agency reports on consumers.
~rectit bureau acquisitions. A credit reporting firm owning a computerized facility in a large met10)0htan area ca n secure sufficient credit data in a relatively short time on individu als to serve not
~n ~ credit gra ntors doing business within that metropolitan area, but also credit grantors doing
b~slnes~ over a wide geographic region surroundin g the computerized fac ility. Fear of the poss it ll(y of competition with a regional computer center has led owners of some small credit bureaus
8 ~ell o_ut before their investment is actually diminished by such competition . Brief for Plaintiff at
Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., Civ. Act. 70- H-1157 (S.D. Texas, Houston Div ..
1 edred1t
Nov. S. 1971).

°
tii

--

47· See text at note 62, infra.

be~8. It is estimated that only 100-150 credit bureaus, man)' of w_hom are in small towns_. do not
R. ong to the ACB. Testimony of John L. Spafford, Executive V1ce-Pres1dent, ACB, Fatr Credit

a e~ortmg, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial institutions, Committee on Banking
a;' Currency. U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1969) [henceforth, Proxmire Hgs. ]. It should
offlo be_ noted tha t Retailers Commerdal Agency, a subsidiary of Retail Credit Co. with over 100
ces 111 the U.S., is not a member of the ACB.
49· For profiles of Hale-Prietsch and Retailers Commercial Agency, see Appendix One.
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4. M ercantile Agencies
The m ercantile agency, or commercial credit bureau, is primarily
engaged in preparing reports on businesses rather than individuals.
The largest mercantile agency, in Chicago and nationally, is Dun &
Bradstreet:O Less than one-half of one percent of Dun & Bradstreet's
reports are prepared on consumers, and these are mostly mortgage
reports requested by lending institutions. The typical commercial report
will contain a limited amount of personal information about individual s. and includes identification of the proprietor, partners, or officers of
a business. plus birth date, marital status, education , work history,
military service, and public record data.
The extent to which the FCRA covers commercial reports is open to
controversy. It is clear from the little legislative history which exists for
the FCRA that the Jaw was not intended to regulate business reports; '
Nonetheless, in one of the few cases decided since the FCRA became
effective, a court has held that under sec. 605, pertaining to obsolete
data. Dun & Bradstreet was not allowed to report the 20-year old conviction (and subsequent exoneration) of an individual doing business as
a corporation : 2
The question also arises in regard to independent contractors. The
advisability of legislating to protect the privacy of individuals reported
on during the course of a business investigation cannot be determined
without additional information as to the potential commercial advantages and disadvantages. For example, if a mercantile agency could not
report all information available on an individual doing business as a
corporation or an independent contractor, this might disadvantage that
individual in competition with other businesses for commercial credit.
C.

THE NON-LOCAL MARKET

In a mobile society where people often change residences, and
where consumers in one city often desire credit from companies located
at a distance, it is necessary to have mechanisms for the long-distance
communication of credit information. There are in fact four major
routes by which a credit grantor in Chicago may obtain information
about a consumer who lives now, or formerly lived, in another area:
1. Direct sales. The credit grantor could establish his own
direct contact with a credit bureau in the consumer's locale. This is
somewhat inconvenient, and the credit grantor has to pay a higher rate
50. For a profil e of Dun & Bradstreet , see Appendix One.
51. S. REP . NO. 91-5 17. 91 st Cong .. 1st Sess. I (1969). See Comm ent. Th e Fair Credit R eport ·
ing A ct: Are Busin ess Credit R eports R egulated. 1971 DUKE L. J. 1229 (1971).
52. An onymous v. Dun & Brad street, 40 U.S .L.W. 21 62 (N .Y. Sup. Ct .. N.Y. City, Sept. 28.
197 1).

1974]

PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET

49

than would a regular subscriber to the foreign bureau's services. Neverthe less, in 1970, direct sales accounted for about 19 per cent of the $40
million national non-local credit reporting markee 3
2. National network. The Chicago credit grantor could
obtain information through the national networks of such organizations
as TRW Credit Data, Hooper-Holmes Credit Index, or the Retail
Credit Co.-Retailers Commercial Agency tandem. These accounted for
about 30 per cent of the non-local market in 1970.54
3. Brokerage. The third choice open to the Chicago credit
grantor would be to request a local full-service credit bureau to obtain
the information for him. This transaction is usually managed through
th e Interbureau Reporting System of the Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc., which accounted for 7 per cent of the non-local market in 1970;5
This system operates through pre-purchased inter-bureau coupons
which allow credit bureaus to exchange reports without worry about
billing procedures or price differentials.56
4. Sales. Finally, a Chicago credit grantor could purchase a
report through Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. , a company which sells the
reports of over 2,000 local credit bureaus for a commission. CBR's
clients tend to be large credit grantors doing business over a wide area,
such as oil companies, mail-order houses, and bank charge-card systems, who do not want to deal with hundreds of local credit bureaus
having different kinds of reports, different prices, and different billing
practices.s·, CBR accounted for nearly 39 per cent of the non-local market in 1970.58
Recently, the Associated Credit Bureaus entered the sales field in
competition with CBR by setting up Credit Services International to sell
to the same companies. When this occurred , CBR sought to move into
the interb ureau field, announcing that it would provide tickets to the
bureaus, instead of coupons, · and that these would not have to be prepurchased.59 Shortly thereafter, the Justice Department cited the Associ60
ated Credit Bureaus, Inc., for violating a 1933 antitrust consent decree
53. Brief for Pl ain tiff a t 52. note 46 supra.
54. !d. Retail Credit Co. a nd Retail ers Commercial Agency together accounte•;l for about 17o/o.
ld,
55. !d.
'
56. " [I)f a n ACB member burea u in Houston need ed a report on a Chicago reside nt , the choice
of.which Chicago bureau (CIC or CCB) to go to would rest with th e Houston ma nager a nd ... by
Ultltzmg the coupon system, the Houston burea u would pay the sa me amoun t whichever burea u he
se lected ." Letter to U . CHI. L. REV., from D . Ba rry Conn elly, Director of Public Affairs, ACB ,
Feb. 28, 1972.
57. Brief for Pl aintiff a t 11 , no te 46 supra .
58. ld., a t 52.
59. T eleph one interview with Ba rba ra Morris, Office Ma nager, CBR, Chicago, Ja n. 26, 1972.
60. See Weitzma n, Th e Fair Credit R eporting A ct and th e NCRA Consent Decree, 59 CREDIT
WORLD 7 (1971).
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by requiring its members to use the ACB Interbureau Reporting System
exclusively, under threat of expulsion from the trade association.61
Meanwhile, Retail Credit Co. , which owns 114 credit bureaus in the
U.S. and participates in the non-local market through Retailers Commercial Agency, attempted to enter the sales field by creating Credit
Marketing Services, Inc. The plan was enjoined for a period of three
years when a U.S. District Court found that Retail Credit Co. planned
to operate its new subsidiary at an expected Joss until it had forced
CBR out of the market. The Court also enjoined Retail Credit Co. from
acquiring additional credit bureaus for a period of S years because,
"With an organization like CMS available, it defies common sense to
say that RCC-controlled bureaus will depend on any entity other than
CMS to reach the non-local credit reporting market." 62 To round out
the present picture of the non-local market, it must also be mentioned
that the FTC has published a proposed complaint against the Retail
Credit Co., alleging in part that Retail Credit Co.'s acquisition of 45
credit bureaus since January, 1970, has lessened effective competition
in the non-local market. 63 The FTC is seeking a consent decree which
would result in the divestiture of the acquired credit bureaus. 64
D. INSURANCE INSPECTION BUREAUS
To speak of "insurance inspection bureaus" is to adopt the nomenclature of the industry. Historically, the inspection bureaus grew in
close alliance with insurance companies, providing the information
which underwriters deemed necessary for evaluating insurance risks~ 5
But as the general business community's need for personal information
grew, some of the larger inspection bureaus branched into employment
reporting and other areas of investigation. Retail Credit Co. now has
nine distinct lines of informational services: life and health insurance
reporting; fire and casualty insurance reporting; personnel reporting;
insurance claims investigations; insurance claims adjustments; paramedical services; credit and commercial reporting; audit, inspection,
and Joss control; and marketing information service. 66
It is not always easy to distinguish an informational supermarket
like Retail Credit Co. from large detective agencies. Retail Credit Co.'s
61. Wall Street Journ al, Nov. 17, 1971, at 3, col. 2.
62. Credit Burea u Reports, Inc. , v. Retail Credit Co., CCH 1972 TRADE CASES. 9 73-813,
(S.D. Texas . 197 1). Affirmed, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP., g 74-450 (April 11 , 1973).
63. In th e Matter of Reta il Credit Co. , proposed FTC compl aint, supra note 27 .
64. /d.: see Wall Street Journ al, Nov. 14, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
65. Th e only work d etailing th e history of th e inspection indu stry is W.A. FLINN, HISTORY
O F RET AIL CR EDIT COMPANY , a 1959 Ph .D. dissertation in economics at Ohio State Universi ty. ava il able from Un iversity Microfilm s, Ann Arbor, Michiga n. Flinn 's perspective , highly favorable to his subject , does not lead him to consid er th e compa ny's iml?act on privacy.
66. R ET AIL CREDIT CO. ANNUAL REPORT, 1971 at 8 (1 971).
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Competitor Index, a confidential internal document, includes analyses
of how to sell the company's services ~n the face of competition from
Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., Wackenhut Corporation,
and other detective agencies. The main areas of overlap are claims
investigations and personnel reports. Major points for differentiation
include: (1) the detective agencies do not engage in insurance inspections; (2) the inspection bureaus do not engage in surveillance in "matrimonial" casesY(3) inspection bureaus place greater emphasis on the
creation and use of data banks; and (4) detective agencies are subject to
much more state regulation than are inspection bureaus.68
Inspection bureaus may be divided into two categories: the nationals and the local independents. The largest national inspection bureaus
are Retail Credit Co., Hooper-Holmes Bureau, American Service Bureau, National Inspection Bureau (O'Hanlon's Reports), and Service
Review. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. is the only
insurance company with a fully internal inspection operation. Most
insurance companies believe that they will be better served if inspectors
are not employed directly by the insurance company. In part, this is
because the independent inspector can be more objective in his reports,
and in part, it is because of history. Individual insurance companies did
not generate enough inspection business to allow them to retain a
broad network of inspectors,69 and by the time most insurance companies had reached a size where they could internalize if they desired , an
entrenched inspection industry was already available and adequate?0

-

67. "Matrimonial cases" are estimated to account for 40- 75% of the average private investigator's work. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 111 (1967).
·
68. Retail Credit Co. is registered as a private investigation agency in N.Y., Calif., Conn .. Nev ..
and Fla. Letter from David P. Weinberger, b,ased on a personal survey, to U. CHI. L. REV. , April
30, 1972. For denials that Retail Credit Co. is a detective agency, see Retail Credit Co. of Atlanta,
Ga., Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968); Hart Hgs .. supra note 37, at 99; Proxmire Hgs., supra note 37, at 180;
and Sullivan Hgs. supra note 37, at 473. It is difficult to understand why some states do not require
~etail Credit Co. and other inspection bureaus to register under existing legislation. See ILL REV.
TAT. 1971 , ch . 38, §§ 201- 1,20 1-2, and 201 -3, a detective statute which on its face would appear
to e~empt credit burea us, but not inspection bureaus. Not only do inspection bureaus report on
habits , conduct, associations, reputation and character, for purposes other than describing business or financial sta nding (as coverage by the Illinois st-atute would require) but many engage in
~ther traditional detective activities as well. E.g., Retail Credit Co. tracks missing persons: the
eterans Administration estimates that it paid Retail Credit Co. $57,000 in fiscal 1971 for "skip1~ate" reports on persons the VA was unable to locate, where there was a debt in excess of $300.
tter from Howard M. Denney, Assistant General Counsel, VA, to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 17,
1972, reproduced in Appendix Six. It is also clear from Retail Credit Co.'s Manager's Manual that
th7 company's inspectors serve as paid witnesses for insurance companies, based upon knowledge
ga ined in investigations.
.
69. FLINN, note 65 supra, at 133 et seq.
70. Equitable Life Assurance Society instituted its inspection system in 1870. FLINN, note 65
S~Jpra, a t I 58. Equitable works through a combination of salaried inspectors a nd part-time corres~ndents workin g on a fee basis. Interview (telephone) with Paul Patterson, Regional Inspection
anager, Equitable, Feb. IS, 1972. See Appendix One.
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The national inspection bureaus are dominated by Retail Credit Co.
In the two major insurance submarkets, life and health insurance reporting and fire and casualty (including automobile) insurance reporting, Retail Credit Co. controls 80 and 50-60 percent of the volume,
respectively? 1 The life and health submarket is particularly concentrated: Retail Credit, Hooper-Holmes, and American Service Bureau
accounted for 90-95 per cent of the 1970 industry volume of $55-60
million? 2 The $120-130 million fire and casualty submarket is somewhat
more fragmented, since the leading three firms had only an estimated
60-70 per cent in 1970. The third important submarket in which some
of the national inspection bureaus participate, personnel reporting, will
be discussed later.73
The local independent inspection bureaus, being shut out of the life
and health submarket, tend to cluster in the fire and casualty area,
reporting on applicants for automobile insurance, fire insurance, and
other types of property insurance. Local independents vary in size from
one-man out-of-the-basement operations, to fairly sophisticated organizations well able to compete (at least in the fire and casualty field) with
the nationals on a local (and in a few cases statewide) basis. Most local
independents were formed by inspectors who had received their training
from the nationals, and it is understandable that their operations tend
to follow the patterns set by the nationals. Unlike the nationals, however, a number of the local independents around the country have
formed a trade association, Associated Reporting Companies. To date,
the association has produced little in the way of training, marketing, or
leadership, and must be considered insignificant?4
Appendix One provides profiles of ten inspection bureaus, national
and local independents, with offices in Chicago. A fuller discussion of
what inspection bureaus do and how they do it occurs in a later section
evaluating the impact ofthe FCRA on investigations?5
Inspection bureaus are generally covered by the FCRA's definition
of a consumer reporting agency, with the chief exception that reports
drawn on businesses are exempt.

71. In the Matter of Retail Credit Co., FTC Proposed Complaint, supra note 27.
72. ld.
73. See text at notes 76 and 233, i11jra.
74. Interview with William Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Mar. 24, 1972. Members of
Associated Reporting Companies in Chicago are Illinois Service Bureau, Jasper's Reports, and
Underwriters Reports, Inc. ARCO Directory, 1971.
75. See text at notes-209 et seq., info.
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E. PERSONNEL REPORTING
Personnel reporting is handled by credit bureaus, inspection bureaus, special personnel reporting agencies such as Fidelifacts 7~ detective agencies, and (in relatively small numbers) by executive search
organizations. In addition, a substantial proportion of personnel investigating is carried on in-house by employers through their own personnel or security sections? 7 This means that the personnel reporting
market is more highly fragmented than the insurance reporting market.
Based on its own information and a survey it conducted, Retail Credit
Co. estimates that 40 per cent of all employment screening is done by
companies' own people and that about 10 per cent of employment
applications are simply not inspected. Retail Credit estimates that it
received about 20 per cent of such assignments and its competition
~bout 30 per cent?B The FTC merely states that Retail Credit is a "leadIng factor" in the $25-35 million personnel reporting market? 9
Coverage of personnel reporting by the FCRA is rather spotty, and
will be discussed in detail at a later point.80

ll.

IMPACT OF THE FCRA
. Prior to passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the participants
In the personal information market were free of governmental scrutiny.
Detective agencies, it is true, were often subject to state regulation, but
this was widely believed to be a mere formality.81 The most important
control was the private remedy of a libel action by a damaged consu~er; but this was of little practical value because credit reports and
Inspection reports were traditionally held to be qualifiedly privileged in
the public interest of expediting commerce, and the problem of proving
~alice was so great that reporting agencies had all but an absolute
tmmunity.82
In the absence of regulation, a variety of abuses developed, and by
the middle and late 1960's critics of the personal information market
were calling for reform, in the name of personal privacy.83 Congressional

--

76. See profile in Appendix One.

S~7. See T. WALSH. SCREENING OF EMPLOYEES IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL

i8URITY:
PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, (2d ed., 1972).
· Plaintiffs Brief at 6, note 46 supra.

79. In the Matter of Retail Credit Co., FTC Proposed Complaint, supra note 27.
80. See text at note 248 infra.
t 8!. See S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959), especially pages 216-230, dealing with deecttve practices in Chicago.
SO82. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right of Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEO. L. J .
9. 516 (1959).
(I 83. See the books cited in note 3 supra; See also, M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS
R. ?64>; Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom and the
'Cht of Privacy, 33 GEO. WASI-l. L. REV. 270 (1964); Karst, "The Files" Legal Controls Over
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hearings produced lurid examples of disregard for privacy values,84 and
the pressure for legislation grew so strong that most of the consumer
credit industry chose to participate in the legislative drafting rather
than stand in opposition.85
In the Senate Report for Senator Proxmire's S.823,86 which with very
minimal changes became the Fair Credit Reporting Act, seven aspects
of the credit reporting industry were perceived as abuses requiring legislative control. These may be summarized as:
1. The inability of a consumer to know he is being damaged
by an adverse report;
2. Difficulty in obtaining access to information in a consumer's file;
3. Obstacles blocking correction of inaccurate information;
4. Failure of consumer reporting agencies to keep information confidential;_
5. The reporting of public record information that is out-ofdate or incomplete;
6. Unfairness in burdening a consumer for life with a bad
credit record if he has later improved his performance; and
7. Intrusions on privacy due to the gathering of highly sensitive and personal information about a person's private life.
To cope with these abuses, Congress passed, and President Nixon
signed into law, the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The FCRA has been in
effect for more than a year and a half at this writing, and it seems proper at this time, before Congress considers any amendments, to analyze
the FCRA in terms of its effectiveness in correcting the perceived
abuses.
the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342
(1 %6); 1. SHARP CREDIT REPORTING AND PRIVACY (1970).
84. See hearings cited supra in notes 37, 48, and 68.
85. See the statements of various industry representatives in Sullivan Hgs., supra note 37.
86. S. REP. NO. 91·517, supra note 51, accompanying S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1%9). S.
823, Senator Proxmire's bill, was approved in the Senate on Nov. 6, 1%9 and was sent to the
House. It, along with several House bills of similar concern (including its companion bill, H.R.
10,139, and Congresswoman Sullivan's bills, H.R. 16,340 and H.R. 19,403), was hopelessly bottled
up in committee and none of these bills was ever voted upon in the House. However, the basic provisions of S. 823 were later attached as a rider to another bill in the Senate which had already
passed the House (H.R. 15,073). The conglomerate bill was later approved in Conference Committee, with slight modifications to the credit reporting section , and then passed the House. See Denney, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. 88 BANKING L. J. 579 (1971); and R. CLONTZ, FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT MANUAL (1971). Debate on the FCRA was minimal. See 116
CONG. REC. 36569-77 (1970). Senator Proxmire's paternity of the FCRA is memorialized by the
consumer reporting agencies in their creation of the verb phrase "to give a Proxmire," which
means, to provide a consumer disclosure under the FCRA.
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A. NOTIFICATION
The first problem noted in the Senate Report was that the consumer
was often unaware that he was being damaged by an adverse credit
report.87 This resulted, in large part, from the fear of reporting agencies
that if their role were known to the public and consumers could learn
of the source and content of adverse reports the reporting industry
would be deluged by litigation. Standard agreements between credit
reporting agencies and their clients prohibited the user from disclosing
the contents of a report to the consumer.88
Retail Credit Co.'s Manager Manual instructed the inspection
bureau manager who received a complaint from a report subject to
"Neither deny nor admit making report . .. Draw your caller out, tactfully eliciting information as to source of leak." In case an unfavorable
report had been made, the manager was to "[A]void the personal contact, if possible. At any rate, do not commit yourself, the inspector, or
the Retail Credit Company." 89 As a result of this attitude of secrecy, an
individual could fall into a situation where he wouldn't be able to
obtain credit, insurance, or a job--and wouldn't have any way of finding
out why.
The FCRA has been successful in remedying this abuse. Under section 61S(a), when adverse action is taken against a consumer either
wholly or in part because of information in a consumer report, the
report user must advise the consumer and supply the name and address of the consumer reporting agency which made the report. Adverse
action is defined as the denial to the consumer of credit or insurance
for personal, family, or household purposes; or acceptance at an increased, or above standard, charge for credit or insurance; or the denial
~~~~me~~
·
To comply with this provision, consumer report users (informed of
their legal obligation in their service contracts with the reporting
agencies) generally use form letters to notify consumers when adverse
action has been taken? 1 The law does not requre that notification be
tnade in writing, however, and some consumer repott users, particularly finance companies, prefer to give oral notification?2

--

8887. S. REP. NO. 91-517, 91 st Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1 %9).
. ld.

89. Retail Credit Co. Manager Manual, page C-39, dated Oct. 1%3, now being revised.
90· FCRA, supra note 5, § 615(a).
91. For examples of the form letters used, see Appendix Two.
92. The finance companies interviewed claimed that they prefer to communicate orally with a
~rson who is not granted a loan because this is the best way to smooth ruffled feathers. There is
fr? reason, however, why a consumer report user couldn't supplement a written notification by a
lendly oral communication.
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A measurement of the effectiveness of the FCRA notification provision may be found in Appendix Three, where figures are given for the
number of disclosures of report content to consumers by Chicago area
consumer reporting agencies, both before and after passage of the
FCRA. As a generalization, it can be said that prior to the FCRA,
credit bureaus made some disclosures to consumers, and that the number of disclosures after the effective date of the FCRA multiplied by a
factor of from 2 to 20. In the case of the largest credit bureau in Chicago, disclosures are made an average of 4,000 times per month, on a
volume of approximately 250,000 reports per month, or of 1 for every
62 reports?3 Considering that some of the 250,000 reports per month are
probably repeats for the same consumer, drawn by different subscribers, one might estimate that about 2 per cent of this credit bureau's
report subjects seek disclosures of their files.
The experience of inspection bureaus is somewhat different, because
none of the inspection bureaus interviewed made disclosures to consumers prior to the FCRA. Since the FCRA, all have adopted procedures
so that consumers can obtain disclosure, but relatively few consumers
seem to be taking advantage of these procedures. For instance, the
American Service Bureau reports on approximately 112,000 individuals
a year, or 9,333 a month, in Chicago; but only 10 to 15 per month seek
d iscl os u re.94
While it seems true that the FCRA notification process has made
consumers more aware of the mechanisms of consumer reporting, there
is reason to believe the notification provision ought to be strengthened.
For example, American Service Bureau's business is mainly in life and
health insurance reporting; it averages roughly 8,600 of these reports
per month?5 But if only 15 consumers seek disclosure, this is less than
0.2 per cent of those reported on. Yet the latest industry figures say
that 3 per cent of all ordinary life insurance applicants are turned down,
and that another 6 per cent are given extra-risk rates.96 Certainly many
93. Letter from T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Credit Information Corporation of Chicago, to U.
CHI. L. REV. , Nov. 17, 1972. CIC is used as the example because it appears to keep the most
careful statistics concerning th e FCRA. The figures cited remained unchanged from Jan. 25, !972
to Nov. 17, 1972.
94. Letter from Claude H. Tinsley, Jr., Exec. Vice President, American Service Bureau, to U.
CHI. L. REV., Dec. 8, 1972. Retail Credit Co. branch offices have averaged four consumer con·
tacts per week since the inception of the FCRA. A company study shows that of 1192 consumers
who received adverse action notifications, 1031 did not contact the inspection bureau. 114 made
contact but agreed with the report content. 47 made contact and questioned the information in the
report. Of these 47, 34 resulted in reconfirmation of the original information. In the other _13
cases, the original information could not be reconfirmed. In two of these cases, contirmauon
hinged on city records unavailable to the public. Retail Credit Co., The Fair Credit Reporting Act.
·
A Progress Report, dated October 1972.
95. /d.
96. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACf BOOK, 1972 at 95(1972).
Figures are for 1967, wnen JO,I9U,U00ordinary life policies were purchased in the U.S. "Of the
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of those turned down or up-rated expected as much; but of the remainder, can it really be that so few are curious enough to contact the consumer reporting agency?
One reason for the low turnout rate may be that the FCRA merely
requires that the consumer be notified of the fact of adverse action, and
be supplied the name and address of the reporting agency. No effort is
made to inform the consumer of his rights under the law, with the apparent result that the consumer frequently does not know that he has a
right to be informed of the contents of his record or that he can challenge the information in the file.
Moreover, the notification rarely explains why adverse action was
taken. Since adverse action often occurs for reasons which have nothing
to do with a "bad" record~7consumers have sometimes found themselves
shuffled back and forth between a reporting agency which gives disclosure but no hint of why adverse action was taken, and a consumer
..
report user who doesn't want to explain his credit policies?8
To remedy these defects, it is suggested that the FCRA be amended
to require (a) that adverse action notifications be written, (b) and that
they include a brief summary of the consumer's legal rights under the
FCRA, and (c) a brief, possibly check-off, explanation for the consumer
report user's decision to take adverse action.
A frequent criticism of the FCRA notification provision is that the
consumer is not able to learn of the existence of his file until after the
damage is already done. This is not precisely true, because the consumer is given the right, under section 609, to obtain disclosure, regardless of whether adverse action has been taken against him. In practice,
however, most consumers are not aware that a file exists or which
~% 0 ~ applications that were not acceptable, less than three-fifths were related to serious health
!tnpatrments and the rest to other factors, including extremely hazardous jobs." /d. Reasons for
extra-rating were: heart disease or its symptoms, 33%; weight problem, 16%; other medical rea~~lns, 29% ; occupation, 12o/o; other reasons, 10o/o. /d. This is the sum total of published informaRon ~ocated which throws light on the possible impact of insurance inspection reports. However, a
rat I Credit Co. manager testified that inspection reports contribute to the declination of 1 - 2o/o
0
tnsurance applications, and to the rating-up of another 3 - 4%. Testimony of A. Freeman, Man D~er,_Retail Credit Co., Oklahoma City, Okla., in Retail Credit Co. v. Derryberry, No. CJ-72-36,
tstnct Court of Oklahoma County, Okla., April 24, 1972.

-0

f 97. E.g., the consumer might not meet the minimum income or employment tenure standards

the credit grantor.
D 98. The ACB, in its widely circulated pamphlet HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CREthiT RE~ORTING ACT (1971), recommended that ~redit _grantors m!lke noti!Jcati<?n whe!lev~r
ey obtatn a credit report and subsequently deny credtt. A hteral followtng of thts advtce, whtch ts
company policy for at least one of the major national retailing chains headquartered in Chicago,
means that many consumers who are turned down for credit are shunted to the credit bureau,
even though the credit grantor knows the bureau report is "clean." This creates bad feelings and a
~e!lse that someone is lying, both of which could be avoided if the adverse action notification conatned a check-list of common reasons for credit denial.
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agency has it until adverse action has occurred~ In view of this, Senator
Hatfield has proposed an amendment to the FCRA which states:
"When any consumer reporting agency proposes to furnish a consumer
report. .. that agency shall mail, or otherwise deliver, a copy of such
report to the consumer to whom it relates." 100
The cost of the Hatfield proposal would probably be great. One
credit bureau in Chicago which sells over a million reports a year estimates that the cost of preparing a copy of each report (paying a clerk to
handle the job, and purchasing envelopes and stamps) would be about
$1.30 per report.101 This may be a high estimate, but the point is clear
that the costs of the Hatfield amendment could put many credit bureaus
out of business. Equally important, the amendment would make it
impossible for a credit bureau to furnish an oral report and would considerably slow a process which serves consumers as well as credit grantors by its speed.
Somewhat different considerations might affect the reports of inspection bureaus! 02 A much smaller absolute number of reports is involved and the cost of sending a copy would represent a smaller proportion of the price of a report. An inspection report, moreover, is generally capable of causing more harm for a consumer than most standard
credit bureau reports; not getting insurance can be far more damaging
than not getting a charge card. Nevertheless, speed in inspections is a
matter of importance to consumers as well as to insurance companies
and their agents,and the disadvantages of any reform which would substantially slow the process of obtaining insurance must be considered.

99. Since a consumer reporting agency is allowed to make a charge for a disclosure in cases
where the consumer has not received an adverse action notification within the past 30 days (FCRA.
supra noteS,§ 612), many agencies have records available on how many consumers seek disclosure
purely "for curiousity." The figure is generally less than 10%. Ninety-five percent of the consumers
who have contacted Retail Credit Co. branch offices have done so as the result of adverse actwn
notices. Retail Credit Co., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, A Progress Report, dated October 1972100. S. 968, 92nd Con g., 1st Sess. (1970). A similar statute exists for credit reports in Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN . tit. 24, §§ 81, 82 (West, 1955)), but it has never been enforced. A state court
ruled in May 1972 that this statute applies to the credit reports, but not the insurance inspections.
of Retail Credit Co. Tulsa World, May 25, 1972. Appeal is pending.
101. Interview with Milton I. Deutsch, President, Chicago Credit Bureau, Jan. 19, 1972.
102. Note that the FCRA distinguishes between simple consumer reports of the type generally_
prepared by credit bureaus, and "investigative consumer reports" , corresponding to the output of
inspection bureaus. The latter are defined in FCRA section 603(e), (supra note 5), to mean:
a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained
through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer
reported on or with others with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge
concerning any such items of information.
A discussion of the significance of this distinction begins in the text at note 241, infra.
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Finally, in weighing the Hatfield proposal one should consider the
10
fact that the majority of consumer reports--possibly a large majority !do not lead to adverse action. This being true, delivery of a copy of each
proposed consumer report to the consumer-subject would have little
practical effect and would likely represent much economic waste. Unless
the consumer were, in effect, given the power to enjoin a consumer
reporting agency from selling a report about the consumer because the
consumer objects to the content, the only benefit of the Hatfield proposal would be to allow a consumer to try to convince the reporting
agency, prior to dissemination, that the report is in error. But the
FCRA already permits errors to be corrected, and it stands to reason
that a credit grantor or insurance company which is in business to give
credit and to sell insurance will reconsider an adverse action once it is
called to their attention that the information upon which the adverse
decision was based was erroneous. Although this conclusion can not
actually be viewed at this time, indications that this reasoning is incorrect did not appear during this course of this study.
B. ACCESS
A second problem noted by the Senate Report was that if a consumer learned about the existence of his file he was generally not given
access to the information in ie 04 Retail Credit Co., for example, had a
Policy which directed managers not to show a report to its subject: "Information involving rumors or third-party hazard or that the average
P~rson would resent or that might expose our informants, cannot be
d1scussed with the subject." 105 Some credit bureaus, the Senate Report
found, discouraged consumer interviews "by placing a nuisance charge
on the investigation, or merely placing the date of the interview as
lll_uch as 2 weeks away:' 106'J'he FCRA's response to the access problem
Wtll be discussed in relation to five questions: (1) who should have access
to file information? (2) when should access occur? (3) what types of
Physical contact with the record should be permitted? (4) to what extent
should information be disclosed? and (S) how should the cost of access
be allocated?

--

IOJ. ~ee note 96 supra. The precise influence of consumer reports upon credit grantors defies
~enerahzation. E.g.. one large national finance company rejects 70'Vo of its loan applicants but
r raws credit reports on only 40 - SO% of all applicants, and lacks figures on the impact of credit
~ports. A competing finance company draws reports on lOO'Vo of applicants, denies SO%, and estill ~tes that 20'Vo of the denials are based on credit reports. The installment loan department of a
tl~tghbor~ood-type bank draws reports on 100'Vo of its loan applicants, rejects 10%, and estimates
bat credtt reports account for SO- 75"7o of the rejections. A systematic survey seems required to go
~~nd these samplings to establish the impact of credit reports.
IO · S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3.
W'th5. Retail Credit Co. Ma11ager Ma11ual page C-75, dated Oct. 1%3. Present policy is in accord
F'~R F'CRA requirements. See Retail Credit Co. memorandum concerning compliance with the
A, dated June 18, 1971.
1
06. S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3.
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Who Should Have Access to File Information?

The FCRA requires disclosure of file content to the appropriate
consumer either in person or by telephone, if he first furnishes "proper"
07
identification~ If there is a personal interview, the consumer may be
accompanied by one other person of his choosing, who must furnish
"reasonable" identification~ 08
The concepts of "proper" and "reasonable" identification have
occasionally been stretched by the consumer reporting agencies to
create an obstacle for consumers. For example, the American Service
Bureau has a form, reproduced in Appendix Four, which must be filled
out before the consumer will be given disclosure over the telephone.
Many of the questions leave the clear impression that the form was
intended for the collection of information rather than for simple identification. In addition to the identification form, many reporting agencies
require the consumer to sign a waiver agreement prior to disclosure.
The waiver, an example of which is found in Appendix Four, often impresses consumers as an implied threat that the reporting agency will
investigate anyone who causes trouble. Such a waiver is both premature,
in that only a small portion of disclosures result in further investigation;109and overly broad, since it can be used, for example, to authorize
a doctor to disclose confidential medical records even though the item
of information called into question by the consumer may be nonmedical~10 It is suggested that the FTC, which has enforcement powers

under section 621 of the FCRA, should render a formal interpretation
that such "chilling" .identification and waiver forms violate the intent
of section 610, which provides for disclosures to consumers.
2. When Should Access Occur?
The FCRA requires only that disclosure be made "during normal
business hours and on reasonable notice."lll A recommendation that
certain off-business hours be provided to facilitate access for working
people112 was rejected by Congress. No Chicago reporting agency has
voluntarily established special hours. Rather than take time off from

107. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6IO(b).
108. FCRA, supra note 5, § 610(d).
109. E.g., the Chicago office of Retail Credit Co. has conducted re·investigations as a result of
only 1'11% of its disclosures. Letter from Henry McQuade, Retail Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV ..
Feb. 23, 1972.
110. The purpose of a waiver is not clear. If authorization is needed for re-investigation, on what
authority was the original investigation carried out?
Ill. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6IO(a).
112. See testimony of Virginia Knauer on behalf of the Administration, Sullivan Hgs .. supra
note 37, at 556.
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work to visit a consumer reporting agency, many consumers have relied
on telephone disclosure.113
The "reasonable notice" provision · seems to be complied with in
satisfactory fashion by most consumer reporting agencies visited in Chicago. In many instances, a consumer can walk in off the street without
giving previous notice and receive prompt attention! 14 A few agencies,
~owever, have set up obstacles by telling the consumer his file is located
tn another city or that disclosure can only be made by a particular executive who happens to be out of town. 115
3. What Types of Physical Contact With the Record?
The FCRA pointedly does not give the consumer a right to see or
hold his file, saying only that the reporting agency must "disclose"
"fully and accurately" the "nature and substance" of the file~ 16 This has
been one of the most controversial provisions in the law, with many
consumers complaining that reporting agencies do not disclose every17
thing in their files~ There is no way to confirm how often selective disclosure actually occurs,' 18 but the widespread belief that the practice
takes place makes it necessary to reconsider the wisdom of forcing the
c.o nsumer to take the reporting agency's word that it is not hiding sensitive materials to avoid embarrassment or possible litigation.11 9
113. The extent of reliance upon the telephone for disclosures varies greatly from reporting
afency to reportin g agency. The Chicago office of Retail Credit Co. estimates that half of its disc osures are by phone, half in person. Interview, Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Jan. 20, 1972.
!he Credit Information Corporation of Chicago handles 22o/o of its disclosures by telephone, 8%
Y personal interview, and 70o/o by mail. Letter from T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Nov. 17, 1972.
¢hhough the mailing procedure does not appear to be permissible under section 610 of the FCRA,
: ~s probably the meth od best serving the interests of the consumer, provided that all codes and
ei~ 1 S are put in layman's language. Section 610 should be amended to reflect this possibility.
4. See Star. Who Knows What Evil Lurks in Your Credit File, Chicago Tribune Magazi ne,
J une 18, 1972.
RI IS. This generalization is based upon several letters received by the University of Chicago Law
evtew from consumers outside of Chicago, ·and upon experience of the author in Washington,
0 .C. One problem seems to be that national inspection bureaus have sub-offices where trained
Personnel, required by section 610 to be provided in order to explain information disclosed to a
~ons um er , are not available. Retail Credit Co. takes the position that sub-offices are not req uired
ha.ve trained personnel on hand for disclosures at all times during normal business hours. Retail
[edtt Co. memorandum concerning FCRA section 610, dated Feb. 26, 1971.
16. FCRA, supra note 5, § 609. Certain exceptions are explored in the text at note 127 infra.
11 Telephone interview with Erma Angevine, Exec. Dir. , Consumers Federation of America,
Dec.7.27,
1971.
1 lt8 .. One example: Jam es Millstone, assistant man aging editor of the St. Louis Post Dispatch,
t~st hts automobile insurance as a result of an inspection report which said, among other things.
1 at he was a hippie-type person, disliked by his neighbors, who used drugs and put up out-ofaown demonstrators all over his house. Millstone twice obtained disclosure from the reporting
wgency, National Inspection Bureau. Not satisfied that everything had been disclosed, Millstone
wrote to .t~e headquarters of the Bureau. Six days later he received a letter advising him that there
fa~~ addtttonal material in his file, some of it adverse, which the reporting agency "inadvertently
1<}7;d to disclose" during the interviews. Letter to Millstone from David B. Slayback, Jan. 20,
11 · See St. Louis Post Dispatch, April II, 1972, at JA, col. I.
th 9· Retail Credit Co. emphasizes to its employees that disclosures will be made upon request of
Yoe ~onsumer, and states that there are three requests which the consumer may make: what do
u ave on file about me? who told you that? and, to whom did you send that information? The
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Why should the consumer not be allowed to read his own file? The
principal answers given by the reporting agencies will be considered one
at a time. First, it is said~ 20 if the consumer can get his hands on the file,
he might destroy it. This problem could be circumvented by offering to
provide a copy of the file. (Most investigative files contain only one or
two sheets.) 121
But if the consumer is furnished with a copy of his report, it is then
argued,122 he might counterfeit or falsify the report, thereby leading to
poor business decisions and an erosion of confidence in the integrity of
the reporting system. Morever, the argument continues, agencies will
not be called upon to sell more than one report on an individual, because after the first report is prepared consumer report users will seek
copies of the report from the consumer, thereby saving the expense of
obtaining reports from the agencies! 23 This seems to assume that consumers will carry around copies of their reports like references, and that
credit grantors, insurance companies, and employers will be too dull to
recognize the possibility of falsification. In reality, it is precisely the
desire for independent sources of information which leads consumer
report users to buy reports, and it is difficult to believe that many
present users would want to take the consumer's word that his copy is
up-to-date and authentic.
Another argument contends that if the consumer were given a copy
of his report, others, including employers, police, or the Internal Revenue Service, could require the consumer to provide that copy as a prerequisite for various benefits. Despite these crocodile tears for the consumer's privacy: 24section 604(2) of the FCRA already allows a reporting
agency to furnish reports "in accordance with the written instructions
of the consumer to whom it relates."
A fourth argument states that if the consumer had a copy of his
report he could learn the code numbers for various subscribers, and
might be enabled to use these codes to obtain unauthorized releases of
information about other consumers. This argument has merit; but it
first question (or words to its effect) initiates disclosure of the nature and substance of the file. Th_e
second and third questions must be asked each time the consumer wants the information. Retatl
Credit Co. memorandum concerning compliance with FCRA section 609, dated June 18, 1971.
This would present the possibility of disclosing less than everything that would be important to the
consumer, especially if the consumer is unaware that he is involved in a guessing game.
120. Sullivan Hgs . .- supra note 37, at 110.
121. Testimony of Retail Credit Co., Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 474.
122. Retail Credit Co. flyer, Hazards in Giving Subject a Copy of Report.
123. It has been suggested that allowing copies to circulate would reduce reporting agency sales,
and that this would be a deprivation of property without just compensation. /d.
124. Proxmire Hgs., supra note 48, at 232.
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only applies to credit bureaus, since inspection bureaus don't operate
on the same kind of code system. Accepting this argument in regard to
credit bureau reports would not entail that inspection bureaus, as well,
should not release copies of reports.
A fifth argument against furnishing the subject with a copy of his
report is that this practice would invite nuisance lawsuits.125 There are
two answers to this. First, if disclosure is as full and accurate as the
FCRA requires there is already sufficient possibility of litigation, and
this would not be augmented by the fact that the consumer has a copy.
Indeed, the consumer is presently permitted to take notes during disclosure, and, if he desires, be accompanied by an attorney.
Second, the FCRA protects the consumer reporting agencies sufficiently under section 610(e), which states that unless there is negligent
or willfull noncompliance with the FCRA,
no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed (under
the FCRA), except as to fa lse information furnished with malice or
willfu ll intent to injure such consumer. 126
Finally, it is argued, providing a copy of a report to the consumer
would allow him to learn about certain items of information which
public policy dictates should not be revealed . This argument can best
considered in answer to the next question; "to what extent should
Information be disclosed?"
4. To What Extent Should Information Be Disclosed?
The meat of the FCRA disclosure requirement is found in section
609, wh ich states that the consumer reporting agency shall "clearly and
accurately disclose ... the nature and substance of all information
(except medical information) in its files on the consumer at the time of
~~e request." This includes identification of the sources of information,
except that the sources of information acquired solely for use in preParing an investigative consumer report and actually used for no other
Purpose need not be disclosed:' 127 Finally, section 609 provides an "audit
trail," stipulating that disclosure shall include the names of recipients

?e

--

:zs.
Flyer, note 122 supra.
26. See articles cited in note 25 supra.

1
~7. FCRA, supra noteS,§ 609(aX2). The section continues, "Provided, That in the event a n
ac~Ion is brought under [the FCRA], such sources shall be available to the plaintiff under approPriate discovery procedures in the court in which the action is brought." (Emphasis added).
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of any consumer report on the consumer which was furnished in the
past six months, or two years in the case of employment reports.
a. Medical Information. A consumer reporting agency
is not required to disclose medical information. This is a potentially
important exception in the law, and its evaluation requires additional
background about the personal information market. Four informational
systems will be described.
The need for medical information in underwriting life and health
insurance is obvious and widely accepted by the public. 128 The best
known method by which underwriters obtain medical information is
through medical examinations, usually carried out by physicians retained by the insurance company. Medical examination information
traditionally moves directly to the underwriter, without intermediary.
Retail Credit Co. is now entering this area by establishing a chain of
paramedical service centers. According to the 1971 Retail Credit Co.
Annual Report, a subsidiary,
Physical Measurements, Inc., will accelerate expansion in 1972.
This chain of health history gathering centers, formerly known as
Medical Service Centers, was established to free physicians from
laborious technical tasks and to speed processing of life and health
insurance applications ... They are staffed by technicians trained to
receive medical history, perform certain laboratory tests and take the
physical measurements of applicants for life and health insurance.
The centers now. produce 4,000 reports per month. While we have
not yet officially entered the pre-employment or employee market,
we are already doing these measurements for several insurance companies' agency departments ... Our plan is to establish 100 centers
as quickly as feasible.'129

Presumably a copy of each report would be retained by the paramedical center in case the original gets lost. If these copies were to be
made available to the parent company's inspectors for future insurance
or employment reports, the paramedical centers would open up a vast
new resource of information to the world's largest private investigating
company.
To supplement the information in the application for insurance and
in the medical examination (if one is required), the underwriter maY
128. In 1970, Retail Credit Co. commissioned the Opinion Research Corporation to study public
attitudes toward certain investigations. One question asked. "If a person applies for a life insu~
ance policy. do you agree or disagree that the life insurance company has a right to investigate thts
person on . . . his health and medical history?" Ninety-two per cent of the sample agreed. In 1972.
a similar study showed that 90"7o agreed. ORC Study, 6.
129. /d., at 7.
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obtain an Attending Physician's Statement (APS) from the applicant's
doctor. The APS is usually purchased from the physician, who mails it
directly to the underwriter. In 1971, approximately 4.7 million APS's
were obtained in the U.S. 130
When an insurance company deals directly with an attending physician it often takes from 18 to 20 days to get the health information! 31To
cut down on the time and on the hidden costs, many insurance companies are turning to Retail Credit Co.'s Underwriting Medical History
(UMH) service. UMH claims that it can reduce the time to an average
of 9 days and can reduce the total cost to the insurer from about $12 to
slightly more than $10.132 According to Inspection News, the in-house
magazine of the Retail Credit Co., the selling of UMH services was the
number one sales priority for 1972~ 33 In June 1972, Retail Credit's offices
handled over 26,000 APS reports.t 34 When Retail Credit Co. obtains an
~PS it keeps a copy for its files, to be used as a lead in futu re inspechons.1 35
As has already been noted, most insurance companies employ indeinspection bureaus to bolster their other sources of information. H. Laurence Ross, in an essay titled "Personal Information in
Insurance Files," observed:
~endent

Limitations imposed by the abilities of the inspectors and the adequacy of their sources of information minimize the amount of medical information that can be obtained reliably; gross matters such as
blindness and amputations are the principal items concerning which
reports can be made. 136
Further examples, not so "gross" as Ross suggested, may be found in a
typical Form 930, a record of "significant" information obtained by a
Retail Credit Co. inspector during his working day; e.g., "spleen prob~em," "polio--age 25, right arm;" "wife's colonitis--nerves," "eye inJUry," etc. This information remains in the inspection bureau's files for
future use.
. The fourth source of medical information for underwriters is an
Intercompany data bank known as the Medical Information Bureau
(MJB), which serves more than 700 life insurance companies, some of

---

:~o. Trotochaud, UMH. A Marketing Miracle. INSPECTION NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1972 at 9.

!. ld
a 13 2. 1i The article relates that Retail Credit Co. paid doctors' fees on only 42.3"1o of the APS 's,
~e r aging $7.18 per payment .

33

. ld
134. li

~~~~: Interview with Tom Linnen, Man ager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan.

20,

136. In ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 28, at 207.
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which also issue health insurance. Medical backgrounds on 12 million
individuals are in MIB computers in Boston.137
MIB was founded in 1902. Not listed in the Boston telephone directory and unknown to most physicians and patients, it grows by 400,000
files a year and answers 80,000 queries a day.138 Data enters the MIB
when an underwriter finds a reportable condition during his review of
an application (including the supplementary informational materials).
The underwriter reports the condition in code. Only selected officials at
the member insurance companies have access to the code book, and
clerical personnel at the MIB are said to be ignorant of the meaning of
the codes.139
The MIB is needed, according to the insurance companies, so that
the effects of lying or forgetfullness by insurance applicants can be minimized. Member companies are not allowed to deny an applicant or
assign an extra rate solely on the basis of MIB information. The MIB's
rules require that information be verified through current medical
examinations and inspections~ Violation of the rules can lead to direct
sanctions, including expulsion. The rules are enforced by medical professionals who are pledged to their enforcement. The fact that insurance
companies are competitive and see no benefit in rejecting potentially
profitable business without proof of hazard is believed to be a third
strong reason for the MIB rules to be followed. 141
Most of the codes in the MIB refer to physical diagnoses. However,
there are also codes for psychiatric disorder, attempted suicide, anxiety
reaction and reactive depression, nonconformity (e.g., drinking), environment (e.g., condition of the home and status of the neighborhood),
and individuals "who are predatory and follow more or less criminal
pursuits, such as racketeers, dishonest gamblers, prostitutes,and dope
peddlers. " 142An underwriter desiring more detail than provided by the
code may request the MIB to get it from the source.
Like inspection reports, the insurance companies attempt to keep
the MIB reports confidential. An Aetna Life and Casualty underwriting
manual notes,
40

137. See, Insurance Data Bank Attacked as Abuse of Confidentiality, HOSPITAL PRACTIC~.
47 (Aug. 1972). The article is based on Hearings, not yet published, of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, concerning the health and accident
insurance industry, May 1972. See also, Ross essay, supra note 136 at 208.
138. /d.
139. /d.
140. Where an insurance company is put on warning about an applicant by an MIB code, if the
company does not carry out an investigation it may be estopped from objecting to a later claim on
the ground that the application was false. Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S ..
457 F.2d 596 (lOth Cir., 1972).
141. Ross essay, supra note 136 at 211.
142. /d., 209-10; HOSPITAL PRACTICE, 139 (Aug. 1972).
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Confidential information received from any source, and in particular
from Company medical examiners, applicants, attending physicians,
veterans medical records, letters from ather companies and the MIB
must be treated as highly confidential. Neither the source nor the
nature of the information may be revealed to the field office, agent
or applicant. in any manner. 143

Occidental Life, in its health insurance underwriting supplement, tells
underwriters that MIB
I

Codes are confidential in nature and neither the details nor the fact
that information was obtained from a code bureau is to be disclosed
to anyone except an authorized person within the Company ... No
written interpretation of codes is to be made in the [applicant's] file: 44

The importance of the MIB in underwriting is difficult to evaluate,
because it is not known how much significant information would have
turned up from other sources without benefit of the MIB's " red-flag"
function. In 1971, however, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company paid
$183,307 for services from MIB's computer~ 45 1t received 145,000 applications for individual health insurance; for the 145,000, the MIB yielded
significant "unadmitted" information on 3,000 applications, which led
to special inspections; as a result, 1,800 applicants were refused policies!46
.

While the FTC has not made an official interpretation of the FCRA
regard to its coverage of the MIB, there are indications that the FTC
staff considers the MIB to be exempt under the medical information
exception in section 609~ 47 If so, it will be argued that the FTC staff is in
error.
In

The MIB fits under the section 603(0 definition of a consumer re-

P~rting agency as a regular assembler of consumer information for .dis-

tnbution to third parties (insurance companies) for insurance purposes.
The question is whether the MIB finds an exception because a consumer reporting agency doesn't have to disclose medical information.
Section 603(i) states,
The term "medical information" means information or records obtained, with the consent of the individual to whom it relates, from
licensed physicians or medical practitioners, hospitals, clinics, or
other medical or medically related facilities.

--

b 1 ~3. Information supplied by staff of Subcommittee o n Antitrust and Monopoly. U.S. Senate,
eheved to be up-to-date.
144. ld.
l4S. HOSPITAL PRACfiCE, 139 (Au g. 1972). This compares to $4.4 million expended on in ~ection report fees. Annual Statement for th e Year of 1971 of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
0.

146. ld.
147. ld. at 143.
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The FTC staff has unofficially advised, "Medical information includes records from physicians and medical facilities, and does not
include comments on a consumer's health by non-medical personnel:'148
The legislative history adds no further gloss: the medical information
exception was added at the last moment, in conference committee, on
the theory that medical information should only be tendered with counsel of a physician! 49
In approaching the MIB, three points ought to be kept in mind. (1)
At least some of the information retained in the computer is not medical within the statutory difinition. This would have to be made available
to the consumer under the FCRA. (2) Some of the information probably
did not derive from medical sources, i.e. it may have been supplied by
the applicant, agent, inspector, or underwriter. This would not meet the
statutory exemption standard. Query: would information originally
obtained from a physician, but which passed through various clerks
and underwriters who selected particular aspects and converted what
may have been complex data into a simple code, be considered "from a
licensed physician" within the statute? (3) The statute carefully includes
the element of consent. But if the individual is not aware of the MIB's
existence and believes that his authorization for disclosure of medical
records was given to one insurance company for one purpose, can it
really be argued that he has consented to the circulation of this medical
history to a potential 700 insurance companies?
It is suggested that the FTC interpret section 603(i) to imply knowing consent. This would have several effects. First, it would give the
individual access to the MIB file so that he could be aware of and, if
necessary, challenge his record. Second, it would give the individual
access to APS data in an insurance inspection bureau file. Third, it
would give the individual access to paramedical reports which might
find their way into an inspection bureau's file.
But, it may be asked, if the individual is to have access to all this
information, what purpose is served by retaining a medical information
exception? It is possible, of course, that a consumer reporting agency
might learn that a particular consumer has a dreadful disease about
which the consumer has not been informed. The medical information
exception might be justified in such a situation. However, such a situation must surely be rare, and it could be handled tactfully by referring
the consumer to his physician. As the law presently reads, a reporting
agency wouldn't have to disclose medical information even to the consumer's physician--even if the consumer authorizes such a disclosure in
148. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,793.
149. H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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writing. The medical information exception should be replaced by a
permissive provision allowing the consumer reporting agency to make
disclosure of medical information to the. consumer's physician, instead
of directly to the consumer, provided that the consumer is informed (a)
that there is medical information being withheld and (b) this information will be disclosed to a physician designated by the consumer.
b. Sources of Investigative Consumer Reports. Section
609 (a) of the FCRA requires that the consumer reporting agency disclose sources of information, except where the information is acquired
for use in an investigtive consumer report. In practice this means that a
consumer can learn of the institutional sources of a credit bureau report
but cannot learn of the sources of relatively subjective information
found in an inspection bureau report. In a real sense the exemption of
sources of investigative consumer reports deprives the consumer of the
opportunity to confront his accusers; yet the opposite position, that all
sources should be disclosed at the outset (rather than during litigation),
is not without merit. Indeed, it is argued by the inspection bureaus that
disclosure of sources of investigative reports would put them out of business. If this is true, then the real question is not what to do with
sources, but whether inspection bureaus serve a valid purpose.
In fact, one doesn't have to choose between extremes. It is probably
true that the man on the street would be less willing to make truthful
negative statements about his associates if he knew that his comments
to an investigator might ultimately be disclosed to the subject. It is also
probably true that some sources might suffer reprisals, even violence, if
source identification is revealed. However, even under the FCRA as it
exists, the possiblity of disclosure of sources is real. Sources may be
identified by inference from other information that is disclosed tinder
section 609.
If there is a re-investigation due to a consumer's challenge of reported information, the source will probably be put on notice that his earlier
~tatements had been questioned. The FTC informally advises that reInvestigations might include returning to the original source, in which
case "it is only fair, both to the sources and the consumer, to warn the
sources that their names could be discovered if litigation should en sue:'150Nonetheless, disclosure of sources prior to litigation would probably have a significant impact on the awareness of informants that their
names could be discovered, and would probably lead to the much-feared
·:drying up" of the flow of information. The pro's and con's of eliminating the source exception are difficult to weigh, and it would probably

---

ISO. 4 CCH CCG. supra note 22, 9 11 ,306 at 59,796.
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be premature to take this step, which could wipe out a useful industry,
without more information, especially when the consumer has the alternative of litigation where the withholding of source identification appears· to be causing significant damage.
Even if full disclosure of sources is rejected, the fear of revealing
sources is no justification for failing to require the provision of a copy
of an investigative report to the consumer. The usual procedure for inspection bureaus is to include in a report the number of informants and
the length of time informants have known the subject, but not the
actual identity of informants. Where such identity is retained for the
file (and it isn't always retained), it is usually written on the back of the
file copy of the report. A reproduction of the file copy would not disclose the source. Moreover, if the medical information exception is interpreted as suggested (i.e., to stress knowing consent) there would be
little likelihood of a copy of a report disclosing exempted medical information.
Inspection bureaus should be required to disclose a copy of all reports that have been made on the consumer. This recommendation
might lead some reporting agencies to avoid putting sensitive information into writing by transmitting such information orally.151Enforcement
might be difficult, but the FCRA should be amended to require that all
investigative consumer reports be reduced to writing. In order to insure
that sources are available to a consumer during litigation, the FCRA
should be amended to require that the identity of all investigative
sources be retained in-}ilefor a reasonable length of time, e.g. one year.
5. How Should the Cost of Access Be Allocated?
Disclosure of file content involves certain economic costs. Most
credit bureaus have had to hire additional employees to staff a consumer relation division which can cope with the new flow of consumers
seeking disclosure. Inspection bureaus, which generally require disclosures to be made by high-ranking executives, must consider the cost of
executive time taken up in consumer contacts. Time to pull a file, read
it to a consumer, and perhaps counsel the consumer on how to improve
his record: 52all cost enough to make increased rates a possibility.
I 51. "It is sometimes unwise to submit an unfavorable report in writing, where the informati?n
is difficult to prove legally, to a small or new local account or to an account of unknown qualtty
even in another city." Retail Credit Co. Manager Manual, page C-27, dated Oct. 1963. In reply t_o
the question, "Under what circumstances do you transmit reports orally to clients?" Retail Credtt
Co. responded, "Only when customer needs rush handling. Field Representatives would call the
customer and give the information orally, but this is always followed by a written report. Would
apply to well under l o/o of our reports." Letter from Henry A. McQuade, to U. CHI. L. REV .. Feb.
23, 1972.
.
I 52. A common example of such counselling involves explaining the procedure for filing a ~ott~~
of judgment satisfaction at the court in order to clear the record of a paid-up debt which ts stl
officially outstanding.
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The FCRA permits the consumer reporting agency to make "reasonable" charge to any consumer who was not the subject of adverse action
154
within thirty days~ 53 This charge averages $5, but because very few consumers seek disclosure merely because of curiosity: 55 the reporting agencies have absorbed most of the cost of disclosure. This seems equitable,
since the reporting agencies (and if prices are raised, their clients)
should consider the consumer's well-being a part of the cost of engaging
in a business which necessarily carries with it the possibility of harming
consumers. But if this is true, why should any consumer bear the cost
of disclosure?
C. CORRECTIONS
A third problem pointed out in the Senate Report was that consumers sometimes had difficulty in correcting inaccurate information in
their files:
Some credit reporting agencies proceed on the assumption that an
individual is guilty until proven innocent and refuse to delete information which is no longer verifiable unless the consumer can prove
otherwise. In other cases, the consumer may have difficulty in getting
his version of a legitimate dispute recorded in his credit file. 156
The FCRA attacked this problem by stating in section 611 that if a
consumer challenges any information in his file the reporting agency
must re~investigate and record the current status of the information.157
. For a credit bureau, a re-check is not expensive, since it generally
Involves no more than a couple of telephone calls. Where investigative
consumer reports are involved, on the other hand, the re-investigation
(or "re-handling") necessitates sending an inspector into the field to
t~~k with the original or additional sources. Because of the possibility of
hhgation an executive actively concerns himself with the case, with the
result that an average re-handling may cost as much as $100, including
management and clerical time.158

--

:53. FCRA, supra note 5, § 612.
c 54: Retail Credit Co. charges $5. If a Motor Vehicle Report is included in the disclosure, the
a~~ ts added on. Retail Credit Co .. memorandum concerning compliance with FCRA section 609,
end um, June 24, 197 1.
155. See note 99 supra.
156. S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3.
th157. Re-investigation is not required if the reporting agency "has reasonable grounds to believe
the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant." FCRA, supra note 5, § 6ll(a). The
s
staff has warned that "frivolous or irrelevant" must not be used as a loophole. 4 CCH CCG.
::Pra note 22, S 11,306 at 59,795. The reporting agencies interviewed stated that they had not had
caston to decline a requested re-investigation .
a 158. Letter from Henry A. McQuade, Retail Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 23, 1972. The
The;age_ handling time per contact for Retail Credit Co. is twenty-four minutes. ~et~il Cr~it Co.,
r e Fatr Credit R eporting Act. A Progress Report, dated October 1972. The Illtnots Servtce Buwa1~. estimates its cost of re-investigation to be no more than $25, all inclusive. Interview with
1
tam Dorf, President, I.S .B., Chicago, Nov. 14, 1972.
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How intensive a re-investigation is required? The law is silent, but
the FTC staff has recommended that the re-investigation must be a
good-faith effort, and it should include checking with the original
source, who ought to be informed of the nature of the dispute. Additional sources might also be contacted, the FTC staff suggests, and fairness would dictate that the sources be warned that their names could
be discovered in litigation. 159
The most typical causes of dispute include faulty identification of
subjects by the reporting agency, frequently involving a confusion of
"juniors" and "seniors," or the misfiling of information due to the
presence of many files on people with the same last name. These problems are easily resolved under the section 611 procedures.
Another recurring problem results from the fact that there is no
mandatory public filing of judgment satisfactions, releases on tax liens,
and other documents which would signify to a reporting agency that a
consumer had fulfilled his obligations. Thus an accurate representation
of the public record as it exists at the time a report is furnished may
not be an accurate representation of the consumer's financial and legal
position. State legislation making mandatory and timely filings of satisfactions of judgments, releases, dismissals, and such other documents
pertinent to the disposition of suits, judgments, and liens is clearly indicated.160
A third type of dispute which regularly occurs arises where the reporting agency is convinced that the consumer is lying. For example, an
automobile insurance applicant, knowing that it will increase his premium if the insurer learns that he drives to work and parks his car on
the street at night, might falsify the application. But if he fails to
inform his family and neighbors of the falsification the insurance inspector will learn the truth. He may even note in his report that he
observed the car parked on the street at night but couldn't locate it at
the consumer's residence during the day. Nevertheless, when the consumer is notified that he has been up-rated, he demands that the inspection bureau re-investigate. By this time, of course, the family and neighbors have the story straight, and the car is temporarily kept in the
garage.
Under section 611(a) of the FCRA, the inspection bureau would
have to delete the original information because it could no longer be
159. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,795.
160. This has been recommended by the Governor's Task Force on Credit and Personnel Report·
ing in California. Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 126. The President of Hale-Prietsch Services
suggests that the debtor should pay the $2 filing fee in Chicago, but that the plaintiffs attor~ey
should be obligated to file a notice of satisfaction when a judgment has been satisfied . IntervieW
with Paul Prietsch, President, Hale-Prietsch Services, Chicago, Jan. 18, 1972.
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verified. This does not make particularly good sense, and some inspectors admit that they handle this kind o{ situation by reporting that the
re-investigation has confirmed the original information through additional (un-named) sources. Such a course would make the inspection
bureau susceptible to suit under section 616 of the FCRA, but the
chance of the consumer pursuing the matter into court is believed to be
minimal.
·
The majority of disclosures do not lead to re-investigation.161 Apparently the proportion of consumer reports containing errors is not larg~:
and most consumers who seek disclosure are satisfied with the knowledge that their record, however unfavorable, is accurate.

2

If a re-investigation occurs and it is found that the disputed information was indeed mistaken, or if the original information can no
longer be verified, the reporting agency must promtly delete the information from its records.163 At the time of deletion, the agency must
ci_early disclose to the consumer that he may request the agency to furntsh notification that the item has been deleted to any person specifically designated by the consumer who has received a consumer report
within the last six months~ 64 Interviews with consumer report users indicate that this provision is rarely, if ever, utilized.
If a dispute is not settled by re-investigation, the FCRA allows the
consumer to file a brief statement setting forth the nature · of the dispute!65The agency may limit the statement to one hundred words if it
provides assistance to the consumer in writing the statement~ 66 This provision has not been invoked with any frequency. During the first halfYear under the FCRA, the largest credit bureau in Chicago had only 10
supplemental statements.167

--

1161. Retail Credit Co. re-handles 7'/z% of disclosures, American Service Bureau , 15%, Credit
nformation Corporation of Chicago, 25%, and Credit Bureau of Western Cook County, 10%.
5ources listed in Appendix One.
162. Of the reports re-investigated under the FCRA, the American Service Bureau has found it
n ec~ssary to revise 25o/o, Illinois Service Bureau, 0% (there was one re-investigation), Credit Infor~latl o~ Corporation of Chicago, tO%, and Credit Bureau of Western Cook County, 5%. Sources
~sted 1n Appendix One. This is generally in line with information provided to the Governor's Task
Orce on Credit and Personnel Reporting in California in 1%9, where reporting errors were dis~overed in 7% of the cred it reports, and 5% of the personnel reports which were re-investigated.
Ul/ivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 130.
:~~· FCRA, supra note 5, § 61l(a).
u<t. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6tl(d).
165. FCRA, supra noteS,§ 6ti(b). The statement (or a summary or code) must be included in
all subsequent consumer reports. FCRA, supra noteS, § 611(c).
166. At TRW Credit Data the supplementary statement is given a code summary, which enters
the computer. The full statement remains in a manual file and is read to the inquirer by an operator. Interview with Gilbert Hamblet, Vice President, TRW, Chicago, Jan. 12, 1972.
l67. Interview with T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Credit Information Corporation of Chicago.
Ch•cago, Jan. 25, 1972.
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168

It has been suggested that corrections and supplemental statements
should be sent to other consumer reporting agencies as well as to consumer report users in order to reduce the consumer's task in setting his
record straight. The consumer, of course, is free to do this on his own,
at his own expense; but to place this burden on the consumer reporting
agency would be unworkable in a metropolitan area like Chicago,
where the corrections would have to be sent to dozens of agencies, not
to consider the non-local reporting market.
D. CONFIDENTIALITY
A fourth problem of the consumer reporting industry noted in the
Senate Report was that information in a person's credit file is not always kept strictly confidential! 69 An example of the easy relationship
that existed between the consumer reporting agencies 170 and the government may be seen: in the following excerpt from the Retail Credit Co.'s
Manager Manual:

[Requests for file information frotn Federal authorities] usually come
from FBI men, and investigators from the Intelligence Units of the
Internal Revenue Service of the U.S. Treasury Department. . . Where
Treasury Department investigators ask to photostat our files, assure
yourself that the investigator understands that the information is
only hearsay and not guaranteed information ... Make such notes
from what you learn from the inquiring authority, as will help on
future investigations, but be sure they are used only as tips to direct
the inspector handling an inquiry on the case, to enable him to develop the factual information. The inspector must not reveal in his
report that we have had this inquiry from a government agency.171
Besides government agencies, private individuals who lacked any legitimate purpose were sometimes able to gain access to consumer reports.
An example which seemed to impress the Senate 172 involved a completely
fictitious company created by a TV network for the purpose of testing
the procedures of credit bureaus. The fictitious company was able to
obtain 10 out of 20 reports requested at random from 20 credit bureaus.173
In response to the apparent looseness of reporting agency procedures, the FCRA set forth three permissible circumstances under which
168. Note, Protecting Consumers from Arbitrary. E rroneous. and Malicious Credit Information.
4 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV . 403 (1971).
169. SEN . REP . NO. 91 ·517, supra note 51, at 4.
170. Not a ll reporting agencies were equally willing to cooperate with the government, but the
courts generally came down on the side of the governmental investigators. S ee, e.g., U.S. v. Davey.
426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
171. Page C-82, dated Oct. 1963. Policy cha nged since FCRA.
172. SEN . REP. NO. 91 -517, supra note 51, at 4.
173. See A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 72 (1971).
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a consumer report can be furnished by a consumer reporting agency. A
report can be furnished: (1) In response to a court order; (2) In accordance with the written instructions of the subject; and (3) To a person
whom the agency has reason to believe has a legitimate business need
for the information in a credit, employment, insurance, or other business transaction1174 with the consumer. 1175
There are several additional provisions supporting these permissible
purpose rules. Reporting agencies are required to maintain reasonable
procedures for compliance, and these include that prospective users of
consumer reports "identify themselves, certify the purposes for which
information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for
no other purpose." 176 Any person who knowingly and willfully provides
information concerning an individual from a reporting agency's files to
a person not authorized to receive that information is subject to fine
and imprisonment.177 Conversely, one who obtains information from a
consumer reporting agency under false pretenses is also liable to fine
and imprisonment. 178
To comply with the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies modified
their service contracts by adding a section outlining the FCRA and
binding the recipient of any report to comply with the law in all respects~79ln effect, any subscriber who signs the agreement gives a continuing certification that he has a legitimate purpose and will make
le~itimate use of any report he requests. The potential weaknesses of
thts system have been frequently commented upon: 80 but an alternative
system which would be both workable and foolproof has yet to be depicted. The main area to be strengthened lies in defining "legitimate business purpose" narrowly enough to keep the reporting agencies on guard
lest they become passive partners in their subscribers' violations. This
the FTC can do without additional authority.
In dealing with governmental use of consumer reporting agencies,
the FCRA attempted to distinguish between the legitimate requests of
PUblic officials and mere snooping. The law bravely states that governtnent officials are permitted to obtain consumer reports under only two

---

1 174. Including cases where the inform ation is to be used "in connection with a determination of
he consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality
§e~uu·ect by law to consider an app licant's financial responsibility or status." FCRA. supra note 5,
I 04(3)(0).

75. FCRA, supra note 5, § 604.
1
;~· FCRA, supra note 5, § 607.
1
· FCRA, supra note 5, § 620.
178· FCRA, supra note 5, § 619.
.
17
9. An example may be found in Appendix Five.
1
N 80. S ee, e.g., Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit R eporting Act: The
R. eedfor Further R eform, 17 VILL. L. REV. 44, 66 (1971); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit
Leports, 80 YALE L. J. 1035, 1066 (1971); Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN.
· REV. 550, 559 (1972).
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circumstances: (1) When the information is to be used in connection
with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other
benefit, where the governmental agency is required by law to consider
the applicant's financial responsibility or status; 181or (2) Where the government has an "otherwise legitimate business need." 182
Informal FTC staff opinions have thrown only limited light on what
government purposes are legitimate. For example, non-legitimate purposes include governmental surveys or economic studies. 183 (Interviews
were unable to ascertain how broadly the adjective "legitimate" is
stretched in practice.) In all situations not covered by the two permissible purposes, the reporting agency is allowed to furnish government
representatives no more than identifying information; viz., the consumer's name, address, former address, place of employment, and former
places of employment. 184
Withholding information from non-legitimate recipients is the
responsibility of the consumer reporting agency. The FTC staff has
suggested that each government agent seeking information be required
to complete a form certifying the specific purpose for which he seeks
information and stating that the information will be used for no other
purpose and be given to no other agency! 85 Whether this suggestion has
been taken to heart could not be determined from the interviews conducted by the author, but there was general agreement among respondents that government usage of reporting agencies had substantially
decreased.
Government agencies believed to have made use of consumer reports
prior to the FCRA were invited to evaluate the impact of the new law
on their work. Responses are reproduced in Appendix Six. In general,
the responses indicate that the government agencies took affirmative
action to avoid violation of the FCRA, that the FCRA has resulted in
governmental investigations taking longer and costing the public more
than in the past, and that alternative sources of information were developed to replace adequately the consumer reporting agencies.
E. PUBLIC RECORD INFORMATION
The Senate Report accompanying the Proxmire bill identified public
record information as another area of abuse! 86 Most consumer reporting
agencies either systematically compile records of such items as law
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

FCRA, supra note 5, § 604(3XD).
FCRA, supra note 5, § 604(3XE).
4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11,304 at 59,786.
FCRA, supra note 5, § 608.
4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11 ,306 at 59,799.
S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra nofe 51, at 4.
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suits, tax liens, arrests, indictments, convictions, bankruptcies, judgments, and other publicly recorded data, or obtain such data on an ad
hoc basis by sending their representatives to the courts. Public record
items are often culled from newspapers or purchased from special
sources such as the daily law reporters 187or state motor vehicle departments.188
Except for "clean" motor vehicle records (MVR's), nearly all public
information finding its way into the personal information market
ts potentially adverse. Some of it is undoubtedly inaccurate or incom9
plete, largely because of the absence of mandatory satisfaction filing~~
Newspaper clippings have a particular proclivity for causing problems
because of incomplete identification of their subjects.190 ·
The FCRA's approach to public record information reflects a compromise between Senator Proxmire's original intention of requiring the
r~porting agency to inform the individual whenever it received potenhonally adverse public record information and the industry's contention
that such a control would force the reporting agencies to cease filing
a~d reporting this highly relevant data!91 0n the theory that a consumer
Wtll be more seiously harmed if he loses a job or job opportunity due to
erroneous or incomplete information than if he merely gets turned
down for credit or insurance, the FCRA provided controls that are
applicable only when public record information is used for employment
purposes.192
~ecord

. Reporting agencies are given a choice in mode of compliance. Sect~on 613 allows the reporting agency to (1) notify the consumer at the
hme a report is made that public record information is being reported
for employment purposes, naming the recipient; or (2) maintain strict
~rocedures to insure that all potentially adverse public record information is up-to-date and complete,. reflecting the current public record
status when it is reported. In practice, the first alternative is used less
fre9.uent1y because many employment-purpose investigations follow a
Pohcy of not contacting the subject.193

-----

:87. See profile of Chicago Law Bulletin, Appendix One.
c 88. S ee profile of Illinois Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services, Appendix One. The FTC staff has
aonsJstently taken the position that a state motor vehicle department is a consumer reporting
1~~~cy und er the FCRA. An official interpretation to this effect is expected. FTC News , Mar. 8,
;June16.1972.
18
1 9. See text a t note 160 supra.
In~· Co_mputerization may reduce the amount of newspaper clipping by credit bureaus; Credit
lnt ormatton Corporation of Chicago, at least, dropped this activity when it went to computer.
ervtew with T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, C.I.C., Chicago, Jan. 25, 1972.
lo19 1. Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 147. The relevance of some items, such as arrests not foll;;d by convictions, is certainly open to question.
FCRA, supra note 5, § 613.
193.· Interview
with Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan. 20, 1972.
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Congressman Koch of New York has proposed an amendment to
the FCRA which would require the consumer reporting agency both to
notify the consumer when public record information is being reported,
and to maintain strict procedures to keep the information up-to-date
and complete1•94 The first leg of the proposal, notification whenever public record information is reported, is similar to the original Proxmire
proposal and is susceptible to the same arguments of burden. Maintenance of strict procedures to k eep public record information up-to-date
and complete, on the other hand, would appear to be a workable requirem ent for all reports, employment and otherwise. Indeed, interviews
left the impression that reporting agencies made no more than very
minor changes in their procedures to comply with the "strict procedures" alternative in section 613. Once again, the real problem has
rested not with the reporting agencies but with the public records themselves .
Because public records may not be up-to-date and complete, strict
procedures on the part of a consumer reporting agency will not necessarily protect the consumer. Since the consumer himself is the only person who can say with certainty that a court record or newspaper article
is accurate and complete, the ideal solution would be to require that he
be interviewed prior to dissemination of any report containing such
information. If we admit that this would be time consuming and expensive, with a pay-off in only a minority of cases, we should nevertheless
follow out the logic which in section 613 created a separate requirement
for public record information used for employment purposes. Wh ere
public record information is to be furnished for employment purposes,
the consumer reporting agency should be required to make a good faith
effort to interview the subject of the report prior to dissemination.195
F. OBSOLETE DATA
"Creditors obviously have a right to know if a person has had trouble in paying his bills. At the same time," Senate Report 91 -517 said,
"it can be unfair to burden a consumer for life with a bad credit record
if he has improved his performance." 196 The growth of dossiers in the
personal information market
creates a potential 'record prison' for millions of Americans, as past
mistakes, omissions, or misunderstood events become permanent
194. H.R. 10434, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1 971).
195. This proposal may create two problems. First, should some employment situations be exempted (e.g .• where an employer suspects th at a present employee is stealin g, and wants a n inves tiga tory report with out lettin g the employee know of the investi ga tion)? Second , by increasin g ~h e
burd ens on empl oyment reporting carri'ed out by consum er reporting agencies, we may be inducmg
compa nies to d o an increasing proportion of their own unreg ul ated in-house investigations. See
text at note 251 infra.
I% . S. REP. NO. 91 -517, supra note 51, at 4.
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evidence capable of controlling destinies for decades. Out-of-date
facts, such as previous political affiliations or nervous disorders,
often go unrevised, and these can hauht a person's life.197
How long is a reasonable period in which accurate adverse information about individuals should be permitted to be retained in a credit
file? The FCRA codified the voluntary industry guidelines of the Associated Credit Bureaus 1 ~8-fourteen years for bankruptcy information and
seven years for all other kinds of adverse information~ There is nothing
00
inherently correct in the time limits chosen~ whatever limits are selected
wili necessarily reflect an arbitrary balancing of the consumer's privacy
and commercial need.
It is difficult to imagine what kind of evidence might be adduced to
support the proposition that the present standard is inappropriate. The
main controversy (and a minor one at that) revolves around the question
of whether a Chapter 13 Wage-Earner's Bankruptcl01 should be considered a bankruptcy, and be reportable for 14 years; or an honest effort
of a debtor to pay all his debts, reportable for only 7 years~02 The FTC
staff takes the position that wage-earner plans are not bankruptcies for
purposes of the FCRA;03 but as Appendix Seven indicates, consumer
reporting agencies are not of one mind on this. To promote consistency,
a formal FTC interpretation is in order.
Information which has become legally obsolete may be!retained 204'but
~ot used, except in connection with: (1) a credit transaction expected to
t~volve a principal amount of $50,000 or more; (2) the underwriting of
hfe insurance reasonably expected to involve a face amount of $50,000
or more; or (3) the employment of an individual at an annual salary of
$20,000 or more.205
.
Because of these exceptions, some reporting agencies see no reason
to destroy data that is statutorily old; it might be needed for a future
"high finance" report. To assure that obsolete data is not used illegally,
however, procedures have been instituted to screen out-going reports.
99

--

197. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 160 (1967).
: ~8. ACB, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 6 (1971).
9. FCRA, supra note 5, § 60S(a). c.f , § 605(b).
2
Mrs. Sullivan's House bill would have set 3 years .for many ite.ms. f:I.R. 1634q. 91st Cong. ,
2~ d00.
Sess. 0969). This proposal would have created confusiOn by adoptmg dtfferent agmg standards
or dtfferent categories of information.
201. II U.S.C. § 1001 et seq .. providing that a wage-earner may have the option to file a plan for
P2Yment of his debts in full over a period not exceeding 3 years under court supervision.
02. S ee statement of Royal E. Jackson, Chief, Bankruptcy Division, U.S. Courts, Sullivan Hgs.,
s~gra note 37, at 294.
3. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11,306 at 59,791.
.
.
.
2
th 04. The Sullivan bill would have required that obsolete mformatlon be physically removed from
~rles. H. R. !6340, 91st Cong .• 2d Sess. (1969).
· FCRA, supra note 5, § 60S(b).

2
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This does not appear to be a problem area. Indeed, if Appendix Seven
presents a fair sample, it may be concluded that the costs of storage
outweigh the costs of purging old information and only a fraction of the
total data is retained in-file for more than 5 years. Continued compu06
terization promises to reduce even this amoune
G. INVESTIGATIONS AND PRIVACY INVASION
Senate Report 91 -517 called attention to the pitfalls of gathering
highly sensitive and personal information about an individual's private
life, laying stress on the fact that such information is not only subjective, but is often of only marginal relevance to legitimate commercial
needs~ While neither the Senate Report nor the FCRA defined what is
meant by "highly sensitive and personal information" or "marginal
relevance to legitimate commercial needs," it is clear from the hearing
which preceded the repore08 that Congress was thinking primarily of the
investigations carried out by the inspection bureaus and in particular
their focus upon the characters, habits, and morals of applicants for
insurance or employment. Before evaluating the effectiveness of the
FCRA in this area, therefore, it will be necessary to supply a fuller
background on the activities of the inspection bureaus.
1. Theory and Practice of Insurance Inspections
The purpose of insurance is to distribute on a regular and moderate
basis the expected economic losses of an unknown few among many
who are susceptible to the loss. 209 To succeed, an insurance company
must be able to predict the extent and timing of the losses that may be
sustained by the entire group covered. This requires establishing a
"standard risk" which is representative of the degree of risk the firrn
considers "normal" for the class of policyholders it proposes to cover.
"For probability theory to be applied in a realistic and useful manner
07

206.
Unlike old fash ioned paper files, where storage is very cheap but selective removal
of d ata is very expensive, in the case of the computer tile, storage is very expensive
and selective remova l is very cheap . Storage costs can run as mu ch as half of the
total computer cost. Consequently, the storage of information which is old and outdated simply cann ot be permitted.
Sta tement of Dr. Harry Jord an, TRW In fo rm ation Services (now TRW Credit Data), Sulliv~n
Hgs .. supra note 37, a t 159. This is not to suggest that computerization presents no potentta l
threa t to privacy: th e MIB fil e, described in the text at note 138 supra, is an exampl e of how htghly
private, often subjective, d ata might be computerized. As Professor Miller observes, "Today's l ~se r
techn ology already ma kes it fe asible to store a twenty-page dossier on every American on a ptec e
of tape tha t is less than fi ve thousand feet long. " A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY I 2
(1 97 1). If, for ex ample, Retail Credit Co. were to miniaturize and centralize its files, with comput~r
retrieva l, private information on 40 milli on citizens could be avail able immediately a nywhere 10
the country.
207. S. REP. NO. 91 -51 7, supra note 51 , at 4.
208. S ee the hearin gs cited in notes 37, 48 and 68, supra.
209. FLINN , note 65 supra a t 100.
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by the individual firm , it is imperative that each applicant for insurance
be evaluated in relation to the standat:ds for acceptance adopted by
that firm. This is the essential purpose of any underwriting inspection:' 210
In determining whether a particular applicant for insurance qualifies as a standard risk, information about that person is needed. In
particular, it may be necessary to know about the applicant's physical
condition, his attitude, his environment, and his heredity. These constitute what is known as the applicant's "personal hazard." 1211 Where can
an underwriter obtain this kind of information?
The most obvious source is the applicant himself; he provides most
of the information needed when he fills out the insurance application.
But the applicant wants his policy to be accepted, and at the lowest
premium. He may lie. Or he may forget. Or he may tell only half a
story, thinking it sufficient.
. What about the agent? He represents the company and can provide
Information about the applicant, which he does. But the applicant may
be his friend; and he does want to sell the policy. If he appears to be
too probing, he might not be able to make his sales. So the agent, like
the applicant, is not a sufficient source.
Other sources are possible. For physical information, there is the
physician, either the applicant's or the company's or both. But the
Physician can say relatively little about the applicant's attitude (his
character, habits and morals) or environment. For information about
What other insurors have learned in the past, there are intercompany
data banks. But what if the applicant is not already on record? What if
the record is old or misleading?
For many years, insurance companies experimented with various
Ways of obtaining the extra, independent information they needed. LawYers, consumer credit bureaus, mercantile agencies, commerical agents;
th:se were tried, but found wanting:m By 1870, some insurance comp~ntes were using their own men to undertake inspections of applicants:!IJ
n 1901, Retail Credit Co. entered upon the scene as the pioneer inde~endent insurance inspection service. By specialization, wide distribution, low cost standardized methods, and aggressive marketing, Retail

---

~:o. Id. at 102.
b t I. ld. a t 95. The more acc urately th e und erwriter can evalu ate personal hazard, in theory, the
sue ter Wtll be his compa ny's loss experience, and the fairer the distribution of risks among in reds
b~ l 2. Id. at 160. Detective agencies were apparently never used for inspection reports . presum ably
2~a use th eir services were too expensive.
in 3· ld. a t 158. The Equitable Life Assurance Society a ppears to have been the first company to
in srsct Its policyh old ers regul arly , beginnin g in 1870. The decision to inspect applicants was made
92, when the Equitable reduced its contestability period to one year from issue. !d. .
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Credit Co. convinced the insurance companies that independent inspections were a key to sound underwriting. Today only a minority of insurance applicants--those under a particular age applying for less than a
particualr amount of coverage--are not inspected by Retail Credit Co.
or one of its competitors.
The growth and shaping of the inspection bureaus reflected the
needs of the insurance companies. These needs included (a) low cost
per report, (b) speed of reporting, (c) standardization of reports, and (d)
accuracy of information.
a. Low Cost. The standard inspection report in Chicago
costs the insurance company $5.25. For more penetrating investigations, where coverage will be extensive or where there is reason to believe that the subject presents an unusual risk, the inspection will be
charged at twice or triple the standard rate. Open-ended investigations
will be charged at an hourly rate, averaging $10.50 in Chicago.
The capital requirements of an inspection bureau are minimal. The
major items of expense are an office, preferably with telephone, desks
and typewriters; file cabinets; and salaries for management, inspectors,
and clerks. Low entry cost into the industry entices many inspectors
with national bureaus to resign and open up their own independent
bureaus. If they can develop contacts with underwriters and other
insurance company management personnel, they may land orders for
inspections sufficient to survive. The local independents have been most
successful in dealing with the fire and casualty insurers. With market
entry so easy, established bureaus are constrained to keep their prices
low; indeed, at this writing, a number of newcomers in the Chicago
market have cut prices and created a minor price war.214
Given this orientation to competitive pricing for the favors of the
insurance companies, it is natural that inspectors will not be highly
paid professionals. The following classified ad is symptomatic:
Male-- Misc. Employ.
INSPECTORS
MAKING insurance and business reports.
No experience, minimum age 21 with car.
Earnings depending on production.
1313 SW 27 Ave. 215
To qualify as an inspector, one must generally have a high school diploma, a car, and an ability to get along with people. Some inspection
214. Interview with William Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Chicago, Dec. 18, 1972.
215. Miami Herald, April 24, 1972, at 28-C. The address is Retail Credit Co.'s Miami office.
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bureaus also require typing skills, but the trend in recent years has
been for the bureau to provide secretari.es.
"Earnings depending on production." While there are variations
from one inspection bureau to the next, the general structure of the
industry relates an inspector's salary to his production. Either directly
or indirectly, this means that the inspector receives a percentage of the
selling price of each report he prepares~ 1 6 Furthermore, the inspector's
commission may be based on a set "quota" of reports made by him. If
17
~he quota is surpassed, a bonus is paid~ If the quota is not met, the
~nspector will be reprimanded and may ultimately lose his job. Most
Inspectors receive per mile travel expenses.
A new inspector usually receives some training, often in the nature
of on-the-job exposure to the methods of senior inspectors. The amount
of training varies greatly among the inspection bureaus. When an inspector is fresh to the job, he is only expected to complete 12-14 reports
a day. An experienced inspector is expected to handle as many as 24
reports a day. When an inspector is sent out to prepare reports on consumers living in rural areas (referred to as being "on circuit"), he might
18
?btain the information for 40-60 reports in a single da/ ln short, the
Inspection industry is structured so that each inspector produces the
~aximum possible number of reports. That this is economically effiCient seems clear; whether it results in a conflict with another insurance
company need, accurate information, is a matter yet to be weighed.
b. Speed. There are two main reasons why the insura?ce companies desire speed of reporting from the inspection bureaus.
First, the longer it takes to approve an application, the greater the
Possibility that the potential insured will change his mind or ta~e his
business elsewhere. Second, the premiums don't come in, and coverage
doesn't begin until the inspection report has been received and the
application evaluated? 19 Delay, therefore, doesn't serve either the company or the applicant.

--

216. Inspectors say that their average portion is about 40%, or $2 on a $5 report . Inspectors
ea rn, they say, between $400 and $800 a month.
217. Determined by the percentage base applied to the number of reports in excess of the quota.
The possibility of this type of bonus is another incentive to produce the maximum number of rePOrts .
218. Figures in this paragraph were offered in testimony by two former Retail Credit Co. inspec1ors tn Reta il Credit Co. v. Derryberry, note 96 supra. The manager of the Oklahoma City Retail
~edtt Co. office testified that the experienced inspector would average 16 to I8 reports per day.
. · Congress had been informed by Retail Credit Co.'s president that the average is around 12
teports per day . Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 503. In speaking of averages, one should keep in
llltnd th at inspectors are called upon to make many different kinds of reports under varying circurnstances, and th at at least some of these reports can easily be made in a few minutes. /d.
}19. There are exceptions. E.g., automobile insurance is often available to apparently good risks
on btnder," pending the outcome of inspection.
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Fast service is related to the production quota system. Having to
complete as many reports as possible, the inspector cannot dawdle. At
the "average" inspection bureau, the inspector is given a batch of order
tickets when he arrives at the office in the morning. The manager (or in
a large bureau, a supervisor) has already segregated the in-coming
order tickets by geographic area so that an individual inspector can
limit his range for the day. The manager has also run the order tickets
through the files, to see if the subjects have been previously inspected
or if there is any public record information, and if so, whether it is
legally obsolete. The inspector reviews any files that were found for
leads, plans his route, and leaves for the field. In most cases, he won't
return to the office until the following morning, or perhaps even several
days later, depending on the size of his batch of order tickets and how
far away his inspection areas are. A few bureaus deal with their inspectors almost entirely through the mail. This is particularly true in the
instance of part-time fee inspectors ("correspondents") who are located
in areas far removed from inspection bureau offices.
Once the inspector has left the office he is on his own. The hours he
keeps are his business, and in fact many inspectors have to work at
night or on weekends to locate sources at home. The inspector is supposed to interview at least two sources on each report, and seek additional confirmation where there is derogatory information!20 ·In the
majority of inspections for insurance purposes, the applicant himself or
an adult member of his family will be one source. Prior to the FCRA,
there was a certain amount of hesita~cy in approaching the applicant,
and the Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual instructed:
Interviews should be avoided: (1) when we have in file or develop on
preliminary investigation information on habits, morals, or reputation which is sufficiently serious to probably cause rejection; (2) when
the agency situation is serious; (3) when a customer requirement
prohibits. 221
Now that the FCRA gives the subject access to the file, the inspection bureaus are less reluctant to interview the subject of a report. A
1972 revision to the Retail Credit Co. Life and Health Manual speaks
of the advantages to be gained by a direct interview:

*
*

Applicant's identity can be conclusively established.
His physical appearance can be observed as well as his manner
of living and environment.

220. Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual3l, page dated Oct. 1967.
221. !d. at 48, page dated June 1964.
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Information regarding health, habits, drug use, arrests, and driving record can be obtained.
Leads for further investigation can be secured.222

Nevertheless, the revision still sets out reasons to avoid interviewing the
subject, including (1) the inquiry instructs "Do Not Interview," and (2)
"The possibility exists that the applicant may be disturbed by our investigation (he was disturbed by a previous handling, or we have a tip
from file or the agent that we should avoid an interView unless absolutely necessary). " 223
With the stress on production and speed, it is inevitable that inspectors sometimes cut corners. According to the inspection bureaus this is
most rare, but according to former inspectors interviewed it happens
regularly. One informant estimated that the inspector departs from the
manuallO% of the time in city inspections, and much more often when
"on circuit." According to the inspection bureaus, the reason why the
former inspectors interviewed think corner-cutting is common is the
same reason these inspectors are "former." 224
. There are several well-tred avenues of corner-cutting. Instead of
Interviewing two sources and confirming all derogatory data, the inspector may interview only one source. (One former inspector confided that
?e had on several occasions seen other inspectors create sources and
Information out of air.) Instead of street investigations, the inspector
may rely heavily on the telephone. Instead of using old information
("O.I.") from the file as a lead, the inspector may rely on the file as his
sole or substantial source. Stock informants,225 such as bankers, service
station attendants or grocery store managers may be relied on , particularly in rural areas, even though their knowledge of a particular consumer may be highly tenuous. Publi.c records may be entirely overlooked.

--

222. Retail Credit Co. Life and Health Manual, page E-2, 1972.
·
;23. ld., Retail Credit Co.'s revised Automobile R eports M anual states : "A direct interview
outd be attempted on every Automobile Report whenever not specifically prohibited by a custo111
re er overprint." Page C-17, dated Jun e 1972. Th e increased willingness to confront the subject of a
lort, seen in the cited revisions, must be considered an important effect of the FCRA.
al 24. It was not possible to obtain inform ation from inspectors presently em~ed by the nationThts, say former inspectors, is beca use the nationals have power to bta~;Kba ll a former em~ oyee from fu ture empl oym ent. Th e sources most impressive to the author were inspectors and
n anagers prese ntly employed by local ind ependent burea us who had previously worked for the
attonals
i ~2S. Retail Credit Co. utilizes a fil e which "lists inform ants who are in a logical position to give
orma ti on on a group of people and who have been interviewed quite fre quently a nd are th erehore cogniza nt of our business and what we want." But, inspectors are told , " Some business
c~~ ses have a rul e th a t no inform ation wh at~ver is to _be given o u~ <?n em_Pioyees. Wh en this oca s, get the point up to the Ma nager , wh o wtll determme whether tt ts destrable to attempt to get
r r~g ul ar informant at the plant or place of business." Retail Credit Co. Inspector M anual, 33,
evtsed in 1970 to chan ge the word "informa nt" to " source."
5

r
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In sum, although there is no evidence available as to how frequently
corner-cutting occurs, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
official inspection bureau policy and actual inspector behavior do not
always remain in close joint:26 This does not necessarily imply that consumers are injured by corner-cutting; in fact, it is reasonable to assume
that a cheating inspector would not invent derogatory information,
because this would be likely to be challenged and a cycle begun which
would lead back to the inspector. The problem arises, more probably,
from situations where time pressures lead the inspector to accept derogatory information without sufficiently checking it out. ·A certain amount
of error, sloppiness, and unverified gossip is likely to enter any inspection system which requires an investigator to average over 15 reports a
day; 27with a minimum of two sources per report; where the investigator
must locate sources (sometimes situated over a large geographic area),
must convince the sources to talk about matters that are sometimes
highly personal and subjective, and must put interview notes into shape
for the report.228
c. Standardization. To satisfy the insurance companies'
need for low-cost, speedy reporting for a variety of lines of insurance,
the inspection bureaus have developed a high degree of standardization
in their procedures. This is reflected in the fact that each line of insurance is reported on a separate form, each form containing questions
29
deemed important for the particular underwriting needs~ ln gathering
his information, the inspector has merely to ask the questions in the
order they appear on the form. Because the forms are drawn to meet
the needs of underwriters, they tend to be similar from one company to
another. A few independent inspection bureaus have experimented with
departures from the norm; for example, they have deleted from their
automobile inspection reports all questions regarding the applicant's
character, habits, and morals?30
Other manifestations of standardization may be found, especially in
the national inspection bureaus, where inspectors fill out daily
production sheets listing the .number of reports made and the amount
226. For litiga tion involving inspector foul -ups, see: Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 185 Neb. 304,
175 N.W.2d 292 (1970); Atwell v. Retail Credit Co., 431 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1970); Peacock v.
Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Copley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
295 F. Supp. 93 (S .D. W. Va. 1968); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 201 A.2d 344 (Md. Ct. App .•
1964); Wagner v. Retail Credit Co., 338 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1964); Petition of Retailers Commerctal
Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376 (196 1); a nd Weinrich v. Retail Credit Co., 186 F. Supp. 392 (W.D·
Pa. 1960).
227. See note 218 supra.
228. Mechani sms for control are described in the text following note 231 supra.
229. Examples a re found in Appendix Eight.
.
230. A few insurance companies are experimenting with automobile inspections th at don't tnvolve th ese subjects. Such inspections usually imply a ski mming of the better risks in the market.
Res ults of such experim ents were not yet avail able.
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of "significant" (also called "protective") data which they have
uncovered. These sheets form the basis for a highly systematic
evaulation of the work of individual inspectors, and allow comparisons
~o be made between branch offices and even between competing
tnspection bureaus.
.
d. Accuracy. Insurance companies naturally want the
Information they receive to be accurate and complete. If it is not, the
w~ong underwriting decisions will be made and the inspection reports
Wtll not be serving a useful purpose. The main area for concern, however, is not that too much derogatory information will be supplied, but
t?o little. That is, if inspectors are not doing their work, they are more
hkely to err on the consumer's side, so that there is little chance of
being caught.
. To counteract this possibility, great stress is placed on the production of "significant data," information which might lead to declinations
or rate-ups. Examples from Retail Credit Co. Form 930 (Significant
Pe~ture and Inquiry Control) include "bankruptcy," "bad driving reputation," "youthful driver in family," "driving violations," "going into
~avy," "topless dancer," "polio, age 25," "high performance car,"
husband's driver license suspended," and "girl crazy--D student."
Some, but not all, inspection bureaus keep close statistics on signific~nt data production. By trending from the past, they know how much

stgnificant data an inspector would normally produce if he were doing
an honest and efficient job. These norms are made known to the inspector.s and become in effect--according to former inspectors--a quota.
P~tlure to meet the quota without good reason leads to reprimand or
·
dtsmissal.
The inspection bureaus deny that they use a quota system for signi-

~cant data, but internal documents, as well as the information provided
Cy former inspectors, indicate otherwise. For example, Retail Credit
0 · supplied its employees a booklet titled "Objectives 1970," which
Opens with a note from a company vice president saying, "I encourage
You to keep and use this booklet ... Nowhere else will you be able to
compile as much important information to help you understand the
goals of your company." The booklet shows the company's average
rercentage of cases with significant information for various insurance
tnes (e.g., automobile services, 52.3 per cent; life and health services,
1 per cent) and gives the latest statistic for the local office, together
Wtth the objective. The booklet also provides figures on below-standard
~nderwriting and below-standard operating, where reports have been
ounct to suffer from various deficiencies.

?A
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Significant information is also used in competition between inspection bureaus for insurance company contracts. A Retail Credit Co.
internal letter to California managers stated that an account with the
American National Insurance Company had just been won back from
the American Service Bureau as a direct result of developing more protective information than the competitor.231
The inspector, then, is faced with two important pressures: he must
produce a large number of reports, and he must produce a given quota
of significant information. To minimize the hazards of this situation,
the inspection bureaus build in certain production controls. The work
of inspectors is under periodic review to see if the reports "ring true."
Occasionally a second inspector is sent out to interview sources already
interviewed, for the purpose of exposing discrepancies. If an underwriter notes a conflict between an inspection report and other information
available to him, he will contact the inspection bureau, and an explanation will be sought. Finally, with the FCRA in effect, mistakes will be
brought to light by the report subjects themselves.
Whether these various protections are sufficient is a matter requiring more evidence than is now available. The impression gained from
many interviews is that the adequacy of production controls varies
greatly from one bureau to another and between the various branch
offices of a particular bureau.232 A key variable appears to be the skill
and integrity of each office manager.

2.

Personnel Reporting by Inspection Bureaus
Expansion of the national inspection bureaus into the field of
employment reporting was natural. Where else could employers gain
information about a potential or present employee's character, habits,
morals, and reputation for such a reasonable price?
Retail Credit Co. moved into employment reporting rather slowly,
beginning in 1901 or 1902 as an aid to the insurance companies in their
selection of agents and medical examiners.233 From the standpoint of
sales volume, however, personnel reporting didn't become important
until the beginning of the Second World War. "As early as 1940, the
desire to employ only persons loyal to the principles of Democracy
231. Letter of Oct. 27, 1971 from th e Regional Vice President.
232. Mistakes have been know n to happen eve n in cases where large policies are involved . E.g ..
United Family Insurance Company has sued Retail Credit Co. for $8 million, charging that it was
misled by a n inspection report into issuing $ 15 million worth of life insurance to an Okl ahoma
rancher. Atl anta Journ a l, June 19, 1972. Apparently, the inspection greatly overstated the ranch·
er's worth, obta ined fi gures on the size of his ranch from a n erroneous newspaper clipping hung
on a wa ll as a joke, and neglected to mention a variety of suspicious circumstances about the
rancher 's life. The rancher was mysteriously murd ered one year after the insurance was drawn.
Wall Street Journal , Nov. 23 and 24, 1971, both at 1, col. 1.
233. FLINN, note 65 supra, at 289.
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induced the Lockheed Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation . .. to utilize
the facilities of the Retail Credit Company." 234
Prior to 1940, the company had maintained a policy of reporting on
applicants only, but, William A. Flinn relates, "Because of the conflicting ideologies fired up by the impending conflagration of total war, the
firm's policy was amended to permit the making of reports on present
employees or"armament manufacturers:'~ 35 Today, employment reporting
accounts for about 15 per cent of Retail Credit Co.'s report!i.36 "Very
few" employment reports are made to employers on present iemployees337
For the other national inspection bureaus, the percentage of reports
made for employment purposes is generally much smaller, and in absolute terms, no inspection bureau approaches Retail Credit Co.'s 6 million a year.238
Personnel reports are sold to a variety of industrial, commercial,
financial and insurance companies, and cover education, job history,
employment experience, character and skills. They may go beyond this.
Retail Credit Co. lists 16 different types of personnel report, some of
which are full-scale detective-type investigations. One example is the
"personal progress report."
The personal progress report is drawn on one who is presently
employed. The inspector is warned not to interview either the subject or
his present employer. According to a Retail Credit Co. solicitation,
These Reports provide investigations of the standing of the employee
as a citizen, his civic and other community activities, records as to
payment of bills, and personal finances. This type of investigation is
suggested on employees under consideration for promotion or for
transfer in position or location; for periodic checks of employees,
especially those at detached locations seldom visited; when disturbing
rumors concerning an employee are circulated, or in any situations
requiring full investigations.239
234. /d. at 293.
235. /d. at 294.
236. Letter from Henry A. McQuade, Retal Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 23, 1972. To
understand the perceived need for employment reports, see Walsh, Th e Case for Applicant /nvesti·
~ations, in BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY:PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d
.ed., 1972), where it is related that in a study of over 6,000 employment applicants, highly skilled
lflvestigators found that 1 in every 7 who had been considered suitable for hire turned out to have
had an unfavorable background.
2.37. McQuade letter, supra note 236. In Chicago, about 33% of Retail Credit Co.'s disclosures
ar1se from personnel reports. /d.
238. Figure relies on McQuade's IS% estimate, /d., applied to 40 million annual reports. Listing
Application to New York Stock Exchange, A-30695, Mar. 1, 1971. Personnel reporting fluctuates
With the state of the economy, and in 1971 accounted for only 6o/o of Retail Credit Co.'s volume.
1971 Retail Credit Co. Annual Report, 7.
239. Retail Credit Co. Brochure titled Personnel Reports for Better Selection of Personnel (1966).
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The report is charged at an hourly rate. The investigator is directed to
describe, among other things, "marital status, domestic life, personal
reputation, habits, morals, and type of associates. Careful attention to
personal standing in the neighborhood and community; whether popular, well-liked, or disliked. Describe membership and extent of participation in any civic, social or fraternal organizations. Cover other leisure
time activities." 240
3. The FCRA and Investigations
Recognizing that inspection bureaus were in important ways different from credit bureaus, Congress created the concept of the investigative consumer reporf 241 to deal with reporting that involves personal
interviews. Investigative consumer reports are subject to the same requirements as regular reports, with two additional provisions. First,
under section 606 of the FCRA, when a person procures an investigative
consumer report he must disclose to the consumer within three days
that the report is being made, and must inform the consumer that he is
entitled to request a further disclosure of the nature and scope of the
investigation. There is one exception: pre-notification is not necessary
when the report is to be used for employment purposes for which the
consumer has not specifically applied. Second, under section 614, a
consumer reporting agency may not include adverse information in an
investigative report drawn from a previous report more than three
months old, unless the agency first verifies the information.
Pre-notification is achieved in three different ways. Some insurance
companies and employers incorporate a pre-notification of investigation
in their application forms. Others supply their agents or hiring personnel with pre-notification letter which can be personally presented to the
applicane42Finally, some insurance companies mail the pre-notification
letter to the potential insured after the insurance application has been
received by the company from the agent.
The last method is sometimes used as an alternative, at the choice
of the agent, when the agent believes that mention of an impending
investigation may block his sale~ This is legal, so long as the insurance
company delivers the pre-notification within three days after the inspection report is requested. The procedure makes clear, however, that the
existing pre-notification provisions do not necessarily allow a consumer
to exercise knowing consent to an investigation. Indeed, if matters are
43

240.
241.
242.
243.

I d. Sample forms for personnel investigations appear in Appendix Eight.
See note 102 supra.
See Appendix Nine.
Interview with John Mauck, Insurance Broker, Jan. 6, 1972.
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moving efficiently, an investigation can be completed before the consumer even knows that his application entails an investigation. To assure
knowing consent, the FCRA should be amended to provide that the
consumer be apprised of a possible investigation at the time he applies
for insurance, employment, or credit, where the application normally
entails an investigation.
Even where pre-notification comes at a time when the consumer still
has an opportunity to decide that he does not wish to trade his privacy
for the benefit applied for, the FCRA provisions do not provide adequate information for the consumer to exercise knowing consent. The
prenotification does not describe either the investigation's objectives or
methods in any detail.244 If he desires more information, the consumer
must make a written request "within a reasonable period of time." 245
The follow-up letters used by most insurance companies upon receipt of
a request for further information provide very little additional illuminati on~46To allow the consumer to exercise knowing consent to an investigation, the FCRA should be amended to require the party requesting
the investigation to supply the consumer, prior to the investigation,
with the standard form used by inspection bureaus or other consumer
reporting agencies in reports of the kind normally prepared under the
circumstances ofthe consumer's application. 247
The FCRA seems to be particularly weak in the area of employment
reporting. Pre-notification is not required if the subject of the report
has not specifically applied for an employment action~ 48 This obtains in
four situations: (1) Where a potential employee has not been approached
by the employer (e.g., an executive search organization scanning a
number of possible candidates for a job); (2) Where incumbent employees are being reviewed pursuant to a periodic program; (3) Where an
employee is being considered for promotion, although he hasn't applied
for promotion; and (4) Where the employer suspects his employee of
embezzlement or some other impropriety. It seems anomalous that
employers may obtain investigative reports on an individual who has

--

244. See Appendix Nine.
245. FCRA , supra noteS,§ 606(b). One underwriter estimated that IOo/o of the potential insureds
request further information.
246. See Appendix Nine.
k247. Two objections might be raised to this proposal. First. the consumer report user might not
. now at the time of the application whom he will hire for the investigation. This does not seem
~rnportant, however, because the standardized reports developed by the reporting agencies for var~ous purposes are sufficiently similar that, for example, if the consumer applied for life insurance,
11 Wouldn't matter whether he saw the Retail Credit Co. form or the American Service Bureau
~orrn. Second, if the consumer knows ahead of time what the investigation is looking for, he will be
1
n a position to make sure the report turns out well for him. This may be true, but why bother with
any pre-notification at all if the purpose is not to put the consumer in a position where he can
tnake reasonable choices about the relinquishment of privacy?
248. FCRA, supra note S, § 606(a)(2).
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not applied for employment when a creditor may not obtain less
objectionable types of reports on individuals who have not applied for
credit.249
In non-notification investigations of the above type, the consumer
may lose a valuable job without ever learning that he was investigated.
This could happen because (a) the subject is often not interviewed in
employment-purpose investigations, (b) other informants are often
asked not to mention the investigation to the subject,250 and (c) once the
consumer reporting agency has met its obligation of ascertaining that
the consumer report user has a legitimate purpose, there is no one looking over the employer's shoulder to see to it that he meets his obligation of adverse action notification under the FCRA. There is no way of
knowing how frequently abuse occurs in this area, but the potential
loophole is large.
Perhaps the loophole could be plugged by amendment to the FCRA,
but no important gain would be registered unless a more gaping hole
were plugged first. This is the problem of the "in-house" investigation.
Employment investigations are often handled by a corporation's internal personnel or security department,2 51 These are not consumer reporting agencies under the section 603(f) definition because they do not
furnish reports to "third parties. "·252 It makes no sense in terms of an
employee's privacy that the degree of informational control to which he
is entitled depends upon the technicality of whether an investigator is
paid by the employer directly or through the intermediary of a third
party. Legislation must be fashioned to protect all employees equally. 253
So long as in-house investigations have special privilege, any move to
tighten controls on consumer reporting agencies will only lead more
employers to create their own internal security divisions.
Before leaving the subject of employment reporting, one additional
ambiguity in the FCRA should be mentioned. Suppose an inspector
decides, whether out of laziness or because he has not been successful
in his attempts at a face-to-face interview, to obtain information from
an employer through use of the telephone. Is this an investigative

249. The author is gratefu l to James A. Ambrose, Vice President of Consumer Trends, Inc., for
his lucid expression of this thought in a letter to U. CHI.L. REV., Jan. 11. 1972.
250. See. e.g., Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual at 37, page dated June, 1964.
251. Industry sources suggest that a trend toward in -house investigations has been enhanced by
the FCRA because of the necessity for disclosure when consumer reporting agencies are involved.
252. A similar in -house problem exists with regard to inspection reports prepared by the Equ itable Life Assurance Society's internal inspection division . The Equitab le takes the position that
these reports are covered by the FCRA', (letter from Paul H. Patterson, Regional Inspection Manager, to U. CHI. L. REV., Nov. 14, 1972), but a court might not agree.
253. Such legislation may have to consider certain exceptions; e.g., where pre-notification of an
investigation might make it impossible to uncover evidence of a suspected crime.
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consumer report? The definition in section 603(e) speaks of "personal"
interviews. Is a telephone conversation a personal interview?
The question is not easily passed over for two reasons. First, because
credit bureaus frequently obtain information by telephone, often in the
form of direct reports. Must pre-notification be given? Second, because
Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. is planning to enter into competition with
the inspection bureaus, using a system whereby credit bureau employees would be trained to obtain the kinds of information by telephone
which are presently obtained through face-to-face interviews by inspectors?54 Presumably, if the telephone conversation elicits inform ation
about the consumer's "character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living; '255 it is an investigative consumer report. But
to bring certainty, the FTC should make a formal interpretation that
the words "personal interview" in section 60J(e) include telephone interviews.
In evaluating the impact of the FCRA on investigative consumer
reporting, three questions should be asked . First, has the new law fostered more accurate and complete records? Second, has it changed
methods of information collection to the enhancement of privacy values?
And third , has it reduced the flow of what one writer has described as
"informational communication that--however accurate and complete-reports facts that cannot decently be retailed ?" 256
To the first question, the answer is a qualified affirmative. The
FCRA has provided a mechanism whereby the consumer can confront
and challenge damaging information. By bringing the inspection
bureaus out from behind their curtain of secrecy, by giving them protection from tort actions in return for opening up their files to consumers, by making them more willing to approach the subject of · the
report for information, by reducing somewhat the indiscriminate use of
old information already in file, and by giving the consumer the opportunity to learn what is in his record and have it changed if it is wrong,
the FCRA has undoubtedly been a force for accuracy of records. Nevertheless, that improvements can be made within the framework of the
FCRA, should be clear from the foregoing pages.257
Has the FCRA changed the methods of information collection?
There have been a few changes. For example, with the possibility of
disclosure to a consumer an inspector's reporting errors are more likely

--

2254. Plaintiffs brief, note 46 supra.
55. FCRA, supra note 5. § 603(e).
256. Lusky , Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV . 693 (1972).
257._ For personalized examples of the FCRA 's weaknesses, see Shaefer, Consum ers Gripe That
Credtt R eporting La w Doesn 't Always Work , Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971; Auerbach, Credit
Probers: Consumers Past Still Fair Gam e, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1972.
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to get back to the inspector, forcing him to be more careful. The increased likelihood that the subject of the report will himself be interviewed marks another change. However, the one sentence which was
repeated over and over in interviews was this: ''We're not doing anything differently now from the way we were doing it before the FCRA."
This response may seem curious because in many ways it is untrue. In a
fundamental sense, however, it is true: the FCRA has done nothing to
restructure the industry.
Yet, there lurks in the FCRA a passage which creative public administration could read as a lever for basic change. The passage is section 607(b):
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report
it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom
the report relates.

An unofficial FTC staff opinion has interpreted this section to imply
the need for adequate training of personnel, verification of adverse information by more than one source, and an end to quotas for the devel59
opment of adverse information:58Jfthe FTC had rule-making authoritl;
section 607(b) could become a tool for the restructuring of the inspection industry; lacking that authority, the FTC can nevertheless move in
that direction by the process of making formal interpretations of the
phrase "reasonable procedures. " 260
Finally, has the FCRA limited the reporting of facts which "cannot
decently be retailed"? The simple answer is No. The FCRA made no
attempt to control the subject matter of investigation. Character, habits,
and morals are still standard reporting material. A person's drinking
problems, sex life, health history, political beliefs, reputation, and associates are still fair game. Insepction bureaus remain the bargain basement detectives, the purveyors of hearsay, which they have always been.
In fairness to the inspection bureaus several things should be said.
First, hearsay itself carries connotations from the courtroom which are
not quite as appropriate in the commercial world. Everyone makes decisions based on hearsy, and the difference between A asking B about C
and A paying D to ask B about C is not terribly great. The additional
step may depersonalize the inquiry and may create new possibilities for
error, but it doesn't change the nature of the communication. The
258.
259.
supra
260.
infra.

4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,791.
Other than to promulgate "procedural rules", the F.T.C. has no rule-m aking power. FCRA.
note 5, § 621(a).
For an indication of what might be reasonable procedures, see text preceding note 291
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change occurs not when the third party intercedes, but when his report
becomes a filed dossier available for future use. However, the future use
of the dossier can be limited, which is one of the FCRA's objectives.
The dossier could be required to be destroyed, but then the subject
would never be able to confront damaging information. In a sense the
files represent a bureaucratization of hearsay which serves the individual, if properly controlled, by giving him a handle over communications which might otherwise be too ephemeral to grasp, and therefore
impossible to defend against.
Second , the inspection bureaus are not made up (as some of the
more lurid episodes in their history might otherwise suggest) of evil,
insatiably curious gumshoes. The inspectors are very much like other
middle-class individuals, just doing a job. If the job requires snooping
into sensitive personal information blame should be placed upon the
master, not the servant, and in this case that means the insurance companies. But the insurance companies themselves are just doing a job-attempting to distribute risks in a fair fashion to themselves and the
consumer public.
The public can call off the inspectors, but presumably not without
paying an economic price. "Presumably" is used because information is
not available which would allow the public to estimate the cost in additional premiums of "characters, habits, morals" inspections were eliminated. The underwriters say this information is "relevant," and so it is.
The question which must be asked is, how relevant in terms of dollars
and cents? If it costs more for an individual to retain privacy, he should
be given the choice of paying the price. The worst fault of the present
privacy-invading structure is that an individual is given no alternatives
Which make practical sense.
.
A third point about inspection bureaus which might otherwise be
overlooked is that the inspection bureaus perform many useful services
for the insurance companies which have little or no bearing on privacy
as it is usually understood. A reading of the report forms in Appendix
Eight will reveal that, at least in the property lines of insurance, investigation of character, habits, and morals is of relatively small importance
compared to the objective types of information collected.
In the final section of the paper we turn attention to the future.
What are the strategies of reform; i.e., how can privacy be protected in
the personal information market?
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PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET
Without the refuge of privacy, creativity is displaced by dogmatism,
spontaneity by behavior for the record and autonomy by the overwhelming sense of powerlessness. The neighbor becomes a potential
informer, the acquaintance at the workbench, a hazardous confidant. Without legal power to know what is being said about him, to
find and confront the faceless bearer of tales, without the right of
privacy, in short- -the only refuge is in radical orthodoxy.
From a Speech by Edward F. Ryan,
Counsel to the Ontario Law Reform Commission

A universally accepted definition of privacy does not exist. We can
all agree with Brandeis, however, that privacy has to do with being let
alone, with not having one's autonomy invaded except by invitation.
Whatever else it may mean, privacy implies an ability on the part of the
individual to control at least certain kinds of information about himself:261Privacy can rarely be absolute, of course, because individuals lead
social lives, and society needs information about its members in order
to function. But the needs of society can be balanced against the need
for autonomy and individuality, and a working definition of privacy can
be arrived at. The precise balance will reflect the institutions, traditions, and values of a particular society at a particular time. In any
society, however, certain kinds of information will be considered so
personal, so private, that they will be treated with special privilege;
habits and institutions will develop to protect this personal information
from uses which the society deems indecent.
Perhaps the United States in 1972 has reached the type of equilib rium situation described , where the society (whatever that means precisely) has accomplished its balancing process and has determined that
an acceptable working definition of privacy will permit millions of investigations each year where friends, neighbors, associates, and commercial acquaintances will be asked questions about an individual' s
character, his drinking habits, his sex life, his political beliefs, his
health, his finances, his associates, and his attitudes. Certainly, there
are surveys which indicate that large majorities approve of credit, insurance, and employment investigations.262 But it is not clear from the
261. "Privacy," Professor Westin says, "is the claim of individuals, gro ups, or institutions to de·
termine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others." A WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
262. E.g., the Opinion Research Corporation's study commissioned by Retail Credit Co. in 1972
showed, among other things, that only llo/o of a sample of the American public feels stron gly that
something shou ld be done about the invasion of privacy.
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surveys that the respondents were informed about either the quantity or
the quality of investigations, and it may be that the surveys indicate no
more than an abstract understanding · that certain types of decisions
ought to be based upon information rather than guesswork. If we make
the optimistic assumption that there is a latent support--nourished in
traditional American attitudes that are both liberal and conservative-in favor of protecting a larger degree of privacy than is presently protected , what changes should we seek?
A. FTC FORMAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FCRA
We can start the process of tightening controls on the personal information market by suggesting that the Federal Trade Commission
use its existing power under the FCRA to issue formal interpretations
of the law that will give the FCRA its fullest play. Several such interpretations have been suggested during the course of this analysis:
1. Chilling identification forms and waiver agreements violate the intent of section 610 by discouraging consumers from seeking
disclosure of their records! 63
2. The definition of medical information in section 603(i)
implies that medical information can only be withheld from a consumer
if it was originally obtained with the consumer's knowing consent,264
3. In deciding whether to honor a request for information ,
a consumer reporting agency must determine in each case whether the
potential report user's purpose is legitimate. The FTC should define the
term "legitimate business need", found in section 604, in a narrow
fashion, giving specific examples of what practices do and do not qualify_265 This is of particular importance with regard to governmental requests for information. No government need ever risk the political
embarrassment involved in spying on its citizens when it can achieve
the same thing by becoming a client of a private corporation like the
Retail Credit Co.

4. The word "bankruptcies" in section 605, pertaining to
obsolete information, does not include wage-earner proceedings under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act. Such proceedings are more in the
nature of suits and judgments, and should only be reportable for 7
Years_l66

-~~~·

26

26

S ee text
· S ee text
~· S ee text
· See text

foll owing note 110 supra.
foll owing note 149 supra.
following note 180 supra.
at note 201 supra.
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5. The words "personal interview" in section 603(e), defining an investigative consumer report, should include telephone interviews?67
6. The FTC should set forth with detail what it considers to
be "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy," as
required by section 607(b);268 Examples of procedures that might be included will be suggested below.269
B. AMENDMENTS WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE FRAMEWORK OF THE FCRA
Going beyond formal interpretations by the FTC, the FCRA itself
needs to be strengthened in many ways. Most of the .following suggestions were developed in the course of this analysis:
1. Adverse information notifications should be in writing.
They should include a brief summary of the consumer's legal rights
under the FCRA. Additionally, they should include an explanation for
the report user's decision to take adverse action. This could be achieved
by a check-off list of common reasons.270
2. At least one credit bureau has demonstrated that adequate disclosure can be achieved by mail, as well as by personal interview or telephone. This should be permissible, provided all terms and
codes are put into lay language, and a contact person is identified in
case further explanation is required.271
3. The medical information exception in section 609 should
be replaced by a permissive provision allowing the consumer reporting
agency to make disclosure of medical information to the consumer's
physician rather than directly to the consumer, provided that the consumer is informed that there is medical information in the file which is
being withheld, and that this information will be disclosed to a physician designated by the consumer. 272
4. All investigative consumer reports should be reduced to
writing and retained on file for at least one year. Sources of investigative consumer reports should be identified and retained on file for the
same period of time, but should not be identified in the actual report or
retained copies. Investigative consumer reports should be disclosed to
the consumer by allowing the consumer to read the report copy and by
having a trained person disclose the nature and substance of any other
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See text at note 255 supra.
See text at note 260 supra.
See text preceding note 291 infra.
See text at note 97 supra.
See note 113 supra.
S ee text following note 149 supra.
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materials in the file~ The consumer should have the right to make an
abstract of the disclosed information and, upon payment of a reasonable reproduction charge, to purchase 'a copy of any reports in his file.
5. Each consumer should be entitled to disclosure at no
charge once a year, upon request.274 Additional disclosures may be
charged to the consumer, except where adverse action has been taken
within the prior 30 days as a result of information provided by the consumer reporting agency.
6. The consumer reporting agency should be required to
maintain strict procedures to keep public record information up-to-date
and complete, without regard for the purpose in which it will be used .275
Where public record information is to be furnished for employment
purposes, the consumer reporting agency should be required to make a
good faith effort to interview the subject of the report. 276
7. Where an application normally entails an investigation,
or where it is known by a party offering credit, insurance or employment that he will probably request an investigation, the consumer
should be so apprised at the time the application is made.277 At the same
time, the applicant should be supplied with a standard form used by
consumer reporting bureaus in reports of the kind normally prepared
under the circumstances of the consumer's application: 78
8. Because actual damages are often difficult to prove when
credit, insurance, or employment is denied, but great inconvenience
and embarrassment might be created for the consumer, the FCRA
should be amended to include mandatory damages (plus attorney's fees)
to be awarded in lieu of proof of actual damages, where the act is viola73

~~

.

ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is a model of administrative fragmentation. The law is set up to be enforced by nine different Federal
C.

--

273. See text preceding and following note 1S1 supra.
r4. See text following note ISS supra.
7S. See text following note 194 supra.
276. See text at note 19S supra.
277. S ee text following note 243 supra.
278. See text at note 247 supra.
279. Th e need for such a provision may be seen in Miller v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Washington,
0 .C. , (Superior Court of Dist. of Col. , June I 972) reported at 4 CCH CCG , supra note 22, S
99.173. A consumer who was denied a credit card on the basis of1erroneous information sued the
~redit bureau for failin g to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
Information . The Court found the credit bureau to have been in negligent non-compliance with
the FCRA. However , since the plaintiff couldn 't prove damages. no recovery was allowed. Prece~ents for in lieu damages may be found in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § lOI(b), and in the UNI .ORM COMMERCIAL CODE. § 9-S07(1). In drawing an in lie_u .~rovision , atten~ion should be
gtven to (a) the possibility of nuisance litigation, and (b) the posstbthty of class act1ons, and whether there should be a limit on the total amount recoverable.
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agencies, no one of which has the authority to promulgate regulations~
Fragmentation in itself has little bearing on the government's ability to
oversee the personal information market, because the consumer reporting agencies fall within the statutory ambit of a single agency, the Federal Trade Commission. (The other agencies are charged with enforcing
the FCRA as it pertains to particular consumer report users who were
already under agency supervision.)
A more significant obstacle to effective enforcement is the FTC's
lack of rule-making authority.28 1Such authority was deliberately left out
of the FCRA because industry representatives, still in a haze over the
complexities in Truth-in-Lending Regulation Z 2 ~~which had been promulgated not long before passage of the FCRA- -feared that they would
be immersed in red tape of the FTC could write rules~83 1t is also possible
to surmise that the consumer reporting industry felt that it could live
with a law which it wrote, but didn't want to face the possibility of
detailed oversight if the FTC could fill in the gaps with rules having the
force of law.
In the absence of regulatory power, the FTC has moved rather slowly
in enforcing the FCRA. Definitional kinds of problems have been temporarily resolved by having the FTC staff issue informal opinions about
the meaning of the FCRA. These are non-binding and purely advisory.
The Commission itself has held hearings on a few definitional matters,
including whether motor vehicle departments, lenders exchanges, credit
guides, protective bulletins, and pre-screening for direct mail solicitation are covered by the FCRA~84 These hearings will eventuate in formal
interpretations of the act, but the formal interpretations will not be
binding on anyone, except to the extent that they are persuasive in
court. Lack of binding guidance from a central source has caused some
confusion and (according to FTC staff attorneys) substantially affected
FTC's ability to administer the law.
Vigorous enforcement of the FCRA will require a number of
changes. Most importantly, the FTC should be given rule-making
authority. It should be able, for instance, to define in detail what are
"reasonable procedures" for consumer reporting agencies to follow.
Going beyond rule-making, several other changes should be considered for the FTC. First, the FTC should be authorized to require all
consumer reporting agencies to register. Registration should include
basic information about the agency's operations, including a statement
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

FCRA , supra note 5, § 621(b).
FCRA, supra not e 5, § 62l(a ). .
12 C.F.R. § 226 (1972}.
ACB, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 21 (1971).
FTC News, June 16, 1972.
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of the procedures used for compliance with the FCRA. Unless registered, one could not conduct business as a consumer reporting agency.
Anyone could register except where the FTC finds that the applicant
could not reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in the
conduct of his business, or where the past conduct of tht> applicant provides reasonable grounds for believing that he would not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.185
Registration is needed for three reasons. First, it would allow the
FTC and the public to identify the reporting agencies and to understand
what each one does. Second, it would provide leads for enforcement, so
that a scatter gun approach is no longer necessary. And third, it would
provide a minimum control over market entry, to weed out at least
some of the more dubious practitioners.
Much has been written about regul ation in recent years, with the
increasingly common conclusion that government regulation generally
doesn't do much good; rather, such closing off of market entry guarantees a monopoly for the members of the regulated industry, to the ultimate detriment of consumers;86As Professor Stigler has observed;87 regulation is generally acquired by an industry and is designed and operated
primarily for the industry's benefit.
Indeed, regulation is beginning to find advocates among the ranks
of inspection bureau owners?88 This is particularly true for the local
independents who are the first to suffer when new competition enters
their market. With market entry costs minimal new inspection bureaus
are constantly entering the scene, and, as one would expect, are making
their presence known by under-pricing the existing firms~89 To meet the
new competition, existing firms must also cut prices. This is normally
done by discount arrangements rather than by changing the published
price schedu le, with the effect that no firm is certain how low it must go
~n negotiating for contracts. Cutting prices has but one meaning to the
Inspector: he must increase an already overwhelming production of
reports in order to maintain the same income. Price competition, then,
leads to shabby reporting. It would be far better, the argument goes, if
competition revolved around quality of reporting rather than pricing.

--

285. In a bill proposed by the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations in Ontario,
Canada, these powers would be given to a newly created Registrar of Consumer Reporting Agen Cies. Bill 229, 2d Sess .. 29th Legis., Ontario, 21 El iz. II, 1972.
~86. See. e.g., Posner, Natura l Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN . L. REV. 548 (1968);
l·hlton, The Consistency of the Int erstate Comm erce Act, 9 J. OF LAW & ECONOMICS 87 (1966);
a nct Note, Is L egislation Necessary? California Air Transportation. and National Regulatory Power,
74 YALE L. J. 1416 (1965).
287. Stigler, Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE 3 (1971).
288. Interview with William Dorf, Illinois Service Bureau, Dec. 18, 1972.
289. /d.
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One implication of this argument might be that the prices of consumer reports ought to be regulated. This approach should be rejected for
three reasons. First, price regulation is always difficult, expensive, and
subject to political distortions: 90 Second, price regulation would make it
.difficult for new firms to break into the market, even if the new firms
were capable of more efficient operations than the existing firms. And
third , there is no guarantee that increased income for the more efficient
regulated firms would be passed down to inspectors in the form of
lower production quotas. It may be that price competition leads to antisocial results in the insurance inspection industry, but price regulation
does not seem to be the proper antidote.
Registration of the type described earlier would have only a small
effect on market entry, by allowing the FTC to screen out firms which
can be predicted to by shabby operators. The screening should not be
used to block entry to firms about whom there is reason to believe they
would operate efficiently and with integrity. It is logical, however, that
registration should carry with it certain standards of how a firm must
operate, in order to be considered satisfactory. It also follows that a
firm which does not meet the required standards should lose its registered status.
The basic standards for maintaining registered status should be set
by Congress, with details supplied in rules and regulations promulgated
by the FTC. A number of standards worthy of consideration have already been suggested in this section. Additional standards applicable to
inspection bureaus include:
1. Individual inspectors must pass an examination showing
understanding of the relevant laws and ethical guidelines for inspection.

2. Training programs and apprenticeship period should be
mandatory and subject to FTC approval.
3. Inspectors should be equipped with identification cards
containing their picture. Interviews under pretext should be prohibited ,
and every source be informed of the identity of the interviewer, his
employer (the inspection bureau, not the client), and the purpose of the
interview. The source should be informed that his remarks will be
treated as confidential, but that his identity may become known in the
case of litigation.
4. Management and supervisory personnel must meet licensing standards based upon examination and prior experience. The
290. See Stigler, note 287 supra.
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supervisory license may be revoked after a hearing by the FTC upon
evidence of incompetence in maintaining high standards of conduct by
the inspectors for whom the supervisor is responsible.
5. All investigative consumer reports must be red uced to
writing and retained on file for at least one year, but for no more than
seven years unless it is up-dated. Identification of sources must be
retained as long as a report, but must not be a part of the report. The
FTC should make random audits at least once a year to assure compliance with this and all other aspects of the law.
6. Protective inform ation quotas and norms should not be
used either in connection with evaluating the work of inspectors or in
the sale of agency services ..
7.

Inspection bureaus should be required to develop meth-

?d s for evaluating the work of inspectors wherein numerical prod uction
Is not the predominant factor.
8. Consolidation of files which contain investigative consu mer reports are not to occur without prior FTC approval. This is inten ded as a safeguard against the centralization of Retail Credit Co.'s files,
and to insure that files will remain in the vicinity of their subjects where
they are easily available for FCRA access.
9. The FTC should have the power to adjudicate disputes
between consumers and reporting agencies which are not satisfactorily
settled under the FCRA procedures.
The type of regulation proposed in the above standards and in the
earlier proposals would not result in most of the disadvantages decried
by the economists (See note 287, supra). Although market entry might
be made slightly more difficult because of registration standards, competition would not be reduced. By avoiding price regulation, many of the
~riticisms of regulation can be overlooked. Finally, by leaving regulation
In the hands of the FTC rather than by setting up a new governmental
agency, the possibility of industry having an overwhelming impact on
the regulators decisions is reduced, because consumer reporting agencies represent only one relatively small concern of the Commission.
. What would be the impact of regulation on the economics of the
Inspection bureau industry? It can be foreseen that higher standards of
~onduct will increase the marginal costs of preparing reports. This
Increment would probably be passed on to the insurance companies
and employers. Whether this would, in turn, be passed on to consumers
de~ends upon the flexibility of demand for reports, a factor about
Which no information could be ascertained.
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It should be pointed out, however, that the demand for reports is
not constant, but reflects the so-called underwriting cycle~ When, as in
1972, insurance companies are particularly anxious to sell policies, they
are less interested in the careful weighing of risks. Consequently they
do not buy as many inspection reports, and are more willing to buy cutrate reports which might reflect a lower quality of reporting. This cyclical effect, which coincided with the passage of the FCRA, must be kept
in mind when members of the inspection industry complain that their
industry is being killed off.
One other point to keep in mind is that the inspection industry can
be expected to benefit in the near future from the expansion of no-fault
auto insurance. No-fault, inspectors believe, will make it more necessary
for an insurer to know how many people are in an insured's household,
how many potential drivers there are, and whether any of the drivers is
accident prone, or a candidate for smashing into a tree for the collection of insurance~ 92 A final factor which makes prediction of the impact
of regulation rather difficult is the possibility of market changes in the
wake of the antitrust actions (described earlier) which are pending
against Retail Credit Co.
D. CONTENT CONTROLS
A proposal which has fequently been made by critics of the personal
information market is that we should simply not allow subjective information to be collected. Phrased in this way the proposal presents serious problems. First, it is not always self-evident whether a particular
datum is subjective. Enough "subjective" confirmations tend to give
information an objective quality. Furthermore, if the purpose of controlling the content of reports is to promote privacy, it must be recognized that certain private kinds of information may be completely
objective. For example, instead of reporting that an automobile insurance applicant's teenage son is a "hippie-type," the report could state
93
objectively that the son has hair that comes to his collar: Instead of
91

291. According to Jaffe, The Undenvriting Cycle, INSURANCE 35 (May 1972), and Snyder, Th e
Insurance Industry 's 5-Year Cycle. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 37 (June 16, 1972), the insurance industry operates in phases. During Phase I, rates are adequate, underwriting is good, agents
are cooperative. and in general the industry is profitable. The word goes out to increase volume
and not to worry too much about risks. During Phase II, underwriting barriers are let down. Auto
and homeowners (personal lines) business suddenly becomes good business. The push for the premium dollar is on. Phase III appears about two years later. After the aggressive premium "buying". the results show up in two ways: deleted surplus and adverse loss experience. In Phase IV,
agencies are terminated, lines reduced, areas of operation withdrawn, company personnel changed,
and classes of risk dropped. The emphasis shifts back to sound underwriting. Phase V is a waiting
period, where the industry waits to see if it can move back to phase I profits. During mid-1972. the
insurance industry was said to be in Phase II, the " go-get-'em" phase.
292. Interview with William Dorf, Illinois Service Bureau, Dec. 18, 1972.
293. See Richard A. Shaeffer, Consumers Gripe That Credit Reporting Law Doesn 't Always
Work, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
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reporting t hat a female applicant for automobile insurance has loose
morals, the inspector might write, "Your subject is known to be single
and residing with a male room-mate without the benefit of marriage:' 294
Objective information, therefore, may be as detrimen tal to privacy as
subjective information.
Another way of stating the problem may be to say that only "relevant" information should be reported. But this, too, has limitations.
The life style of the auto insurance applicant's son may not appear to
have much relevance to the risk presented by the father, but an auto
insurer can certainly argue that it is important to know that a young
woman's boy friend is a potential driver of her insured vehicle. Indeed,
given the desires of an insurance company or an employer to predict as
much as possible about a potential insured or a potential employee,
everything has a certain amount of relevance. As a representative of the
American Insurance Association told Senator Proxmire's committee:
With the existing type of reparations system for automobile coverage, the question of whether or not, in case of an accident of a serious
nature, that the insured is one who would be a defendant that could
be credible, or conduct himself, or have the kind of habits that would
have the proper effect on jury determination, has a lot to do with
what the eventual impact will be on damages in the event of a serious
accident. 295
The real question seems to be; What kinds of information are we
Willing to see collected? And this carries with it an additional question;
Under what circumstances are we willing to have certain kinds of information used in decision-making?
At present, these questions are answered in a laissez-faire manner;
that is, if the party paying for the information considers it worth purchasing, it is collected. This is a relatively haphazard method of determination, however, because once it is decided to undertake an investigation, the marginal costs of seeking one type of information as opposed
to another are almost infinitesimally small.
Of equal importance, there is no substantial evidence that the pur~hasers of investigative consumer reports can point to which would
Indicate the economic impact of not obtaining particular kinds of information. The representative of the American Insurance Association w.as
asked by Senator Proxmire if he could prove his assertion that the
Potential risk of an insured includes his possible credibility to a jury.

--

294. Notarized statement provided by the subject of an article titled VISTA Worker's Car Insur-

a29eSoars, The Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 9, 1971.
S. Proxmire Hgs .. supra note 48, at 313.
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"No," he responded, "it is a question of judgment:' 296 The hidden question in the controversy over content controls turns out to be; Whose
judgment should be accepted?
The judgment could be left to a government agency. After the appropriate hearings, such an agency (most likely the FTC) could state
officially what kinds of information could be gathered for what purposes. The problem with this approach, though, is that privacy is an
individual concern as well as a societal concern; and if the government
agency accepts the arguments of relevancy produced by consumer
report users, individuals who value their privacy more highly than the
government would have nowhere to turn . On the other hand, if the
government were to adopt stringent standards it would be saying, in
effect, that citizens may not traffic in certain kinds of information.
While the courts have given the government leniency in controlling
commercial communications,297 there may be a limit beyond which the
·
First Amendment should be made applicable. 298
The government's role in limiting content should probably extend
no further than to a series of general statements concerning subjects
about which there is wide agreement. For example; in supplementing
the existing controls on obsolete data in section 605 of the FCRA, a
statute might state that a consumer reporting agency shall not include
in a consumer report:
a. any information based on evidence that is not corroborated unless the lack of corroboration is noted with and accompanies the
information;
b. information regarding any criminal charges against the
consumer where the charges have been dismissed , set aside or not proceeded with;
c. information as to race, creed, color, ancestry, ethnic
origin, or political affiliation.
Beyond this, the proper goal should be to give the consumer reason able alternatives so that if he is forewarned that a particular application
will involve an investigation which the consumer finds offensive, he
might obtain 'his objectives in other ways without having to give up
valued privacy. For example, group life insurance could be expanded as
an alternative to individual life insurance. Insurance companies should
296. !d.
297. See, e.g .. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 898
(1971); and Dun & Bradstreet v. Kansas Electric Supply Co., 448 F.2d 647 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert.
den. 405 U.S. 1026 (1971), both holding that credit information is not protected from libel by the
First Amendment.
298. See Christie, Th e Right to Privacy and the Freedom to Know; A Comment on Professor
Miller's Th e A ssualt on Privacy, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 970 (1971).
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be pressured to experiment with other forms of insurance that would
require less personal information about potential insureds. Employers
should be required to bargain, collectively and individually, on their
policies toward employee privacy. 299
There is no single, quick and easy way to readjust the balance of
privacy and commercial need in the personal information market.
Many approaches are needed, and all of the participants in the market-reporting agencies, report users, consumers, and government--must be
involved in the search for a decent equilibrium. More information
about the market, particularly about detectives and other private investigators, mail-list brokers, and others not treated here, may be required
before a complete program of reform can be drawn. But this analysis
has hopefully presented sufficient information about the entities covered
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act to indicate the areas in which this
pioneering attempt to protect individual privacy is strong, and where it
is weak; and to suggest the specific directions in which we must move if
we are to keep alive the age-old drea~ of a society of free, autonomous,
and above all, spontaneous individuals.

---

. 299. Legislation should be considered for the purpose of bringing employer investigative practices

~nto line with the policies encompassed in the FCRA. One possibility would be to redefine section
03(0 of the FCRA (supra note 5) so as not to exclude " in-house" investigations.
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APPENDIX ONE

THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET IN CHICAGO
I.
II.
III.
IV .
V.
VI.
VII.

Limited Purpose Credit Bureaus
Full-Service Credit Bureaus
Credit Agencies
Mercantile Agencies
Inspection Bureaus
Personnel Reporting
Miscellaneous Participants in the Personal Information Market

LIMITED PURPOSE CREDIT BUREAUS
1. Consolidated Employee Index
The Consolidated Employee Index is an agency which maintains an index
of employees working in large corporations. Only subscribers have access to
the index, and they use it for employment verification purposes. Information
provided includes: name of employer, type of work, how long employee has
been with company. An estimated 60,000 to 70,000 reports are made per year.
Source: Harvey Van Geem, Manager, telephone interview, Feb. 22, 1972.
2. Guaranty Credit Corp.
This is a specialized agency, a credit bureau and a collection agency deal ing strictly in the contracting and rental fields. It has files on about 2,000 people, mostly "colored people" who do business out of their own homes, e.g. by
borrowing home improvement or building equipment from a rental firm. Most
information comes from day-to-day contacts with renters. Some comes from
Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. By reporting on independent contractors, this small bureau falls on the unclear border line between consumer
and commercial reporting. Source: Arthur J. Wetle, owner, telephone interview, Feb. 22, 1972.
3. Hooper-Holmes Inc. Credit Index Division
The Chicago office of this national derogatory information index employs
five people, none of whom are investigators. The central computer, located in
Basking Ridge, N.J., contains 12 million items. An item includes the name of a
consumer who has been written off as a bad debt; the dollar amount lost; the
date reported by the subscriber; the age of the account at the time reported;
the code number for the reporting company; and the reporting company's
code number for the account. The operation is fully computerized, but uses a
batch system of processing which results in a lapse of 12 to 24 hours in-house
instead of instantaneous response. The Hooper-Holmes Index has approximately 150 subscribers nationally, most of whom are oil companies with credit
card programs, direct merchandise marketers such as mail order houses, and
book and record companies. These clients are national in orientation and use
the index for pre-screening of credit applications so as to reduce their volume
of full credit reports bought in the non-local reporting market. The subscriber
pays lOc/per request, regardless of whether derogatory information is located.
Volume discounts are given at plateaux of 100,000 annual inquiries. With the
I.
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exception of a very minor amount of public record information which is collected in some metropolitan areas, all of the information in the computer is
provided by the subscribers. One to two million requests from subscribers go
through the Chicago office each year, with about two-thirds originating in Chicago. Source: E. William Carney, Regional Manager, and Wayne Kaminski
Chicago Manager, interview, Jan. 28, 1972.
'
4. Chicago Lenders Exchange
Every metropolitan area has a lenders exchange. The Chicago Lenders
Exchange has a secret telephone number and is not listed in its building directory; the Chicago Daily News calls it "Chicago's secret credit bureau. " (Nov.
11, 1972 at 17.) The function, however, is not particularly sinister. The Exchange is an organization of small loan companies, representing 48 member
companies in the metropolitan area, with 329 offices. All of these offices telephone the Exchange before approving a loan . The information they receive is
In the form of code numbers representing loan companies with whom the
potential borrower has outstanding debts. According the Exchange rules, when
a company calls in and obtains a code, he must then call the coded loan company to find out whether the account is open or closed. (In theory it should be
open, because when a company closes an account it is supposed to notify the
Exchange.) The Chicago Lenders Exchange is a "closed exchange," which
means t hat if a record contains three listings for an individual, either as maker
or co-maker, no loan can be made unless the proceeds of such loan will be
used to pay off one or more of the outstanding loan balances in full. In the
fourth quarter of 1971, the 16 employees of the Exchange handled 66,267
clearances. Source: R. W. Hahne, President, telephone interview, Jan. 26., 1972.
S. TRW Credit Data
TRW Credit Data is a national credit bureau, whose operations are focused in a computer in Anaheim, Calif. The Chicago office handles the 7 northt:rn counties of Illinois, plus Lake Co., Ind., and holds information on an
~sttmated 5 million individuals in that area. Its projected volume for 1973 is
rom .65 to 1.2 million reports. Subscribers pay 95c per report if they feed their
?Wn automated files into the TRW computer; $1.05 if they turn over account
Information manually. The Chicago office has approximately twenty visual
t~rl!linals and one printer (for subscribers who want a written record), which
thie Into the Anaheim computer in about 8 seconds. Some individual subscribers
ave their own remote terminals which have direct access to Anaheim.
TRW Credit Data is classified as a limited purpose bureau because the
great bulk of information carried is objective financial transaction data. Apparently the company is just beginning to include public record information
(ban~ruptcies, bankruptcy dishcarges, wage earner plans, wage earner plans
termmated, judgments, judgment satisfactions, federal and state tax liens
~e Ieased) in at least some of its reports. Chicago office business is classified as
.8 per cent in-file reports and 4.2 _per cent special reporting. The latter in~u~es mortgage reporting, 'developed' reporting, and employment verification.
o Investigative reports are made. From its beginning as the Credit Data CorPoration in 1960, this firm has been the leading advocate of reform in the
chredit reporting industry. The company's history and activities are detailed in
t ~forthcoming book, Data Banks in a Free Society, by Alan F. Westin and
l\.1 Ichael A. Baker. Sources: Gilbert J:Iambl~t, Vice Presid~nt, in~erview, Jan.
12, 1972; letter, Cheri L. Cole, Associate Director of Pubhc Affa1rs, Dec. 12,
1972.
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FULL-SERVICE CREDIT BUREAUS
1. Chicago Credit Bureau, Inc.
The Chicago Credit Bureau is not only the oldest in the city, but is the
only one of the Big Three (CIC and TRW Credit Data are the others) which is
not computerized. CCB advertises that it has over 7 million credit records in
file, and that it serves more than 2,000 local subscriber firms. It employs about
200 individuals, some of whom work at the subscriber's place of business. All
investigations are by telephone. CCB offers a variety of services, including infile clearances (30c to a subscriber if no record is found; 45c if there is one),
trade reports, short form reports, standard credit reports ("complete detailed
information as to residential data, character, employment or business, finan cial responsibility and trade history residing in Chicago" for $2.75 to subscribers), employment verification, employee reports, business reports, assetslocate reports, and mortgage reports ($7.00 to subscribers). CCB also has a
collection division, the Credit Service Corporation. Subscription to credit
bureau services is $25 yearly. Source: Milton I. Deutsch, President, interview,
Jan. 19, 1972.
II.

2. Credit Bureau of Western Cook County
CBWCC is a full-service credit bureau located in the Chicago suburb of
Oak Park. It is a manual operation, employs about 85 persons, and has approximately 2 million individual files . Of the 250,000 reports prepared each
year, about 55 per cent are consumer credit reports, 40 per cent mortgage
reports, and 5 per cent investigative reports, prepared for employment purposes. Criminal record and arrest information is obtained from police departments. CBWCC has a collection division. Source: Mr. Sterling, Manager,
interview, Jan.17, 1972; letter, Nov. 21,1972.
3. Credit Information Corporation of Chicago (CIC)
CIC, the largest credit bureau in Chicago, is a subsidiary of the Trans
Union Systems Corporation, which is an affiliate of Trans Union Corporation.
It is the successor to the old credit bureau of the State Street merchants, but
has grown rapidly since the 1968 Trans Union takeover, computerizing and
acquiring six other metropolitan area credit bureaus. All information is in the
central computer on Michigan Avenue, the branch offices being tied in by
remote terminals. CIC has records on 5.8 million individuals in the Chicago
area. It sells over 3 million reports a year, 90 per cent of which are consumer
credit reports. About 1 per cent of the reports are for employment purposes,
with the remainder divided between mortgage reports and tenant reports. All
investigating is by telephone or mail. CIC advertises that it serves "over 3,000
Chicagoland businesses." Its 250 employees answer over 10,000 inquiries a
day. CIC does not engage in collection work, but like CCB, it is associated with
brokerage and sales firms in the non-local market. Like the other full-service
credit bureaus, CIC collects and reports public record information. In addition
to the in-file report, which sells for $1.25, CIC's schedule of reporting services
and prices includes 13 categories of reports, ranging from skip tracing reports
($6) to special investigations ($10 per hour). [The latter would seem to contradict the assertion that all investigations are made by phone or mail.] Source:
T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, interview, Jan. 25, 1972, and letter, Nov. 17,
1972.
4. Service Credit Bureau
Service Credit Bureau is a full-service bureau located on the South Side
of Chicago. It has manual files on 500,000 individuals, and specializes in
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written reports. Consumer credit reports account for 10 per cent of Service
Credit's volume; rental reports, for 60 per cent; mortgage reports for 15 per
cent; and personnel reports for 5 per cent. The only investigative reports,
under the FCRA definition, are those prepared for personnel purposes.
Source: Joanne Strong, Manager, interview, Feb. 10, 1972.
5. Other Credit Bureaus
Other full-service credit bureaus serving the metropolitan area include:
Central Credit Bureau of Cook County; Credit Bureau of Arlington Heights;
Credit Bureau of the South-West Area; Credit Bureau of Eash Chicago; Credit
Bureau of Hinsdale; Credit Bureau of Palatine; Credit Bureau of Skokie Valley, Inc.; Credit Bureau of Southern Cook Co., Inc.; Credit-Q Suburban Bureau; and Southtown Service Bureau, Inc.
Ill. CREDIT AGENCIES
1. Blomquist Reporting Service, Inc.
This is one of several reporting agencies listed in the telephone directory
which was unwilling to grant an interview. Mr. Blomquist stated, however, that
his firm only does mortgage reporting, and that these are non-investigative
reports, routinely containing information on the mortgagor's age, wife, children, residence, employment, assets, references, and litigation. Source: Mr.
Blomquist, telephone interview, Jan. 30, 1972.
2. Hale-Prietsch Services. Inc.
Founded in 1933, Hale-Prietsch is one of the larger independent reporting agencies in the country. Its primary, though not exclusive, area of service is
~hicagoland. The clients of Hale-Prietsch tend to be banks and savings & loan
Institutions; these are frequently faced with commercial decisions involving
large amounts of money, where the standard credit report would provide sufficient information. Hale-Prietsch has 8 to 12 million records on more than 2
million individuals. About half of the business relates to commercial reports.
Of the 100,000 reports per year covered by the FCRA, in-file clearances ($1.25)
account for 70 per cent. Narrative written reports ($15 minimum) account for
30 per cent. No reports are made for insurance purposes; 5 to 10 per cent are
personnel reports. All investigating is by telephone or mail. Of the 55 to 65
employees, 30 are "reporters" who gather information and write reports. Two
men are in the courts daily to check public records. Several people monitor the
telephones for in-file clearances. The operation is not computerized. Except
for telephone clearances, the average report takes days or weeks to prepare.
Source: Mr. and Mrs. Prietsch, interview, Jan. 18, 1972, supplemented by their
testimonty before the Proxmire and Sullivan committees (see footnotes to the
text, No.s 38 and 49, supra).
3. Retailers Commercial Agency (RCA)
.
A wholly owned subsidiary of Retail Credit Company, with offices adjoinIng the parent, RCA is one of the older credit bureaus in Chicago. Although it
does some work for local clients (e.g., checking out tenants for the John Hancock building), it mainly handles national accounts such as the credit card oil
companies. The RCA report is different from other credit reports in that it is
narrative in form and goes into more depth. Most of the investigating is done
by telephone, although if more is needed, street work will be subcontracted to
Retail Credit Co., (whose office is adjoining). The Chicago office of RCA has
about 200,000 individuals on file and prepares about 32,000 consumer reports
per year, according to a spokesman for Retail Credit Co. There are 14 employees in this office. Sources: Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Chicago Retai!
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Credit Office, Jan. 20, 1972; letter from Henry A. McQuade, Assistant Director Public Relations, Retail Credit Co., Feb. 23, 1972.
IV. MERCANTILE AGENCIES
1. Dun & Bradstreet
The Chicago office of D & B, which covers DuPage, Cook, and Will
Counties in Illinois and Lake County in Indiana, has files on approximately
87,000 of the more than 200,000 businesses in the area. Because D & B might
send out 10 to 100 or more reports concerning a given company during a year,
the 87,000 figure is the most meaningful indicator of size. Subscribers to D &
B services are primarily manufacturers, wholesalers, banks and insurance
companies who have need for reports on other businesses to serve as a basis for
credit, insurance or other business decisions. Less than 'h of 1 per cent of D &
B's reports are consumer reports within the FCRA definition. Typically these
are reports requested by lending institutions which are considering granting a
mortgage loan. "Such reports, while they contain identifying information con cerning the consumer, verification of employment if possible and, if requested,
permissable record items, are less broad in scope than consumer reports which
might be prepared by other companies, for purposes such as determining qualifications for insurance. In other words, we do not seek or publish information
concerning a subject's personal habits, consumption of alcohol, etc." D & B
Individual Report Form 98, however, does include a question about character
and general reputation.
Commercial reports also contain a limited amount of personal information, usually concerning the proprietor, partners or officers of the business
reported on. The primary source of information is the subject himself. "Our
employees always indentify themselves and never act under subterfuge. Every
Company (or individual) on which we report may read and discuss his report
with us at any time desired." Source: Charles F.G. Raikes, General Counsel of
D & B, letter, Mar. 14, 1972, and interview, Mar. 22, 1972.

2. Other Mercantile Agencies
Among the other mercantile agencies listed in the Chicago Yellow Pages
are: Builders Commercial Agency; Dairy Credit Bureau; Dealers Control Credit Bureau; Electrical Manufacturers Credit Bureau, Inc.; Florists Credit
Association, Inc.; Food Industries Credit Bureau; Food Service Equipment
Manufacturers Credit Bureau; Graphic Arts Credit Bureau; The Jewelers
Board of Trade; Lumbermen's Credit Association, Inc.; Manufacturers Clearing House of Illinois Inc.; Printing Trades Credit Association; Professional
Merchants Credit Bureau; and the Sporting Goods Industries Clearing House.
V. INSPECTION BUREAUS
1. American Service Bureau
Founded in 1920 by the American Life Convention in order to provide
competitively priced inspection to the life insurance industry, ASB is a leading
inspection bureau in the life and health insurance area. Life and health
account for 93 per cent of ASB's reporting; auto insurance constitutes 6 per
cent; and personnel reporting, 1 per cent. The Standard rate for an ASB life
insurance inspection in Chicago is $5. Special reports for insurance, personnel,
or claims investigations are charged at double or triple the standard rate, or on
any hourly rate of $10.50. ASB employs approximately 40 full -time inspectors
and 11 part-time inspectors in the Chicago area. They report on approximately
112,000 individuals annually. Source: Frank D. Wood, President, interview
Jan. 27, 1972; letter from Claude Tinsley, Jr., Exec. V.P., Dec. 8, 1972.
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2. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
Equitable has had an "in-house" inspection operation for over 100 years ;
at present, however, it is the only insurance company which does not turn to
independent inspectors for reporting. For its Chicago area reports, Equitable
employs 6 full-time and 5 part-time inspectors. They reported on approximately 12,000 individuals in the Chicago area in 1972. Eight-five percent of
these reJ>orts were for life and health insurance. Other reporting included personnel (5 per cent), mortgages, claims, group cases, and ann rttants. Source:
Paul H. Patterson, Regional Inspection Manager, telephone interriew, Feb. 15,
1972, and letter, Nov. 14, 1972.
3. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.
GAB was formed about 60 years ago by the stock casualty companies. It
has about 700 offices nationally, Prior to 1965 GAB served the industry in
~and ling all types of losses and claims under every class of property and liabil ~ty insurance policy. Since 1965, GAB has been moving gradually into the
111spection field. It now has 15 to 20 inspectors working in the Chicago area,
primarily or completely in the property field. Sources: Telephone interview
with GAB employee who wishes to remain anonymous; Retail Cred it Co. Competitor Index.
4. Hooper-Holmes Bureau
Hooper-Holmes is Retai l Credit Co.'s main competitor nationally, and its
operations are modeled after Retail's. In Chicago, Hooper-Holmes has 13 inspectors who prepare between 48,000 and 54,000 reports a year. Of these,
approximately 60 per cent fall under the FCRA. About 39 percent of HooperHolmes volume is life insurance reporting; 2 per cent is employment reporting.
Source: Loy R. Ivester, Manager, telephone interview, Feb. 11, 1972.
5. Illinois Service Bureau
ISB is the largest of the local independents, having statewide inspection
operations. ISB's full-time Chicago inspectors report on 35,000 individuals a
year. (Statewide, 85 inspectors prepare about 60,000 reports annually.) ReportIng breaks down as 60 per cent commercial, 30 per cent fire and casualty insurance, 5 percent life and health, and 5 per cent claims. ISB has files on over
one million individuals, but these are mainly order tickets and news clippings.
C?nly 100,000 old reports are maintained. The standard rate for an ISB inspection in Chicago is $5.25. For automobile inspections, a motor vehicle report
(MVR) is obtained from the state (at a cost of $2 to the state plus 25c to the
Springfield Service Bureau, which expedites matters) and sold to the insurance
company for $2.35. ISB types out an interpretation of the code for each MVR.
Source: William Dorf, President, inverviews, Mar. 24, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972.
6. Insurance Inspections. Ltd.
This is a relatively small inspection bureau on the South Side, run by a
young man who had earlier experience with two of the nationals. Seven inspectors are employed to prepare over 7,000 reports a year. A majority of the
:eports are automobile insurance inspections; the remainder are property
Inspections. Source: Michael Davenport, President, interview, Feb. 3, 1972.
7. 0 'Hanlon Reports (National Inspection Bureau, Inc.)
O'Hanlon Reports was founded in 1934 by a former officer of HooperHohnes, Inspection methods are similar to Retail Credit's, but most of O'Han l?n's reporting is in the fire and casualty and claims field. Unlike most inspection bureaus, O'Hanlon's uses a color code system on its reports which indicate

114

Consumer Journal

[Vol. 11:37

at a glance the result of the report. O'Hanlon's refused to grant an interview,
but it is believed that Chicago operations are on a very small scale. Source:
Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index and confidential industry sources in Chicago.

8. Retail Credit Co.
As the national leader in the provision of business information, Retail
Credit's operations are discussed at length in the text and footnotes . The
Chicago office employs about 75 persons, about three-fourths of whom are
inspectors ("field representatives"). The office prepares approximately 75,000
consumer reports annually, which break down as : life and health insurance, 45
per cent, automobile insurance, 19 per cent, property lines, 9 per cent, employment, 7 per cent, claims, 5 per cent, and miscellaneous, 2 per cent. About
400,000 individuals are subjects of files kept in the Chicago office. Source:
Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Chicago office, interview, Jan . 20, 1972;
letter from Henry A. McQuade, Public Relations, Feb. 23, 1972.
9. Service Review
Service Review is a subsidiary of Allstate Enterprises, Inc., and has been
making reports for Allstate Insurance since 1929. In the last two years it has
also been making reports for other insurance companies, in competition with
Retail Credit and the other bureaus. Service Review has 27 inspectors covering
the Chicago area. While Chicago statistics are not available, Service Review
prepares 75,000 to 90,000 reports per year statewide. Of these reports, 70 per
cent are for automobile insurance; 20 per cent for property; and 10 percent for
life insurance, personal reports, and claims. Sources: Mr. Colliver, Service Review employee, telephone interview, Feb. 1, 1972; letter from S.R. Burg, Operating Manager, March 27, 1972.
10. Underwriters Reports. Inc.
U.R.I. is a local independent which has an office in St. Louis as well as
the Chicago office. In Chicago, it employs 6 full-time and 8 part-time inspectors, and annually prepares between 75,000 and 100,000 reports . Of these, 65
per cent are for commercial lines of insurance; 20 per cent for automobile
insurance; 10 per cent for homeowners insurance; and 5 per cent miscellaneous . U.R.I. has files on approximately 200,000 Chicago area residents.
Source: H . Gianvecchio, General Manager, interview, Feb. 16, 1972; letter,
Nov. 17, 1972.
11. Others
Other inspection bureaus thought to be operating in Chicago include
Best's Reports (organized in 1960 by a former O'Hanlon employee); Factual
Service Bureau (formed in 1953 by former Retail Credit Co. claim inspectors,
specializing in more involved types of investigations); Jasper's reports (formed
by a former Hooper-Holmes manager in 1949, working in the fire and casualty
field); and Thomas Reports (mainly fire and casualty lines). It is believed that
several other small inspection bureaus are operating in Chicago, often with
only one or two inspectors. Sources: Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index; confi dential industry sources in Chicago.
VI. PERSONNEL REPORTING
1. Burns Detective Agency
Like the other big detective agencies, Burns handles personnel reports as
a sideline. Most of this work involves highly paid executives either being consi-
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dered for a job or suspected of malfeasance while on the job. Source: Mr.
Springborn, Investigations Division, telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1972.
2. Fidelifacts
This nationwide firm, originally formed by former FBI men, had fran chises in 27 cities in 1969. It specializes in personnel investigations. No interview could be obtained. Source: Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index.
3. Heidrick and Struggles
Heidrick and Struggles is a national executive search and management
consulting firm with home offices in Chicago. It is retained by organizations
~earching for peculiarly well-qualified high level officials. Most of the research
1s carried out by the Heidrick and Struggles staff, though supplementary information is occasionally obtained from Retail Credit Co. and other investigative
firms . Source: Gardner Heidrick, interview, May 2, 1972; Wall Street Journal,
September 28, 1971.
4. John T. Lynch Co.
Prior to the FCRA, this detective agency had a fairly steady flow of requests for background pre-employment investigations on executives. These
would take in the vicinity of SO hours, charged at $12.50 an hour. This business has fallen off drastically since passage of the FCRA. Source: unidentified
head of investigation, telephone interview, Feb. 22, 1972.
5. Wackenhut Corporation
Wackenhut's Investigations Division specializes in the field of security
personnel investigative work for defense connected industry. According to the
Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index, "The company's plan is to set itself up as
a clearing house to aid private business in its hiring of personnel -- pre~mployment clearing house. It also plans intensive involvement in counter bus~ness espionage ... They currently have files on over 3,000,000 people." As to
Inspection methods, the RCC Competitor Index says, "Essentially the same as
ours with less rigid requirements as to how the information is obtained. Use a
great deal of policemen on their off duty hours or vacations and retired military personnel with investigative backgrounds. However, in the Investigative
.
Division they use far more equipment than we do."
According to the head of investigations in Chicago, Wackenhut does very
few pre-employment reports, except on the executive level. Source: Mr. Gavin,
telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1972.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL INFORMATIONMARKET
l. Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services
In 1971, the State of Illinois transmitted 1,585,543 motor vehicle reports
(MVR's). Of this total, 1,392,174 were sent to private citizens, insurance companies, credit bureaus, etc. The remainder, 193,369, were sent to Iaw-enforcem~nt officials. Disclosure of these records is mandatory under state law upon
W~1~ten request accompanied by the statutory fee of $2. Source: Thomas ·R.
Bllhngton, Legal Advisor, Mar. 22, 1972.
2. The Chicago Law Bulletin
As a sideline to its normal function as a daily law bulletin, this company
~ells public record information to local consumer reporting agencies. As an
Indication of the volume of this sideline, the Chicago Credit Bureau purchased
the following items, each on a small card, in the m~mth of December, 1971:
6,0Jl judgments; 956 satisfactions; 855 federal tax hens; 281 federal tax lien
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releases; 714 Lake County judgments; 405 Will County judgments. Source:
Milton Deutsch, Chicago Credit Bureau, interview, Jan. 19, 1972.
APPENDIX TWO

ADVERSE ACTION NOTIFICATIONS
I.

Sample Form Letter Used By A Chicago Women's Clothing Chain
Dear
Your application for a charge account has had our careful consideration
and we truly wish we could give you a favorable decision.
The information submitted, however, does not meet our requirements and
we, therefore, cannot grant your request. Our decision is based on the information given on the application and supplemented by a routine credit
report received from the credit bureau named below.
It is always most difficult to give such a decision to a customer and we are
sorry we cannot servie you in this instance.
Very truly yours,
ABC COMPANY
Credit Department
Name of Credit Bureau
Address
(information stamped in)

II . Sample Form Letter Used By A National Insurance Company
Headquartered in Chicago
Dear
Re: Policy#
As a regular part of our business we develop certain facts necessary for
proper rating and thorough underwriting. Sometimes we seek to verify this
information by ordering a report from an unbiased third party.
We did order such a report in your case and wholly or partly on the basis
of information contained in that report we:
are unable to write your insurance
are unable to renew your coverage
find it necessary to cancel your policy
have increased your premium
have restricted your coverage
This information was provided in a consumer report made by
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a reputable source of information.
If you have not already heard from your agent on this, you will shortly.
If you want to know more about the a ctual content on that report, please
contact the company named above.
Yours very truly,
Manager, Underwriting Division

APPENDIX THREE

DISCLOSURES. SELECTED CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIE S,
CHICAGO

I.

Credit Bureaus
Agency
Disclosures per Month to Consumers Date of Information
Pre-FCRA
Post-FCRA
40- 60
200- 500 Jan. 19, 1972
Chicago Credit Bureau
Credit Information Corporation
Nov.17,1972
4,000
of Chicago
200 - 300
TRW Credit Data
100
600
Dec. 12, 1972
Western Cook County
80
140- 160 Nov. 21, 1972

II. Inspection Bureaus
Agency
Disclosures per Month to Consumers Date of Information
Pre-FCRA
Post-FCRA
0*
10- 15
Dec. 8, 1972
American Service Bureau
0
2
Feb. 11, 1972
Hooper-Holmes Bureau
1
Nov. 14, 1972
Illinois Service Bureau
0
80
120
Jan.
20, 1972
Retail Credit Co.
0*

* Sometimes the consumer would learn the content of his file from the mana ger of the inspection bureau or from his insurance agent; but this was rare.
Source: Figures were provided by executives of the agencies concerned .
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APPENDIX FOUR

IDENTIFICATION FORMS AND WAIVERS
I.

Sample Identification Form Used for FCRA Disclosure*

II. Sample Waiver Form Used for FCRA Disclosure

* This identification form is not necessarily typical for the industry. The President of ASB acknowledged that it asks for too much information, and stated
that it would be changed when the supply runs out. Interview, Frank D. Wood,
Jan. 27, 1972. As of Dec. 8, 1972, it is still in use. Letter from Claude H. Tinsley, Jr., Exec. V.P., Dec. 8, 1972.
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APPENDIX FIVE
SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR FCRA COMPLIANCE

HALE-PRIETSCH SERVICES, INC.
COMMERCIAL

REPORTS

SERVI CE AGREEMENT

I n compliance with-Section 607 of Title VI (Fol r Credit Reporting Act) under Publ ic
Law 91 ...508, kn01m as the Consumer Cred i t Protection Act, we must ask our clients to
sign this ag r eement and certification.

In order to cooperate with other business and professional people In the
dissemination of confidentia l credit, employment, and other Information,
the unde r signed •grees to the fo l lowing when using the reporting serv ice
of Ha l e • Prletseh Services, I ncorporated , for consumer credit a nd emp l oy ...
ment purposes.
THE UNDER 5 1GNED Cll ENT AGREES:

That he will comply wi th all the provisions of Title VI (Fair Credit Reporting Act)
of Public Low 91-5o8.
The client certifies that consumer Inquiries wi ll be "'-de, and / or consumer repo r ts
ordered on l y for a permissib l e purpose at defined in Section 604 of the Act, name l y
(A) Intends to use the lnforrutlon In connection wi th • cred i t trans•ctlon invo l ving the consumer on whom t he Information is t o be
furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or
collect ion of an account of, the consumer; or
(B ) intends to use the fnfonutlon for employntent purposes:

or

(C) Intends to use the lnform~~tfon In connection with the underwriting
of Insurance Involving the consumer; or
(D) otherwise has a legltlrute business need for the lnforNtlon In connection with a business transaction Involving the consumer.
The client further certl fles th11t the InforMation wi 11 be used for no other purpose
th11n the one gl ven when orderIng the consUWtr report , 11nd
Th11t the employees of the client 11re forbidden to attempt to obtain reports on themse l ves or associates, or on 11ny other person except In the exercise of their officia l
dutIes.
C11 ent 's code II _ _ _ _ __

Nome ________ ___________
By ___ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _

Dote _____________
Title of officer
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IMPACT OF FCRA ON GOVERNMENT
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Correspondence from
Correspondence from
Correspondence from
Correspondence from
Correspondence from

City of Chicago Department of Police
Federal Housing Administration
Veterans Administration
U.S. Postal Service
Department of Justice

CITY OF CHICAGO/ D[PARTMfNT 0' POLIC E

1121 South Stalt Street

Ch•UIO, llhnoi• 60605

RICHARD J, DALEY, M•r•

JAMES I, COHLISIC, JA., S•p•R•u.ooiul

26 January 1972

Hr. Albert A. Foer
Aaaocbte Editor
The Unlveulty of Chicago
Law Review
1111 Eut 60th Street
Chicago , Illinoil 60637
Dear Hr. Foer:
The Superintendent of Police , Jamn 8. Conlilk, Jr., haa
referred t o the underaigned your recent COimlunfcation for
acknOitfledgment and reaponae.

You r l ette r contained reference to the Federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act o f 1971 and itl impact on tnvntfgative procedurea of
the Chicago Police Department, u well 1111 aome rehted inquirtu.
Questions poled and responaea to the aame follow:
1. Q - Ex t ent of uae of Conaumer Reporting Agenciea prior
to approva l of FCRA 7
A - Unable t o determine frequency of such use but
reliance on auch agenciel declined conaiderably after service fees
we re impoa ed.
2.

Q- Purposes for which they were utUhed?

A - To determine criminal motive, such as collection of
fraudulent insurance clai.ml; •a•ociation o f persona and/or organh.a t iona which could be con1trued aa "front" cor poration or partneraht.p
for pouibh illictt purpoaea; l oution of victims, offendera and
wt tneasea, and locat e mta•lng peuona , to ident ify aome purpoaea.

).

Q -Impor tance of auch aaenclea

11

in~attaacion

aida?

A - S ignif i cant onl y aa additional aour c u of information.
The t nforml t ion g leaned hu been auuud ea "m inimal but he lpful " in
developing tnvea t igations.

I. Correspondence from City of Chicago Department of Police
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Jan u.uy 14, 1972
IN ............ 1;101:" •01

FAMO

Hr. Albert A. Foer
,_.sociate Editor
The lkliversity of Chicago Lav Review
1111 East 60th Street
dlicaqo, Illinoia 60637
Dear Hr. Foer:

(j

~

S.

Q - Hu FCRA hurpe r ed de~lopm~~nt of pe r tinen t and

A - Utilizat i on declitw:d to t he uro leve l.

nec.euary 1nfor-stlon1
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A - No . Depart~~~ent reaourcefu l neu hu developed
productiv e colla t eral aources which have bean and s t ill ara
ut il ized .
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You a.re correct in your understanding that FHA N.}:;es extensive use of
conSW!Ier credit reports . Credit report• are the basis for evalu.atinq
the acceptability of the mortg age credit riak on applications for U"Ort gaqs insurance . 'Itle FHA contracts for credit reporting services on the
bash of ~titive bids . under the terM of the contract FHA 1110rtqaqees
may elect to purchue reports from the contract sources at the contract
price . Althouqh FHA does not refuse to •ccept credit reports submitted
vith • .ortgage insurance application fro~:~~ any credit infol"Diilltion source
of a JI'Ortgagee's choosing, FHA reserves the riqht to supple-.nt or verify
the credit infonMtion subaitted by the 1110rtgagees. 'l'he number of reports
obtained by FHA during a qiven month varies extensively vith the necessity
of suppl eme.ntinq or verifying credit infoi'llt4tion obtained with the applications sul:lmitted. During the calendar year of 1971 approxilllately 600,000
cases were insured . Each of these cases ..,.s covered by a consumer credit
report which was obtained by the mo r tqaqee o r the FHA. Jlejected cases
are not reflected in this figure even thoUC]h credit reports would have
been attached to the su.t.aissions.
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Credit raporu are obtained from a varying number of firJU each year .
Credit reporting agencies bid competitively f or award of the annual contract(&)
in thei r respective geogr aphic al a reas of interest . Twenty- six contracts
were awarded fo r the Fiscal Year 1972. several of these twenty- six provide
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This wil l supplement IIY letter of December 29, 1971 concerning your
request for infonaation reqardinq credit r eport-a obtained for ntA use.

The credit reportinq coveraqe criterion required under the FUA Factual
Data {Credit) Reports contract falls within the guidelines of the CONSUMER
REPOR!' type sat out in the Fair Credit Jleporting Act (Public: Law 91 - 508) ,
wherein the infol"'ID.Jtion co-• from repositories of accumulated credit record s and public records as to suits , judgments, foreclosures , qarnishlrlent..s,
bankruptcies and other leqal actions involving a subject. \oie do not re quire or order the type of INVESTIGATIVE ~SUMER REPORTS set out in the
Fair Credit Repo r ting Act de&linq with a consUIII8.r ' s c:ha.racter , qeneral
reputation, personal characteristics or mode of livinq obtained throuqh
personal interviews with neiqhbors, friends o r associates.

4.

()
('!>

3

~
2.
('!>

:I:

CL:y~~~
Char l u Finston
Aide and Legs! Coord i nator
to the Supe r intendent

~
;:s

"';:::
~

~

~
;:::
~

~
......

0

c

"'s·

O'CI

>
c.
3

e:

"'~

:::.

g

<~

w

-....I

-

I

\ C)

-..J

~
J.

Puagnph 604 of Title VI of the Fair Credit Reporting Act list.e the purposes f or which c.redit reports may be ordered. TtLis has caused u.s to forego
order.inq credit report. in one phase of our operations. SOIIIeti.llles an applicant for an insured a:art9age has recently sold a property on lthich there
is an outstandinq FHA insured mortgage and the buyer has usu::.d the mortgage
paygenta. Often in such cases , ve will review the credit of the substitute
mortqaqor before we will qu.arantee another loan to the seller . To assist
i.n the review, ve require the subi!Lission of a credit report on the substitute
t~C~rt.gagor.
some credit bureaus have refused to provide these credit reports
because the substitute mortgagor is not a party to the purchase transaction
or mo rtgaqe application tha t is under consideration. !be credit bureaus
hold that this is not one of the purposes for which credit reports may be
provided. \oie h&ve not contested their interpretation of Pu:aqraph 604 o ·f
tha Law .
Wa tru.1t that the t:oret}Oing information will be of some aasbtance
in your study.

sfil.l~,
R. David Lasure
Director
~a9ement and Operations
Assistance Division

to you

2.

credit information in 1:10r e than one 9eQ9r&phical Metropolitan area, and
only one givaa qua.si total coveraqe of the entire United States .
We do not require nor use investi9ative reports . The Consumer credit
report as previously stated is \Uied to assist \UI in determin9 whether an
applicant has a satisfactory credit standing . I t would not be possible
to determine what percentage of reports result in a rejection of the
applications.
Each insurance proqru contains specific and vuyinq requirements for
qualification for 1110rt9119e insurance . 1\ny one or colabination of reasons
therefore lllilY be the reason for rejection, including of course, an unaatisfactory credit standing-.
To co:roply with that section of Public Law 91- 508 which requires the user
of a credit report to notify the cons\ll!l8:r whenever the consumer has been
denied credit or insurance because of information in the credit report ,
the FHA advises the mortgagee who had ~;ub!IU.tted the mortgage app l ication
of the rejection, and in these insunces the mortqagee forwards the extra
copy of the FHA "Report on Application" to the mortgagor. On this copy
of the " Report on Application" is the name and address of the credit re porting agency as well as a notification of the rejection due to credit
characteristics. There is no definite form letter used by the ~K'rt9a9ee
in notifying- the mort9agor. The mort9a9ees prepare their own letter&
based on instru ctions from this office to include the required i nformation
under the Public Law .

The requirement limiting responses to inquiries about individuals has not
resulted in any changes in our procedures. on an individual case basis,
mortgage credit personnel .soa.e.ti..e& request "'ri.fication of information
conu..ined in an application by phone or letter. However , the IDOrtqagor
in his application qive& us permis sion to ~rify any information contained
therein. Thus, we do not believe this ill a violation of the Fair Credit
Raportinq Act.
Creditors in the pas t ha.ve alw•ys rated the accounu with their cu.~tomera .
That is, they would advise that " payt:~ents u:e as aqreed," or "30 to 60
days slow," or "unsatisfactory, " etc . These ratinqa along with information
on the accounu would appe•r in the credit report. Since the Pair Credit
Reportinq Act has become law, we have been advised by some field offices
that ac- credi tors will not r•te the accounts any more . They will only
provide information on the &mOunt of credit extended, tertllllll of payment,
and balance owin g. This ha.s not become a &eri.oua problem for u.s , but
whenever i t occurs , evaluation of the borrower's credit is made IDOre
difficult.
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Hr . Alber t A. Foe r
In each cau where a l o. n is den ied because of the infonutt.on con·
talned in the c redit re po rt the applicant is furnished with a copy
of a htur v hich. infor•s hit~~ that the reason for denta l of his
loan was bined on lnfor1111t i on contained in a c redit r eport prepared
by a spedUc credi t re porting agency. Copies of t he form leneu
that are used by our field stations a re ;~ttached.
t n..,es ti Kit ive consumer repo rt s ar e ob t ai ned on fee app rai ser•, compli·
ance inspectora, and pr ope rty 1111rn~ge~~~e n t broker s , We have no sta·
tls tics as t o number of repo rt s ob t ai ned or cos t . These r eports are
obtai ned under the contrac t disc ussed abo..,e . When a n individual
h des i ¥nated 1 cred it report la o rde r ed . the notice advises that
designation was ~Nde pend ing receipt of a s at hhc t o r y credi t report.
I n t h.e acco unt 1 receivable act l \l ity there are two types of reports
secured froa Retail Credit C0111pan y for persons wh.o a re indebted to
the Veterans Adcllin i st r ation: (a) asset and inc0111e reportl for debts
of $200 or IIIOU , and (b) skip-locate r epor t a fo r thoae persons wh0111
we a r e unable to locate and when t he deb t exceeda $300 . the price
of c redit reporu ranges from $4 , 90 t o $5 . 2S; skip·locau report s
tan¥e fro. $10 . 00 t o $10,75 pe r h.our with a limit of $35 each .
Whl.le we have no statist i cs as to number of r epor t s o r dered , t he
cos t for fY 1971 was $204 , 000 . I t h estl1111ted that $51,000 was used
for 5kip·locau reports and $141 , 000 was used for ,user 11nd income.
reports. these re po rt s are used in mak ing a determination as to th.e
debtor's ab ilit y to pay. Prenot ifi cation t o the conaumoer is not
required aa benefits are not denied because o[ infor~Wtion contained
in ~he repo rt.
In addit i on to the foregoing, several elements of our Departa~ent
of Medicine and Surge r y utilh.e credit reports on an as-needed basis .
I ncluded are the Vet er ans Canteen Serv i ce , t h.e Supply Servi ce, and
the Board on Co llections and Co.p r omises . the r epo rts are o r de r ed
by indiv i dual field station s , and this office ma in tains no statistics
wi th respect to them that would enable us to .!ln s1Jer your questions.
the Veterans Adminis t ra tion has no t made any major change• i n it a
procedu r e• as a result of the req ui r emen t lllaitin¥ reaponae• to in ·
qu iries about individuals since we do not order inveati~ati\le type
reporu incident t o l oan appllca ti ona .
When the Fair Credit Reporti ng Ac t wa s fi ra t i mplemen t ed ther e \o'ere
IOIDe do ubts in t h.e minds of lending in s tituti onl , especially bank1,
aa to wheth.er by sub111itting a c redit re port to the Ve urana Admin·
htra t ion they would be con s l de re.d c red it r epo rtl n~ agencies . !his
m.atur has been the s ubjec t of interpretation by thf': Federal Age ncie s
cha r ged 1Jith t he supervision of the va rlou a typel o{ lending inlltltutlons.
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VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Orne~: Of'" Gu.vu.1.. COUHsG.
WASHINGTON. D .C . 20420
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Mr. Albert A. Foer
Auochte Editor
The Un iver si t y of Chicago Law
Review
1111 tut 60th Street
Chicago , lllinoh 60637
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Dear Hr . Poer:
Thi 1 i l in respons e to you r lstter of November 30, 11171, request •
ing information fr 0111 the Vetera..n s Administ r ation pursuan t to your
s tudy of the effscts of the Fa.lr Credit Reporting Ac t .
the Veterans Adclliniltr a tion requiru that a Credit Report be s u b•
ai tted with each Gl loan applica tion a ubtr~ itt ed by a private lender
for 1 guaranty coamitme.nt . Ou..r ing C&lenda.r Year 1971 we g uara nt.eed
soee 275,000 h ome loa n s o f an lliiiOUnt. of approximately $6 billion .
Credit Repo rt• are llso obtainsd by the Veterans Administration in
connection with the processing of direct loans, release of liabll it.y applications and offe r a to purchas e Ve t eraos Administration
Ololt\ed propert ies which a re for sale . these a re conaut~~er type credit report s . Investigative ty pe repo rts are not submitted with
l oan applications no r are t hey ordered dlrect.ly by the Vet.e r ans
Admin.htratlon .
For s everal yea r s the Veterans Administration has bad an agree:ment
with t he Dep&rtment of Housing and Urba n Development whereby HUD ,
as the contracting a ge ncy, let.s inv it a tions to bid a nd enters into
contracts wit.h qualU:ied bidders t o aupply consumer type credit re•
ports and both agencies, as 1Jell •• lenders , -y ob tain consume r
t ype credit reports for loan purposes from these contrac tors . For
Fiacal Year 1972, HUD a wa rded 26 credit reporting con tracts under
which the Veterans Administration and private lenders who int.end
to sublllit Gl loan applicat ions - Y order con1umer cred it reports.
The price of the s e reports ranges fr0111 $5 . SO to $1.50 for t he basic
report p l us $4 . 00 for anteced&ntl or foreign re ports . We have no
stathtic s as to the number of credit reports submitted to the
Veterans Acbainiatration o r ordered by the Veterans A.cbainhtratlon
or lenders frOID aucceuful bidders .
Consumer reports that are supportive data to loan applicat i ons
used to deter-in• whethe r the veteran is 1 1atlsfactory cred i t
u r equired by the governing law. No figures are available aa
the number of ad\lerse actions or rejections of Gl loans solely
a reault of the in fonution contained in tbeaa reports.

Sl»w WtrrMis f.Jl - , VA jlt u.W, ..J s.ri.J Jrc.rif7 •.mbrr
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Nr. Alber t .\ . Poe.r

LAW DEPARTMENT
WMhlnQIOn. DC 20260

December 30 , 1971
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Mr. Albert A. Foer
Auociate Editor
The University of Chicago
Law Review
1111 Eut 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
Dear Mr . Foer:

We have noticed an inc r e11e ln the number of c red ltou who dec line
t o furn ish c redit bureaus ~o~lth lnforJUtlon, o r decline to give a
r a ting. We hav e no s t a ti s tics o n this and our v lew1 a re ba1ed on
re vle1.11 of indi v idual easel 1nd r eport• frou our field 1tatlon
personnel .

S ince rel y yours ,
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I tru s t the above 1.1lll 1s1hl you ln conduct i ng your study,

~

Asalatant General Couiae l
Enclo1ures
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This i 1 i.n reply to your letter of December 3, 1971, asking for our
eva.luat ion of the effect of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (P. L . 91-508)
on the postal system. We have r eceiver' the following informatio n from
the Postal Inspection Service:
Unquestionably, the restraints placed on credit reporting agencies
have bad a del ete r ious effect on the investigative eflorh of the
P o stal inspection Service . This is particularl.y true in the a r ea
o f mail fraud where incipient violations were previously brought
to attention by casualty inde xes and r epor ting agencies such as
Hooper Holmes and Company. Since enactment of the new l aw,
such c r edit reporting agencies no longer provide thia Service
with reports, and violato r s in such instances are able to ope rate
for longer periods of time without being detected.
Inspectors obtained consumer credit r epo r ts as an investigative
ai d in many classes of cases . Such re ports p ro vided much helpful
info r m ation and l eads quite aside from pu r e financ.i al data, L e .,
leads to acquisition of known handwriting exempl ars, physical
deacription of suspects and fugitives, etc. On March ZS, 1971,
approximately one n'l.onth before the effective date of the Act, ita
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MAR 2 I 1972
Mr. Albert Foer
Associate Editor
University of Chicago Law Review
1111 East 60th Street

Chicago, Illinois
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Dear Mr . Foer:
This i s in response to your l e tter t o Mr. Kleindienst
regarding the Study that you are making of the operations
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, P.L. 91 - 508, Title VI;
84 Stat . 1127; 15 U.S.C . 1681 ("the Act").

The letter asks a number of factual questions about
consumer reporting agencies and government investigations.
Your questions were referred t o the FBI which has furnished
us with the following answers.
1. What degree of reliance is placed on information
f r oo consumer reporting agencies?
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2.

Has the Act i n creased the cost of investigations?

While precise accounting i s not available, the
FBI feels that the restrictions imposed by the Act have
generally increased time and manpower costs.

Although the Fair Credit Reporting Act has limited our quick acceu
to certain probative and othe r helpful data and has increased the
overall cost of investigations, we have no means of accurately
estimating the increased coat. Additionally, it has the effect of
reducing to some extent the thoroughness of some of our investi.
gations from the standpoint of bringing all poasible !acts together
for analysis .
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The resourcefuln es s of Inspectors haa resulted i n the development
of alternate me ana of obtaining appropriate information, however,
it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of these means. Certainly,
they are more time consunling than was the case when such data was
obtainable at one source.
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With enactment of the Act , credit files became
unavailable as investigative resources in criminal and
security inve stigations . The FBI responded to the limita t ions of the statute by discontinuing credit bureau file
checks as a routine investigative technique in other than
employment cases. Credi t information obtained under the
exceptions provided in the statute is identified ::o that
it will not be used subsequently for purposes other than
those permitted by the law.

restrictive provisions were brought t o the attention of all Postal
lnlpection Service personnel with irutructiona t o dhcontinue obtaining or r eviewing credit reports, and, thereafter, such reports
were no lo nger r elied upon for investigative purposes.

1 hope this answers your questions.

;:

~~·ot~~~~y
W. Allen Sanders
Aasistant General Counsel
Legislative Divisio n
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It is conceded, for.example, that the government is limited
in obtaining informati on from consumer rep ort ing agencies
by f 604 of the Act , 15 U. S . C. 168lb. However, the defini tion of 11 consumer r eporting agency 11 includes words of l imitation which appear to exclude the FBI f r om the definition.
The FBI does not furn ish informa tion outs i de the government
for monetary fees. Moreover , t he term 11 cooperative non pro f it basis" is not applicable to the reporting activities
of Federal agencies . 11 Cooperative non- profit basis 11 is
generally understood to refer to the functions of private
associations that provide services to their members on a
mutually beneficial basis, such as th e cooperati ve credit
bureaus which exist in this field.
The letter of April 7, 19 70 to wbi.ch you refer from
Deputy Attorney General Kleindiens t to Leonor K. Su lliv an,
Olairman of the SubcOtmDi tte e on ConsUIJ'Ier Affairs of the
House Banking Committee confirms this. (The text of the
l etter appears in Fair Credit Reporting, Hearings on H. R.
16340 before the subcotrlllittee on consumer affairs of the
House Conl:Dittee on Banking and Currency, 9lst Cong., 2d
Sess . (1970) a t page 605 . ) The letter states in pertinent
part :
Another factor which warrants close
Cotmnittee consideration is the possibility
that the definition of 11 consumer reporting
agency 11 in H.R . 16340 may be read to include
agencies of Government . This is obviously
not intended and so we would suggest some
limiting language such as that used on page
5, lines 10 and 11, of S . 823. Certainly,
there is no intention to require the F.B.I.
or other agenc i es o f Government to open their
files to all person s whose names appear in
them .
At the time that thi s
passed the Senate and
The Senate bill at p.
l anguage limiting t h e

letter was written S. 823 had already
had been in tr oduced in the House.
5, lines 10 and 11, included the
de finition of 1 'consumer reporting

- 3 -

3 . To what extent have substi tute means of ob ta ining
similar i nforma tion been found?
The estimate given above that costs have been
increased is based on the fact that investigative l eads
now must be developed, if they are ava ilable at a ll, though
various alternatives involving direct interviews of numerous
possible sources seeking the one having relevant inform,tion.
4.

How often do banks utilize FBI fingerprint checks?

Wh il e stat i stics concerning the total number of
fingerprint checks requested by banks are not readily avai l able, employment application fingerprint identification
service is available by law and regulation (Public Law
92-184; 28 C. F . R. 0.85(b)) to federally insured or chartered
banks .
You have a l so raised a legal question as to whether a
government agency such as the FBI may be a consumer reporting
agency within the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Ac t,
P.L. 91- 508, Title VI, 84 Stat. 1127, 151 u.s.c. 1681. The
Office of Legal Counsel cannot furnish you with an officia l
legal opinion on this question since we are limited by law
to providing such opinions to officers of the Executive
branch acting in their official capacities. However , we
offer the fo l l owing analys i s for your information .
The Act defines consumer reporting agency as any person
which "for monetary fees, dues , or on a cooperative nonprofit
basis 11 regularly engages in assembling consumer credit
information for the purposes of 11 furnishing consumer reports
to t hird parties. 11 15 U. S.C. 168la(f). An example of
dissemination t o a third party, .!·.!·, outside the governmen t,
by the FBI could be the employment applicant fingerprint
service available to Federally insured banks pursuant to
P.L. 92-184 .
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It is true that the Act includes a general definition
of 11 person 11 , 15 U.S . C. 168la , that covers government
agen cies and that some sections may apply t o such agencies.
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It may be noted that legislation has been prop osed
by the Admini stra tion which would provide new rights for
individual s to examin e rec ords main t ained by the govern ·
ment. On September 20 , 1971, the Attorney General sent
to Congress the "Criminal Justice Information Sys t ems
Security and Privacy Ac t o f 1971," which has been intro ·
duced as H. R. 10789 . Section J(c) of the bil l provides :
(c) An individual who believes that
criminal offender record information con ·
cerning him i s inac curate, incomplete, or
maintained in vio lation of this Act sha ll,
upon satisfactor y ver i fication of his
identity, and in accordance with published
rules seating the t ime , place , fees to the
extent authorized by sta t ute, and procedure
to be followed, be entitled to review such
information and to obtain a copy of it for
the purpose of cha l l enge or correction.
Thus, some of t h e same sort of protecdon afforded to con·
sumers against private investigative agencies would , under
t he bi ll, be provided in the government field as well.
Sincere l y ,

?~P.e.
Ra l ph E. Erickson
Assis tant At t orney Genera l
Office of Legal Counsel

- 5 -

agency 11 to enterprises acting "for monetary fees, dues, or
on a cooperative nonprofit basis ," which now appears in t he
Act. (See S . 823 , November 12, 1969, as referred to the
House Corm! , on Banking and CUr r ency , printed a t page 15 of
House hearings, supra .) The bil l introduced by Congress·
woman Sul livan, H. R. 1 6340 , did not , as noted in th e l e tt er ,
include similar l anguage . See page 2 of House hearings,
~· ~/
The Department ' s view was that the addi tion o f
thi s l anguage woul d make it clear that goverm~ent agencies
did not fall within the definition.
There is nothing in the subsequent l egis l ative history
which suggests that anyone took issue with the Department ' s
position. The findings and purpose set out by the Congress
at the beginning of the Act reflect the view that Congress
was concerned with comnercial interests and not with th e
practices of government agencies . Sec. 602 , 15 U. S.C. 1 681.
The entire tenor of the legislative history reflects a con·
cern with private rather than public agencies.
The whol e question of disclosure of government f il es
was the recent subject of searching debate when the Freedom
of I nformation Ac t was passed . 5 U.S.C. 552. It hard l y
seems like l y that Congress in passing the Act woul d have
radically upset or altered che equilibrium and compromise
achieved by che Freedom of Information Act wi t hout ind i ca ·
cing that i t had an intention to do so .
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H.R. 1 6340 was not reported out by the Comni ttee .
Instead, another bill which did no t include a prov ision
dealing with credit agencies , H.R . 1 5073, was reported
out. H. Rep . No. 9 1· 975. Tha t bill, in substantially
similar f orm was introduced i n t he Senate as S. 3578. It
was amended on th e Senate floo r to include the provisions
relating to credit agencies and then adop ted as an amend·
men t in the nature of substitute for H.R. 15073. What
became the present Act was then agr eed t o by the House in
confer ence . H. Rep . 91·1 587, p. 25.

- 4 -
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APPENDIX SEVEN

OBSOLETE DATA PROCEDURES, SELECTED CONSUMER
REPORTING AGENCIES, CHICAGO
I.

CREDIT BUREAUS
A. Manual
1. Chicago Credit Bureau
Everything over 10 years old destroyed. Personnel trained to avoid
giving out statutorily obsolete data.
2. Credit Bureau of Western Cook County
On-going manual purging. Also, obsolete data destroyed as encountered in response to inquiries.
3. Hale-Prietsch Services
Obsolete data retained, not segregated in file . Supervisor reads and
pulls obsolete data before passing file to reported, unless section
605(b) exceptions apply. Reported double-checks. Chapter 13 bankruptcies considered under 14 year limit.
B. Computerized
1. Credit Information Corporation of Chicago
All information programmed out prior to statutory limit. Chapter 13
bankruptcies kept only 7 years. Inquiry records kept 10 years.
2. Hooper-Holmes Credit Index
All information purged with in 5 years.
3. TRW Credit Data
All information programmed out of computer prior to statutory
limit.
II. INSPECTION BUREAUS (All Manual)
I. American Service Bureau
Favorable information destroyed after 13 months. Adverse information retained 5 years.
2. Illinois Service Bureau
Copy of report destroyed after 2 years, including derogatory information. Files containing newspaper clippings and order tickets kept
5 years. Daily manual weeding.
3. Insurance Inspections, Ltd.
All information destroyed after 13 months.
4. Retail Credit Co.
·
Files destroyed after 13 months, except that significant adverse data
kept 5 years. Bankruptcy data kept 10 years. A file with highly sensitive data, e.g. concerning crime syndicate, retained longer, but obsolete data not reported.
5. Underwriters Reports, Inc.
Oldest information is 2 years, except for adverse information . Too
costly to purge manually. Manager checks each file when it is pulled
before passing it to an inspector.
Sources: See profiles of the respective bureaus in Appendix One.
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APPENDIX EIGHT

SAMPLE FORMS USED BY INSPECTION BUREAUS
Tenant Home Owners Report, Blank Form, Retail Credit Co., 1968.
II. Comprehensive-Homeowners-Tenants Report, Blank Form, Insurance Inspections, Ltd ., 1972.
III. Personnel Selection Investigation, Specimen Report*, Retail Credit Co.,
1965.
IV. Fire-Report-Dwelling, Sample Form, O'Hanlon Reports, 1964.
Note: For a sample of an American Service Bureau "Special Service Life
Report", see Senate Hearings on S. 823 (Fair Credit Reporting)
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., First Session (May 19,
1969), at 278-279.
I.

*All names, locations, and information appearing in this Specimen Report
are fictitious.
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I. Tenant Home Owners Report, Blank Form,

Retail Credit Co., 1%8.
RET AU. CREDIT COMPANY
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arm . This condttton has coapletely healed and hU appearance 1s entirel y
norul . He has dlaplayed no nervousneaa as a result or th ll lnjUrJ ,
though thh ar11 11 eaatly fatigued. We learn or no other health hlatory,
He uses lnto:~:tcanta on a ~aode rate and tnt' r eouent basta.
been known to drlnk to excess or use dr~J&&.

He has ee'l'er

FINANCES: Subject 111'eS wtthln hll :~~eans and matntalnl cloae control
O't'er hla rtnancea; no known !'1nanctal curnculty. He draws d11ab111ty
payr.:ents rroa the goverDtlent as a result or hla aer't'lce connected injury.
ll'ormer employwent recorda tndlcate the a111ount to 'Oe $50 a month .
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APPENDIX NINE

PRE-NOTIFICATION AND FURTHER INFORMATION
I. Pre-notification Hand-out, Aetna Life'& Casualty.
II. Pre-notification Letter*
III. Response to Request for Additional Information Under Section 606(b)*
I. Pre-notification Hand-out,
Aetna Life & Casualty.
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*(facsimile of form letter used by a major insurance company)
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II. Pre-notification Letter

III. Response to Request for Additional Information Under Section 606(b).
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APPENDIX TEN

AUTHOR'S APPROACH AND METHODS OF RESEARCH
Although my intention was to be as scientific as possible, after a year in the
vineyards I have to admit that science, in a study of this nature, turns out to
mean little more than gathering as much information as possible from the
greatest possible variety of sources, and then attempting to evaluate it with as
much sophistication and judgment as one can muster. To study an industry
like the personal information market, much of which has traditionally been
shrouded in secrecy, where statistics are almost entirely lacking, where many
informants must be promised confidentially, and where the subpoena power is
the researcher's pipe dream, required more art than science.
The major source of information upon which this article is based was the
personal interview. During the last two months of 1971, I sought out users of
consumer reports in Chicago. These included retailers, insurance companies,
banks, savings and loan institutions, finance companies, real estate companies,
and government agencies. Executives or counsel of 40 such units were personally interviewed by the author or an associate. These interviews followed a prepared pattern and lasted an average of one hour, focusing on the uses and
sources of consumer reports and the perceived impact of the FCRA. Another
40 consumer report users were interviewed in less depth by telephone. Respondents were informed that publication was intended and that they might requ est
confidentiality.
Based upon this interview experience. a four-page questionnaire was prepared and mailed to 200 additional consumer report users. "The replies_ to our
questionnaires soon illustrated that questionnaires are utterly useless in a factfinding study of this kind."* An insignificant percentage of potential respondents were willing to utilize our stamped, self-addressed envelopes.
During the first two months of 1972, attention was shifted to the consumer
reporting agencies in Chicago. Executives of 6 credit bureaus and 8 inspection
bureaus were interviewed for an average of 3 hours each. Executives of an additional 9 consumer reporting agencies were interviewed over the telephone.
Many of those interviewed were of continuing help throughout the project,
answering additional questions as they occurred and serving as a sounding
board for my observations and proposals. Considering the reputation of the
credit bureaus and inspection bureaus for secrecy, I was amazed to find this
d.egree of openness and cooperation. Only a few firms refused to be interVIewed.
The basic footwork in Chicago was supplemented in many ways, beginn ing
with a thorough search of the literature on privacy, credit bureaus, insurance
Underwriting, and the FCRA. Contact was est:J.blished with consumer groups
and privacy-concerned individuals around the nation. Some correspondents
produced documentation of abuses in the personal information market. Others
provided internal documents from various consumer reporting agencies,
?btained in ways which I can only imagine. Additional sources included former
Insurance inspectors and credit bureau employees, detectives, insurance agents

-*

S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 9 (1959).
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and underwriters, Congressional staff members, and Federal Trade Commission attorneys in Chicago and Washington. In all, over 250 people were consulted.
Many, if not all, of my sources had a point of view to sell. A former insurance inspector, for instance, might give biased information if he had been fired
from his job. Facts, I found, rarely exist in pristine form; rather, there are tendencies of opinion and observation which point in particular directions. I have
attempted to be alive to my own prejudices and those of my sources, eliminating information (except in Appendix One) which could not be verified from
other sources. To foster objectivity, I submitted drafts to a variety of experts in
the various fields involved, including persons less than sympathetic to my objectives. I am grateful to them all, but take full responsibility for the results,
some of which will certainly not appeal to all my correspondents.
My own prejudices must not be overlooked. Objectivity can carry a writer
only so far when his material requires constant evaluation as to truth or significance. I start with the belief that the best society is one where diversity is
encouraged, where debate is vigorous, and where spontaneity is undampened
by the lurking fear that someone is watching and taking notes. The invasion of
privacy is, in a word, a matter of serious concern to me. On the other hand,
I've grown up on a consumer credit society (my father is a retailer with much
credit business), and I make full use of the benefits of credit cards and charge
accounts. My approach, therefore, assumes the continued existence of consumer credit in its various forms. Nor do I believe that insurance companies
should accept all risks without any attempt to evaluate them. I believe that
credit bureaus and inspection bureaus can serve a useful purpose; my objective
is to seek ways in which that purpose can be served without unduly violating
individual privacy.
I chose Chicago as the locus of the study because I was attending the University of Chicago Law School. As a financial, retail, mail-order, and insurance
center, Chicago provided a wealth of subjects to study. Indeed, Chicago is not
typical of the personal information market, because there is so much competition, so much activity. Where other cities have only one or two credit bureaus
and a couple of inspection bureaus, Chicago has over 20 credit bureaus and
almost as many inspection bureaus. This unusual degree of competition imposes upon the empirical part of the study, but should not affect my observations
and recommendations concerning the FCRA.
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DIETHYLSTILBESTROL
Joyce E. Br.eiman*
EDITOR'S NOTE
On April 27, 1973, the Food and Drug Administration announced the withdrawal of all authorization for the use of diethylstilbestrol in food-producing animals. t While the following article
was prepared prior to that date, its impact is not affected by the
FDA ruling. For one thing, it is very likely that the ruling will be
appealed in the courts by the drug manufacturers, and such appeals will probably involve many of the same issues and research
findings discussed below.
Of greater importance within the context of this Joumal.
though, is the fact that the diethylstilbestrol problem is not an
isolated one, occurring because it was unexpected and the appropriate agencies lacked machinery to deal with it. On the contrary,
the greater concem is not for diethylstilbestrol per se (as alarming
as that may be in itself), but that the administrative and legal
processes involved work slowly. unevenly. and often provide guidance and protection to no one -- not the drug manufacturer nor the
livestock producer, who are often left without clear and reasonable
guidelines, and certainly not the public-at-large whose health is the
chief reason that any controls at all are placed upon drugs administered to food producing animals.
Already advertising campaigns are being mounted by drug
companies to induce livestock producers to use substitutes for
diethylstilbestrol which may prove to be equally undesireable, and
perhaps even more so. Thus. the problem is a continuing one. Even
!f the FDA ban on diethylstilbestrol is upheld in the courts. issues
similar to those discussed below will likely also arise with respect to
the substitute drugs.

* A.B., University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1972, Loyola University of Los Angeles,
School of Law .
. t 38 Fed. Reg. 10926 (1973). This ruling withdrew all new drug applications for the use of
dt~thylstilbestrol in animal implants. As will be seen below in the text, the use of this drug in
antmal feed was earlier prohibited. At the present time, therefore, all uses of diethylstilbestrol in
food producing animals have been banned. The April 27 ruling was based on
. . . new Department of Agriculture tests that detected residues of DES (diethylstilbestrol) in livers and kidneys of animals slaughtered 120 days after the synthetic
estrogen was implanted in their ears.
Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1973, pt. I, at 9.

140

Consumer Journal

[Vol. 11:139

INTRODUCTION
Diethylstilbestrol, often called stilbestrol or DES, is a synthetic
female sex hormone first developed in 1938. 1 Although once limited to
specific clinical uses, 2 continued research indicated that the administration of this drug to chickens and cattle resulted in more efficient
feed conversion with a corresponding weight gain in the animals treated.3 With governmental approval, DES became widely used on animals
bred for human consumption.4
This article will explore the complicated medical, legal, and legislative history of DES and will review the dangers of its widespread and
relatively casual administration to beef-cattle. It will also demonstrate
the need for continuing consumer action to enforce already existing
legislation which clearly prohibits the use of DES in food -producing
animals.
In 1941, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), acting under
the "new drug" section of the 1938 Federal Food, ·Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, permitted eleven firms to begin marketing DES for clinical use. 5
Six years later an application for the use of DES pellet implants in
poultry was allowed to become effective. 6 In November, 1954, the FDA
approved the first application for the daily use of 10 milligrams (mg.) of
DES to be added to feed for fattening cattle weighing at least sixhundred pounds.7 Subsequently, in 1955, the use of DES pellets for
implantation in the ears of cattle was permitted.8 By 1958, DES was
routinely added to 75% of all feed for beef-cattle in feed lots.9
1. Parkes, Dodds & Noble, Interruption of Early Pregnancy by Means of Orally Active
Oestrogens. BRIT. MED. J. 557 (1938). See also J. MEIGS & S.H. STURGIS, PROGRESS IN
GYNECOLOGY 499 (1946). Two compounds were synthesized by Dodds: one, stilbestrol, which is
relatively inactive; and the other, diethylstilbestrol, which is highly active. See note 25 infra. and
accompanying text. Some pharmaceutical companies, however, use the trade name "stilbestrol"
for the more active hormone, diethylstilbestrol (DES). These terms are used interchangeably in
this article as referring to DES.
2. Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197, the Color Additives Amendment to the Federal Food.
Drug. and Cosmetic Act. before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 86th
Cong .. 2nd Sess. at 69 (1960) [ hereinafter, /960 Hearings]. Statement of Arthur S. Flemming.
Secretary of Health, Education , and Welfare.
3. Ringuette, Medicated Animal Feeds of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958: A Case
Study. IS FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 320 (1960).
.
4. See generally 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 69-70.
5. Id. at 69.
6. ld.
7. T. Byerly, hormones in Feed, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDICATED
FEEDS , BEFORE THE VETERINARY MEDICAL BRANCH OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION 17 (H. Welch & F. Marti -Ibanez eds. 1956) [hereinafter, SYMPOSIUM].
8. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70.
9. Ringuette, supra note 3, at 320. In the 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, Secretary of HEW.
ArthurS. Flemming, estimated that " ... 80 to 85 percent of the beef cattle are now fed on feed
containing stilbestrol." I d. at 70.
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Although use in poultry was discontinued in 1959,10 it is conceivable
that virtually all beef-cattle received medicated feed: 1 implants , or both
until January 1, 1973. As of that date, by order of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), the use of DES in feed was to
be discontinued .12 This order did not apply to DES implants and, in
fact, it specifically stated that its purpose was to allow the industry
sufficient time to convert the drug to use in implants rather than feed .13
The argument for allowing the use of DES is based upon the theory
that it allows a greater efficiency of feed conversion, resulting in the
production of more and better meat at less cost to the producer and
consumer. The Department of Agriculture has estimated that to prohibit the use of DES would cost consumers up to $460,000,000 annually~ 4
There seems little question that DES results in financial gain to the
cattle raiser, but the savings to the consumer have been estimated to
amount to no more than $2.30 per person, per year.15
Furthermore, there is evidence which suggests that DES does not
result in better quality food . Carcasses of treated animals do not grade
consistently to the same standard of quality as do carcasses of nontreated animals; rather, reduced carcass quality is common after DES
. _10. Bell v. Goddard . 366 F.2d 177. 179 (7th Cir., 1966). The FDA issu ed a final ord er prohibttln g the use of DES implants in poultry in 1961. but the manufacturers of DES poultry implants
had agreed to suspend the sa le of their products as early as December. 1959. /d .. court's footnote
3. See text at notes I 08 -112. il!fra.
. I I. Cf note 9 , supra. The resu lts of a telephone survey conducted by the author indicate that
from 75 to 99 percent of beef cattle received such feed . The agencies contacted are: Veterinary
Med tcal Officer , State of Californ ia, Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Anima l Hea lth . Los
Angeles, Nov . 19, 1970; Senior Meat Inspector, California Department of Agriculture, Burea u of
Mea t In spection , Los Angeles , Nov. 19, 1970; Senior Inspector, Ca li fornia Department of Agriculture, Field Agricu lture and Chemical Division, Los Angeles, Nov. 20, 1970; California Cattle
Feeders Assoc .. Bakersfield , Ca lifornia, Nov. 20, 1970; Persons in the meat packing industry. Los
Angel es. Nov. 20. 1970; State Farm and Hom e Advisor, University of California at Los Angeles.
Nov . 20, 1970 (who indicated that such record s are simply not kept). Stated estimates did vary
from 75 to 99 percent. In July, 197 1. the California State Department of Agriculture estimated
!hat 90 perce nt of cattle in feed lots are fed either DES or other growth stimu lants. W estern States
Mea t Packers Assoc.. Inc .. Bulletin No . 1309 (1971).
12. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747. 15749 (1972). See also 37 Fed . Reg. 26307 0972).
13. /d. at 15748. For discussion of the lega lity of the Commissioner's allowing time for the
Phaseout of DES in feeds , see H earings on the R egulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Irs use as a

~rug fo r humans and in animal feeds) before the Intergovernmental R elations Subcommittee of
(he Hous e Committee on Governmental Operations. 92nd Con g., 2nd Sess., pt. 3, at 417 et seq.
1972) !hereinafter, Aug. 1972 Hearings].
14. W estern States M eat Packers Assoc.. Inc .. Bulletin No. 1309 (1971).
IS. /d. See also Hearings on the R egulation of Food Additives and Medicat ed Animal Feed

before th e Subcommittee on Int ergovernmental R elations of the House Committee on Govem'»e'!ta / Operations, 92nd Cong., lst Sess. at 445-458 (1971) [hereinafter: March 1~71 H earings].
EstJmated cost increases due to the non-use of DES are stated for vartous sttuattons . All such

tnneases are qua lified as being subject to over-estimation . ;tnd ~ee H earings on the R egulation of
Dtethylstilbestrol (DES) (Its use as a drug for humans and m Ammalfeeds) before th e lntergovern 'rt enta{ R elat ions Subcomm ittee of th e House Committee on Governm e~zt Operations, 92nd Cong.,
lst Sess .. pt. 2. at 253 (1971) [hereinafter, Dec. 1971 H earmgsj, where tt was asserted by Dr. C.D.
Va n l-louwelin g Direc tor Bureau of Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration. that the
cost increase t~ the con'sumer due to th e non -use of DES wou ld amount to $3.85 per person
an n ua lly.
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implantation or feeding. 16 It has been found that cattle treated with
DES often develop cover fat, sometimes to excess, without corresponding marbling through the lean meat, with the meat becoming watery~
In fact, there is evidence that the extra weight gain may be due to water
retention, indicating that the consumer is actually paying for extra
water.18 Similar criticisms had been raised regarding DES treated poultry. In one study the fat of such fowl reportedly differed chemically
from that of normally fattened birds; it was watery and "culinarily
inferior." 19
Perhaps the most important consumer issue is the potentially serious health hazards presented by DES. It is an active female sex hormone which, as indicated below, is capable of producing undesirable
sex-related physiological effects. Moreover, it is acknowledged to be a
carcinogen.20 At the time that the initial application for DES pellets was
allowed to become effective, DES had been shown to cause cancer in
test animals when administered orally.21 It was believed, however, that
no significant residues of the drug would remain in the edible tissues of
treated animals, which would thereby endanger the health of consumers. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be the case.22
7

I.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL

Hormones are chemical substances secreted into the bloodstream by
specific glands. Among these glands are the adrenals, and parts of the
ovaries and testes. Secretion hormones are transported through the
bloodstream to other parts of the body (so-called target organs),
where they cause various specialized effects. Hormones are remarkably
potent and only minute amounts circulate in the blood. This makes the
16. For specific details of reduced carcass quality follow ing DES implantation in lambs and
catt le. see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION, AGRICULTURAL
BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. HORMONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND APPLICATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF MEATS.
MILK AND EGGS, at 34-35, No. 714 (Supp. 1959).
17. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 287 (statement of Sen. John Dingell, reading excerpt from
the Western Livestock Reporter). Also. personal interview with a spokesman for the Meat Industry.
Los Angeles, Oct. 19, 1970, who stated that treated meat may be recognized by its excessive water
content.
18. See L. WICKENDEN, OUR DAILY POISON, 11 7-119 (1956).
19. LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF 1958 FOOD ADDITIVES AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL FOOD. DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT at 95 (C. Dunn ed . 1958) [hereinafter. LEGIS.
REC.].
20. H earings on the Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES> Uts use as a drug for humans and
in anima/feeds) before th e Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations. of the House Committee on Governmental Operations. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess .. pt. I. at 43 (1971) [hereinafter, Nov. 1971
Hearings]. Statement by Dr. Umberti Saffiatti of the National Cancer Institute. Cf statement of
Dr. Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner, FDA. /d. at SO.
21. / 960 H earings. supra note 2, at 69.
22. See LEGIS. REC .. supra note 19, at 96.
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development of sensitive and accurate assay methods difficult.23 Furthermore, hormones may diffuse slowly between cells and produce some
local effects without entering the bloodstream in detectable quantities. 24
DES has been estimated to be about four times as potent as the
natural estrogen, estradiol, and about ten times as active as estrone~ 5
Unlike the natural hormones, however, DES passes unchanged through
the portal circulation,26 rather than undergoing degrad ation and detoxification in the liver. As a result, the liver's normal protective function is
largely ineffective27 and this may account for ·some of the toxic effects of
DES.28
1.

DES as a Cause of Cancer

A carcinogen is defined as "any agent which tends to promote ...
[or] accelerates the development of cancer ... " 29 Stronger carcinogens,
by their very strength, are subject to almost certain clinical discovery; 30

23. Hormones are discussed general ly in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL
NUTRITION. supra note 16. at 14. For a discussion of the problems involved in detec ting hormonal residues in a nim al tissues. see text i1~{ra at notes 141-150.
24. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION. supra note 16. at 14.
25. A. OSAL, R. PRATT & M. ALTSCHULE, THE UNITED STATES DiSPENSATORY
AND PHYSICIANS PHARMACOLOGY (26th ed. 1967). Cf Dodds. Stilbestrol. CXLI I TH E
PRACTITIONER 309, 312 (1939), in which DES is estimated to be three to four times as active as
estrone when administered subcutaneously, and almost as active as estrone when given orally.
. Estrogen is a generic term applied to any substance, whether naturally occurring or syn thetic. that. exerts biologic_al effects characterist_i~ of estrogenic horm one~ (e.g., seconda ry sex
charactenstlcs). The name IS denved from the ab1hty of such substances to mduce estrus in lower
mamm als. STEI?MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22nd ed: 1972). There are three major.
naturally occumng estrogens m the human female: estradiOl, estrone, and estriol. R.W.
KISTNER , GYNECOLOGY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 556 (1%4).
. 26. Th e portal circulation refers to the circulation of blood between the liver and the small
tntestine via the portal vein. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22nd ed. 1972).
27. See A. H. CURTIS & W. HUFFMAN, A TEXT BOOK OF GYNECOLOGY 118 (1950).
28. S ee Shorr, Robinson & Papanicolaou, A Clinical Study of the Synthetic Estrogen Stilbestrol, 113 J.A.M.A. 2312, 2315 (1939). See generally MERCK CO .. STILBESTROL ANN. BIBLIOG. (1941) [hereinafter, MERCK]. A group of women treated with DES (primarily to curb
symptoms of menopause) developed toxic reactions to the hormone in the form of nausea, vomitmg. and acute psychotic reaction. They demonstrated no tendency to acquire a tolerance to DES.
See generally Zondek & Sulman, Inactivation of Diethylstilbestrol in the Organism, 144 NATURE
596 0939).
29. BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed . 1972) at 254. See also 1960
Hearings. supra note 2, at 44, for a summary of a special report prepared by Dr. C. Midl er, Asso Ciate Director for Intramural Research of the Nationa l Cancer Institute. Emphasized in the report
are th e following:
I. Cancer can be caused by extraneous agents. 2. Not all members of the exposed
population are expected to develop cancer, but those more susceptible to cancer
cannot be identified except by experience. 3. Even a [known] powerful carcinogen
requires weeks or mon ths to elicit cancer in mice or rats and probably requires years
in man . 4. No change need be recogn izable in the organ or tissue destined to become
cancerous before th e cancer itself appears.
30. 1960 Hearings , supra note 2. at 44.
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they identify themselves by that very characteristic which makes them
dangerous (i.e., the more rapid development of malignant tumors)!'
Less potent carcinogens, paradoxically, are therefore potentially more
dangerous, in that their harmful effects may evade recognition; 2 In fact,
they are a significant factor in human cancer and present difficult evaluation problems~ 3 The effect of certain chemical carcinogens, moreover,
can be markedly increased by other compounds which are not in themselves carcinogenic!"
Evidence also indicates the irreversibility of a malignant response
once initiated and, furthermore, suggests cumulative effects of carcinogenic agents, at least in animals?5 Thus, the effect of a small dose is not
"forgotten" by the organism. Unlike some poisons, carcinogens may
not have threshold values.36 The body is often capable of excreting a
small amount of an ingested toxic substance (if it does not do substantial harm initially), but this may not be true ot carcinogens, insofar as
they are believed to have irreversible cytologic effects.
Evidence exists to show that the time of appearance of tumors after
exposure to carcinogenic agents is, within limits, dependent upon the
dose and frequency of exposure, but small and often a single dose of
carcinogenic agents may elicit tumors, notably after prolonged latent
·periods. In view of the latter findings,and in view of the summative
carcinogenic effect of repeated small doses, concepts of safe threshhold doses· are dubious where complete control of a hazard involving
exposure to carcinogenic agents is desired.37

Furthermore, it has been established that
. .. any of the known human carcinogens takes about 10 to 20 years
to produce its specific biological effect---[whereas] in the experimental animal, it requires on the average of a third of the lifespan of the
animal to elicit these effects.38

31. /d.
32. The danger lies in the fact that such substances may not be recognized as being potentially
harmful. Certainly a substance which produces a malignant growth quickly in a laboratory test
animal can be more easily and positively identified as a carcinogen than one which makes its
effects known only after a considerable del ay. The longer the time of exposure needed to develo.p a
discoverable cancer, the less likely it will be that the actual source can be pinpointed. See 1960
Hearings. supra note 2, at 53-SS, which includes an excerpt from P. Kotin, Experimentally Weak
Carcinogens. 18 CANCER RESEARCH at 1-3 (1958).
33. 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44, and 53-SS.
34. /d.
35. /d. See also SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 176.
36. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 176.
37. /d. at 9, quotin g from the resolutions adopted by the International Union against Cancer;
XI ACTA Union Int ernational Contre le Cancer, No. I, 72-76 (1954).
.
38. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 57 (statement of Dr. Roy Hertz, Senior Physician ,
Rockefeller University, New York).
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A substance that is not normally a carcinogen may disturb the regular functioning of some part of the body in such a way that a malignancy results. For instance, hormone~ are not normally carcinogenic,
but certain cancers (particularly of the reproductive system) have been
linked with disturbances of the balance of the sex hormones. There is
evidence indicating that estrogens, if allowed to build up to abnormally
high levels, may become carcinogenic. Extensive experiments on mice,
rats, guinea pigs, and monkeys show that prolonged administration of
estrogens, not necessarily at high levels, causes changes in the tissues of
the reproductive organs, varying from benign overgrowths to definite
malignancies?9 Thus, even at low dosage levels, estrogens adm inis ered
over a period of time present a significant threat of cancer, and it is this
continuing exposure to minute doses that is to be feared from the introduction of hormones into the food supply.40
There is also evidence indicating that human tissue may be susceptible to the same carcinogenic effects observed in animals.41 Investigators
at the Royal Victoria Hospital (McGill University), Canada, discovered
that two-thirds of the one hundred-fifty cases of uterine cancer studied
had abnormally high estrogen levels.42 In a later study of twenty cases,
eighteen showed similar high estrogen levels.43
Because of its estrogenic activity, DES also proved to be a carcino~en;44it has been shown to lead to a wide range of pathological changes
45
In animals and humans. In guinea pigs, for example, uterine tumors

39. S ee generally R. CARSON , SILENT SPRING (1962). See also 1960 Hearings. supra note
2. at 55. In mice, rats, and ha msters th e adm inistration of estrogens has been fo un d to ind uce
va rious forms of ca ncer. /d.
40. See generally Knight , Martin, Eglesias & Smith , Possible Cancer Hazard Presented by
Feedmg Diethylstilbestrol to Cattle, SYMPOSIUM , supra note 7. at 167- 169.
41. In the Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, Dr. Roy Hertz of Rockefeller University noted
that
. .. a ll o f th e kn own hum a n ca rcinogens a lso produce ca ncer in a nimals. We cann ~t
say th e reverse, but we ca n say that th ere is this crossover between hum a n carcinogenes is and anim a l carcinogenesis to the extent that a ny substa nce which is kn own
to produce ca ncer in humans will a lso produce cancer in a nim a ls. a nd frequently a t
the sa me site . . .

ld. a t 57-58. Dr. Hertz a lso offered this wa rnin g:
. . . wh en you observe a carcin ogenic effect in experimental anim a ls, you had better
sit up and ta ke notice as to wheth er this is going to happen und er simila r conditio ns
of ex posure for similr period s of tim e in th e hum a n subject .

ld. at 58.
42. R. CARSON , SILENT SPRING 236 (1962).
43. /d. S ee also 1960 Hearings. supra note 2. at 55-56.
44. See generally G erschicker. Mamm ary Carcinoma in th e Rat with M etastasin Indu ced by
e strogen . 89 SCI. 35-37 (1939).
45. G . Knight, W.C. Martin, R. Inglesias. W.E. Smith , Possible Cancer Hazard Presem ed by
Feeding Diethylstilbestrol to Cattle. SYMPOSIUM , supra note 7, a t 167.
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have been induced with as little as 1.5 mg. of DES in subcutaneously
implanted pellets.46 In fact, tumors have been induced in guinea pigs
exposed to as little as 0.008 mg. of DES per day.47 A DES pellet removed
from a guinea pig one year after implantation has been found to retain
sufficient activity to induce a tumor upon reimplantation in another
animal.48 Investigators at the National Cancer Institute found that
cancers of the breast can be induced in mice with as little as 0.0007 mg.
of DES per day.49 Fifty percent of male mice, which do not normally
develop such tumors, were found to develop breast cancer when exposed to DES.50 Thus, the carcinogenic effects of DES have repeatedly
been demonstrated in test animals, and even extremely low dosage
levels have been shown to produce these effects.
DES has also been linked to cancer in humans. Prolonged administration of the hormone as a therapeutic agent has been found to be
accompanied by the development of mammary cancer in some male
patients.51 Recent studies have also demonstrated a clear association
between the administration of DES to pregnant women and the occurrence of vaginal adenocarcinoma (a rare form of cancer) in their daughters, fifteen to twenty years later.52 Dr. Herbst of the Massachusetts
General Hospital (the Herbst Report) studied a number of cases of
vaginal adenocarcinoma and found that a significant number of the
mothers of these patients had been treated with DES during pregnancy.53 Later research has substantially corroborated Dr. Herbst's findings;'4 The reason that the mothers themselves did not ultimately develop
malignancies was explained by the extreme sensitivity of fetal and neonatal tissues to carcinogenic agents. The dosages used were apparently
insufficient to affect the mother, but were in fact capable of inducing
cancer in the highly susceptible unborn child.55

/d. at 167-168.
/d. at 168.
/d. See discussion of impla ntation infra.
Knight eta/., supra note 45, at 168.
SO. /d. at 168.
51 . 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 55 (Report - The Role of Certain Chemical and Physical
Agents in the Causation of Cancers, by Dr. G.B. Mider, Associate Director of Research, National
•
Cancer In stitute).
52. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskazner, Adenocarcinoma of th e Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. OF MED.
878-881 (April 22, 1971). Dr. Herbst presented a summary of his findings in his testimony during
the Nov. 1971 Hearings, supra note 20, at 2-9. See also Science Editors, Inc., Clin-Aiert 188 (Sept.
4, 1971).
53. /d.
54. See 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33,35 (Dec. 25, 1972).
55. Clin-A/ert. supra note 52. Not e; The fact that the mothers did not demonstrate any malignant response might suggest that DES does have a "threshold value." Cf note 36 and accompanyin g text, supra. However, the fact th at no cancer was observed in the mother does not necessarily
es tab lish that none was present. See note 29, supra.

46.
47.
48.
49.
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Thus, there are theoretical reasons, as well as animal verification
and increasingly suggestive human findings, to indicate that this hormone is specifically carcinogenic to human beings. This conclusion has
even been afforded judicial recognition, one court finding as early as
1966 that:
The record shows that DES is definitely a cause of cancer in anim als,
at least an inciter of incipient cancer in man, and possibly a cause of
cancer in man. The record also shows that it may take many years,
as much as the greater part of a lifespan, for a carcinogen to produce
a detectable cancer, and that the quantity of DES which is required
to cause a cancer is presently unknown. All that is positively known
is that there is a definite connection between DES and cancer.
Furthermore, it was shown that prolonged exposure to even small
amounts of carcinogenic substances is more dangerous than short
term exposure to the same of even larger quantities. 56

As was suggested in the Herbst Report, by avoiding the treatment of
pregnant women with stilbestrol, vaginal adenocarcinoma may be prevented in the future. Of more immediate concern, however, is the possibility of DES residues in meat, especially when consumed by women
who are pregnant. Because the fetus is so vulnerable to minute doses of
carcinogenic substances, there is no way of judging the extent of the
risk created by DES residues which are not detected by the current
government assay methods. 57

2.

Hormonal Effects of DES

DES may have adverse effects on human health aside from its tendency to produce cancer. Because it is a female sex hormone, its effect
is predictably antagonistic to those of masculine hormones. In one
study it was found that male birds treated with stilbestrol " .. . lose
many male characteristics; combs, wattles, and reproductive organs
shriveled, and their propensities for crowing and fighting disappeared."58Similar results were observed in another study using male rats; in
adult rats the testes atrophied, and normal development of the testes in
immature animals was retarded.59 Where pregnant rats were adminis-

-

56. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 182.
57. See Clin-Alert. supra note 52. Note: A given person's susceptibility to carcinogenic substances may be determined by a number of factors. One such factor is age, which helps to explain
the extrem e vu lnerability of fetal tissues. " By and large, the younger the individual exposed. the
more susceptible is the tissue to carcinogenic response experimentally." Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra
note 20, at 58. Another possible factor is heredity. " ... cancer <?f the breast among occide ntal
women runs in the family. Mother-dau ghter cancer of the breast ts a very common association."
1d.
58. LEGIS. REC. , supra note 19, at 95.
59. Gaarenstroom & Johen, Th e Effect of Diethylstilbestrol in th e Male Organism, 9 ACTA
REV. NEERLAND 178-181 (1939), as reported in MERCK , supra note 28.
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tered DES, the sexual development of their male offspring was altered
in such a way that they acquired female characteristics. They were
found to develop nipples and rudimentary vaginae, and their testes
failed to descend but remained in the female position at the base of the
kidney.60 In still another study, one hundred chicken eggs were injected
with DES on the second day of the brooding period. Ofthe one hundred
eggs, eighty-two produced hens. No roosters were hatched .61 Also, a
previously common failure . of male minks to induce pregnancy in females was found to be the result of their being fed chicken heads which
contained DES residues.fi 2
In humans, stilbestrol has been shown to have similar effects. DES
injections given to a seventeen year old girl who had never menstruated,
completely lacked breast development, had an enlarged clitoris, and
showed a masculine growth of hair, resulted in discernible breast development within a month, menstruation after four months, atrophy of the
3
clitoris, and paling and partial disappearance of the abnormal hair~
Similarly, a 27-year-old male with a history of sex crimes was treated
with DES to correct a hormonal imbalance causing him to have an
abnormally large penis and testes. As a result of the treatment, his
penis and testes decreased in size, and there was a corresponding
decrease in sexual function~ Because of its effect of shrinking the male
sex organs, DES has been prescribed by doctors to ease the pain of
prostatic cancer by reducing the pressure of the malignancy.65
Stilbestrol has also been known to cause breast enlargement in male
laboratory workers who were exposed to the hormone.66 A four-year-old
boy, whose mother worked in a pharmaceutical company packaging
DES veterinary pellets, developed enlarged breasts with the nipple area
showing pigmentation as in pregnancy.67 His ten-year-old sister began

60. R. Green , M. Burrill & A. Ivy, Exp erim ental Int ersexuality: Effects ofEstrogens on t~e
Antenatal Sex ual Developm ent of th e Rat, 67 AM. J. ANAT. 305-345 (Sept. 1940), as reported tn
MERCK, supra note 28.
61. J. Gaarenstroom. Geschlechtsbeeinflussung Durch Diathylstilboestrol, 9 ACTA BREV.
NEERLAND 13-14 (1939), as reported in MERCK, supra note 28.
62. THE MERCK VETERINARY MANUAL - AND HANDBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS AND
THERAPY FOR THE VETERINARIAN (O.H . Siegmund ed . 1967). Cf WICKENDEN. supra
·
note 18, indicating that it was th e male mink th at was suffering the disability.
63. H. Diser, Feminization and Demasculinization of a Seventeen Y ear Old Girl by Injections
of Stilbestrol, 27 ENDOCRINOLOGY 385-386 (Sept. 1940), as reported in MERCK, supra note
28.
64. C. Dunn , Stilbestrol - Induced Gyn ecomastia in th e Male, liS J.A.M.A. 2263-2264 (Dec.
28, 1940).
65. LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96-96.
66. R. Scarff & C. Smith, Proliferative and oth er L esions of th e Male Breast with Bestrol <Estrogen) Work ers, 29 BRIT. J. SURG . 393 (1942), as noted in Prouty, Gy necomastia with Pigm ew
tation in a Four Y ear Old Male Following Stilbestrol Ex posure, 9 PEDIATRICS 55, 56 (1952).
67. Prouty , supra note 66, at 55.
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menstruating, and the mother experienced almost continuous menstrual bleeding.68 The hormonal activity of DES has even been linked with
the manifestation of previously Iaten~ leprosy. 69
The hormonal effects of DES on animals and humans seem clearly
established. Under close medical supervision these effects may be desirable. 70 What is undesirable, however, is to expose the general population to such effects due to the presence of DES in the meat they
consume. The danger exists because of the practice and inherent difficulties of administering DES to livestock, and the problems in detecting
residues ofthe drug in meat.
II.

THE METHODS OF DES APPLICATION AND THEIR REGULATION

Three basic methods have been employed for the administration of
diethylstilbestrol to animals: (1) mixed in the animals' feed; (2) pellet
implantation; and (3) combined implantation and feed mixing.

1.

Mixing With Feed

Although the use of DES in cattle feed has been prohibited since
January, 1973? 1 it is important to understand the problems involved in
DES treated feeds for three reasons: (1) There remains some question
as to whether the prohibition is being honored, especially by the small
cattle feeders. In fact, it is believed that some feeders might even have
stockpiled DES premixes for later use.72 (2) There is a possibility that
legislative amendments will allow the resumption of DES use in feed;73
and (3) The ruling prohibiting the use of DES in feed is presently being
appealed by several drug manufacturers and could conceivably be overturned.74
Prior to the ban on DES mixed feeds, livestock producers were
allowed to administer to each head of cattle (weighing over 750 pounds)

68. ld. at 56.
69. W. Symmers, Sudden Appearance of a L epromatous Erup tion During Prolonged Admi.ni.stratwn of Stilbestrol in a Case of Unsuspected L eprosy. l 9 INT. J. OF LEPROSY 37 (1951).
. 70. Th e qu estion of DES as a drug used in medicine is beyond the sco p~ of this article. For a
hst of medi ca l uses for which it has been recomm ended , see Nov. 1971 H eanngs, supra note 20, at
49-50.
71. S ee note 12, supra.
72. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 13, 15 (Dec. 24, 1972).
73. S ee tex t at note 160, infra .
74. S ee text at notes 156-1 59, infra.
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a daily dose of 10 mg. of DES in the feed. 75 Usually, however, cattle are
not fed on an individual basis. They are typically grouped together in
"feed pens" where a number of animals share a common supply of
feed. The body weight of the cattle is averaged and, on the assumption
that each head will consume two-and-one-half to three percent of its
body weight daily, a per capita allotment of feed is computed for each
pen. This practice led to problems in controlling the amount of DES
ingested by individual animals. While cattle of similar weight within a
given feed pen presented little problem, the greater the weight variation
among cattle in the same pen the more likely it was that some would
consume more than their allotted share.76
The accuracy in determining the amount of DES that a particular
steer received depended upon the safeguards instituted at a particular
feed lot. These safeguards could vary considerably, as might be expected. Moreover, an ingredient added frequently to feed in small quantities will not necessarily possess uniform dispersion characteristics.
There was a tendency for a portion of the DES added to remain undispersed in the feed, forming small zones of excessive concentration,77 so
that, again, a particular animal could well have received a disproportionate amount.
The manufacture and use of DES-treated feeds also gives rise to the
danger that other feeds might become contaminated.78 DES is so potent
an agent that it is difficult to control even under laboratory conditions.
For example, one researcher noted that " ... occasionally the presence of
estrogen-treated animals in the laboratory leads to accidental contamination of the food supplies of animals in adjacent or nearby cages.'m
Contamination of "non-medicated" feeds has often been discovered
where such feeds were prepared in the same machinery previously used
to mix DES-treated feeds. 80 It has been argued that careful cleaning of
75. FDA Statement of Position on DIETHYLSTILBESTROL, Food and Drug Administration,
Office of Public Information (January 20, 1971). In 1970 the FDA permitted the users of DES
prepared by one particular drug company to administer up to 20 mg. per day in cattle feed. Id.
See 35 Fed. Reg. 14391 (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 13Se.l8 (1972). The maximum allowable daily dosage
per head of sheep was 3.0 mg. See 21 C.F.R. § 121.241 (b). Note; As of January 1, 1973, all uses of
DES in livestock feeds were proh ibited. 37 Fed . Reg. 26307 (1972).
76. Personal Interview with cattle feeder, Los Angeles, July 10, 1971.
77. Mahoney & Benson, Design of M edicated Feed Supplements. SYMPOSIUM, supra note
7, at 74.
78. T. Byerly, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 23.
79. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 68.
80. See 160 AMER. VET. MED. ASSOC. J. 1399 (1972). This problem has been particularly
acute where liquid feeds have been used. A common ingredient of liquid feeds is molasses, and
because of the nature of this substance, where DES is added to the feed it is often impossible to
clean the mixing apparatus sufficiently to prevent the contamination of non -medicated feeds pre·
pared later with the same equipment. In one investigation, "non-medicated" feeds from fourteen
liquid feed manufacturers were found to contain low amounts of DES. /d. As will be discussed
immediately below in the text, the use of non-medicated feeds in cattle was required during the
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mixing equipment would eliminate this danger, but such seems unlikely
considering the potency of even minute traces of the hormone. Even the
use of entirely separate facilities for the preparation of treated and nontreated feeds may not solve the problem of contamination. DES residues have been found in cattle whose "non-medicated" feed had been
contaminated by airborn amounts of the hormone which had emanated
81
from a nearby source. In any event, comprehensive governmental inspection and regulation of the animal feed industry is clearly warranted
in order to help eliminate the danger of contamination.82
Earlier regulations had required that cattle be withdrawn from DES
treated feed for a set time period prior to marketing, in order that any
residues in the animal be eliminated from its system.83 The enforcement
of these regulations was substantially dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the feed producers and cattle raisers.84 In extending the 48hour period (which had been in effect from 1954 to 1971) to seven days,
the Commissioner of the FDA acknowledged the impracticality of
expecting a cattle feeder, who would probably regard the change-over
to non-medicated feeds as a mere nuisance, to have complied with this
regulation. 85 Although the Commissioner indicated that the seven-day
"withdrawal period" which preceded slaughter. In order th at such withdrawal periods be of a ny
effect, it is important that the feed used therein be absolutely free of DES contamination. See
Hearing on S. 2818 (R egulation of Diethylstilbestron. before th e Subcommittee on Health of th e
Senate Committee on Labor and Public We(fa re, 92nd Cong. , 2nd Sess., at 43 (1 972) [herein after.
July 1972 Hearing]. See also 37 Fed . Reg. 1S748 (points 8, 9, and 10), (1972).
81. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 70.
82. For a discussion of the problems involved in regul atiiJg r:n anufacturers of medicated feeds,
~ee March 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at S04-Sl3. Of special Importance are the foll owing: Th e
teed industry is the sixteenth larges t industry in the United States. There are 8,S67 fi rm s registered
as manufacturers of medicated feed (no brea k-down is given as to th e number of manufacturers
~pprov ed for th e use of DES). In ~e cen~ :rears the FDA has b~e n turning over th e responsibility of
~ndu s try surve illa nce to the states tn a JOillt state/ federal m edica~ed feed program, and d.ecreas ing
~ts own active participation. In fi scal year 1968- 1969, the FDA withdrew from feedmill inspections
In th ose sta tes which have entered in to this program. In 1970 th ere were 32 such states. !d. at 508509. The program has been un successful , however , and !n fi s_cal :rear 1968-1969 only 700 out of the
total number of registered firms were mspected. In Caltform a, tor example, there were no inspections made durin g either fi scal year 1969 or 1970. id. at S07. Furthermore, in 1969 there were
fewer th an 200 collections for analysis of medicated feed samples, as compared to 2,S31 in 1967.
ld. In 197 1, however, th e FDA inspected S50 feedmills, while 1,6SO inspections were made by the
sate. Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS. at 276.
83. See 36 Fed. Reg. 23292 (1971). It had been generally believed th at the period fo r th e elimination of DES from most tissues was about 72 hours, or less. Consequ ently, beef-c attle were not to
be fed DES containing feed for 48 hours before slaughter. ~ ased upon a later study whic h showed
th at radioac tive DES fed to a nim als left no detectable residues after 132 hours, th e FDA d etermin ed th at a ll residu es were elimin ated from th e anim al in "about" five a nd one-half days. Th e
.
required withdrawal period was increased to seven d ays. /d.
84. See Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at 218-219, and Los Angeles Times, pt. I. pg. 26
(Sept. 17, 1970). Problems arose concerning the lack of cooperation from livestock prod ucers. In
1971 the Departm ent of Agriculture withheld from sl a ughter all cattle from two Texas feed lots
when it was di scovered th at the withdrawal feed used for these cattl e contamed DES. Associated
Press Bulletin. Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 1971).
8S. 36 Fed . Reg. 23292 (1971).
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withdrawal period was more likely to be followed, 86 it was ultimately
conceded that such controls were not " . . . reasonably certain to be
followed in practice . .. ". 87
2.

Pellet Implantation

Implantation involves the insertion of a small "pellet", containing
DES (or other active agent), .under the skin of the animal to be treated.
The pellet is designed to be absorbed into the animal's system over a
protracted period of time, thus permitting a continuous application of
the drug at a rate slower and more consistent than would occur with
feed-mixing or hypodermic injection. Nonetheless, the theoretical and
practical aspects of hormone implantation are quite complex, and do
present problems in controlling the administration of the drug.
When DES is implanted as a pellet, the rate of release of the active
material cannot be completely controlled. It may be released too rapidly
initially, and too slowly during the latter part of the absorption period~8
The rate of pellet absorption is generally related to the surface area of
the pellet. With the passage of time, as the surface area decreases,
there is a corresponding decrease in the rate of absorption. Pellets containing 12 to 15 mg. of DES are absorbed at the rate of about two
milligrams per week for a three to four week period, and more slowly
thereafter as the surface area of the pellet decreases.89
In addition, the absorption rate may vary between different animals
of the same species. Pellets of differing chemical compositions (even
though they contain similar concentrations of DES) likewise may have
differing absorption rates.90 Moreover, the use of DES implants in the
livestock industry presents several practical problems in insuring that
no animal receives too much of the hormone. This is particularly true
where DES was administered by both implant and feed-mixes because
of the difficulty in calculating the actual amount of the hormone introduced into the animal's system. In addition, it is possible that some
cattle raisers use an excessive number of pellets.91 Of course, the greater
86. /d. Th e seven-day period was deemed more likely to be followed because it conformed to
the norm al "feeding cycle'' used in the industry. Dec. /971 Hea rings. supra note IS, at 219.
87. 37 Fed . Reg. IS748 (1972).
88. Burroughs , Culbertson, Kastelic, Cheng & Hale, The Effects of Trace Amounts of Dietlzy/·
stilbestrol in Rations of Fattening Steers, 120 SCI. 66-67 (1954).
89. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION, supra note 16 at IS.
90. /d.
91. It is certainly possible that some cattle-raisers will attempt to achieve greater animal
weight increases by ad ministering more than the recommended number of DES pellets to each
a nim a l. Du e to the lack of adeq uate governmental controls over the cattle industry. there does not
appea r to be any way to effectively prevent this from happening.
·
For a general discussion of th e use of hormones in livestock, see BUNDY & DIGGINS.
LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY PRODUCTION at 261 -263 (2nd ed . 1961).
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the amount of DES introduced into an animal's system, the more likely
it will be that residues of the hormone will remain in the edible tissues
of the animal when it is slaughtered. ,
Aside from the possibility of DES residues remaining in the animal,
there is also a possibility that traces of the implanted pellet itself might
find their way to the meat counter. This possibility obviously presents a
significant danger to human health. As a result of the tendency of
living tissue to "wall off'' foreign bodies, the stilbestrol pellet may not
be completely absorbed into the animal's tissues.92 Moreover, if an animal is marketed prior to the required time for pellet absorption, it is
likely that a portion of the pellet will remain in the carcass.93
One possible solution to this particular problem might be to require
that all pellets be implanted in parts of the animal which would not be
sold for human consumption~ In the cattle industry, the recommended
procedure is to insert DES pellets in the flesh of the animal's ear:5 The
ears are not used for food, although it should be considered that ears
are often salvaged for use in soap products. However, the Federal Regu lations provide no clear mandate that implantation in cattle be limited
to the animals' ears.96 In fact, meat packers have seriously questioned

92. See LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96.
93. /d.
94. Prior to the banning of DES pellets in poultry, it was required that the pellets be impl anted
under the skin at the base of the bird's sku ll. LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96. The theory was
that any un absorbed portion of the pellet would be removed with the head at the time of slaughter.
However, FDA sampling revealed that sixty percent of the chickens tested contained portions of
un absorbed stilbestrol pellets in the areas of the neck wh ich would be bought by the consumer
after the normal severing of the head. /d. Chicken necks were not thought to be a popular food
Item. See WICKENDEN, supra note 18, at 117-118.
95. See. e.g .. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULL. No. lOS, July,
1965.
. 96. Prior to 1969, it was not required that the approva l of any app lication for the use of a drug
In meat an im a ls be published in the Federal Register (or the Code of Federal Regulations). Hence,
many of the ea rlier approved uses of DES (many of which were still in effect in early 1973) are not
to be found in the Federal Regulations, although uses approved after 1969 are published (see note
128, illfra). Letter from Daniel W. Clink, Food and Drug Officer, Bureau of Veterinary Medicine,
Public Health Service, Food and Dru g Admin. (Rockville, Md.), dated April 6, 1973.
The only published regulations concerning DES impl ants in cattle pertain to its use in
conjunction with the male hormone, testosterone. Originally, 21 C.F.R. § 121.241 (Table 2) (1970);
d~leted in 1971 and replaced with 21 C.F.R. § 13Sb.6 q6 Fed . Reg . 7648 (1971Jl .. These regul ations
d1d req uire th at cattle implants of DES combmed w1th testosterone be ad mmtstered subcutaneously in the a nim a l's ear. Two months after its inclusion in the Code of Federal Regulations, however, § 13Sb .6 was amended so as to pertain to "injections" rather than implants, although the
requirement that suc h be made in the anim al's ear was retained. 36 Fed . Reg. 12608 (1971). It is
important to note that these regulations covered only the adm ini s~ration of DES in combina~ion
With testosterone, and did not apply to any previously approved Implants of DES alone Which ,
aga in , do not appear in the Federal Regulations).
.
S ee also 21 C.F.R. § 131.21 (1971). This regulation recommends that the following "warn Ing stateme nt" appear on packages of DES impl ant pellets:
Drugs for Veterinary Use: Recommended Warning and Caution Statements:
ESTROGEN PELLETS IN CATTLE AND SHEEP.
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whether cattle receive only implantations in the ear. Scar tissue found
on the hip and loin areas tend to indicate that this is where many implants are actually made.97
3.

Combined Implantation and Feed-Mixing

Although the FDA has never sanctioned the simultaneous use of
DES implants and mixed-feeds,98 interviews with industry personnel
indicate that this may have been a common practice?9 In fact, the FDA
acknowledged that no information is available as to number of cattle
administered DES solely by way of implant, and that USDA sampling
had revealed DES residues in animals which had been treated with
both implants and mixed-feed.100
III:

THE REGULATION OF DES UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

As enacted in 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter,
"the Act") included two sets of provisions which were pertinent to the
r.e gulation of DES as used in the animal industry. The "Food" sections
of the Act prohibited the sale or transportation in interstate commerce
of any "adulterated" food products~ For the purposes of these provisions
01

Warning--Implant pellets in the_(name of the anatomical area) __ only. Any
other location may result in violation of Federal law. Do not attempt salvage of
implanted site for human or animal food.
Note that this warning statement is only recommended, and is not required. Note also that the
particular anatomical area where the implant is to be made is to be designated by the drug manufacturer (ostensibly in conformance to the conditions stipulated in the manufacturer's new animal
drug application). Moreover, it is important to consider that the warning is from the drug manufacturer to the cattle raiser. No similar warning is given to the meat packer, who is usually responsible for discarding the implanted part. See note 99, infra.
97. Interviews with persons in the Meat Packing Industry, Los Angeles, July 10. 1971. See also
March 1971 Hearings. supra note 15, at 495, where it was reported that regulation at the meat
packing level has been largely ineffective due to the time required to analyze meat samples in the
laboratory (Statement of Dr. C. Yeutter, Adminstrator of Consumer and Marketing Service of the
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture).
98. FDA FACT SHEET, CSS-D, at I and 2 (Dec. 5, 1969). See also, FDA Position on Diethyl stilbestrol. supra note 75. In a letter dated Oct. 7, 1960, Charles P. Orr, Administrative Offtcer
·(Division of Federal-State Relations), Food and Drug Admin., stated: "Feeds containing diethylstilbestrol should not be fed to diethylstilbestrol implanted cattle or sheep." C.f 21 C.F.R. §
13Sb.6. permitting the simultaneous use of DES in combination with testosterone in feeds and by
means_of "injections" in beef cattle 0971).
99. Note 97, supra. See also. March 1971 Hearings. supra note 15, at 491, 494, wherein the
FDA took the position that the livestock producer bears the responsibility for the proper use of the
drug. The producer should be cognizant of instructions on drug container labels (see note 96.
supra), and is in the best position to determine if a drug has been adminsitered. In actuality,
though. even if DES residues are discovered at the processing level, it is usually difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the identity of the culpable producer.
100. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747,15750(1972).
101. 52 Stat. 1042, 1044, and 1049 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331,334, and 346 (1964).
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A food shall be deemed to be adulterated ... if it bears or contains
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious
to health. 102
Because it is basically a pharmaceutical product, DES also fell within the scope of the "New Drug" provisions of the Act~ 03 Prior to marketing their products, the manufacturers of DES pellets and feed additives
were required to submit a "new drug application" to the Food and
Drug Administration.104
A 'new-drug application' must contain, among other things, reports
of animal tests, clinical studies, or other research to show that the
drug will be safe under the proposed directions and conditions of
use. In the case of veterinary drugs [such as DES implants and feedmixes], the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted this section to require that evidence be produced to show that no residue of
the drug remains in human food products derived from the treated
animals. If the evidence is convincing, the application is allowed to
'become effective' and the drug may be marketed . If the evidence of
safety is not convincing, the application is denied, and marketing of
the drug in interstate commerce is a violation of the law. 105
While it was known that DES had been shown to induce cancer in
test animals, the assay methods used prior to 1957 failed to detect any
residues of the drug in the edible portions of treated animals.106 As a
result, DES was deemed to b.e "safe" for use in meat producing animals, and the first application for its use as an implant in poultry was
allowed to "become effective" in 194 7. 107
In 1957, however, a more sensitive and reliable assay method was
developed. Using this new procedure, the FDA discovered traces of
DES in the liver ~,tnd skin fat of treated chickens.108 At that time no residues were detected in DES treated beef cattle. Pursuant to these find ings, the FDA considered revoking its approval of DES implants in
poultry! 09ln order to revoke a new drug application which had previously become effective, however, the Government was required to show not
only that residues of the drug had been detected, but also that, as a

102. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(l) (1964).
103. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 69· 70.
104. 52 Stat. 1052 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964).
lOS. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 69 (Statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health ,
Education. and Welfare).
I 06. I d. at 69-70.
107. /d. at 69.
108. /d. at 70. The following concentrations of DES were detected: liver tissues · 20 to 30 parts
per billion. skin fat. 35 to 100 parts per billion. ld.
109. /d.

156

Consumer Journal

[Vol. Il:l39

result of such residues, the drug was "unsafe" as used.110 At that time,
the Commissioner determined that there was not sufficient evidence to
show that the residues found in the treated chickens posed a threat to
human health/ 11 and no action was taken to revoke these new drug
applications until 1961.112
An important development took place in 1958 when Congress passed
the "Food Additives Amendment" to the Act~ 13 Under this Amendment,
a party seeking to use a food additive is required to file with the FDA a
"petition", which is similar in content to a new drug application! 14 Such
petition could be denied " ... if a fair evaluation of the data ... fails to
establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe." 115
Of special importance here is one particular provision added by the
Food Additives Amendment, the so-called "anti-cancer clause" or the
"Delaney clause," which provides that:
... no additive shaH be deemed safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which
are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to
induce cancer in man or animal .. .116
It has been held that the Delaney clause " ... is generally intended
to prohibit the use of any additives which under any conditions induce
cancer in any strain of test animal! 17 lt has further been found that this
clause

.. . indicates the magnitude of Congressional concern about the
hazards created by carcinogenic chemicals, and places a heavy burden on any administrative officer to explain the basis for his decision
110. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (e) (1964). In effect, this provision shifts the burden of proof onto the
Government in revocation of suspension proceedings. Rather than the drug manufacturer having
to demonstrate that its product is "safe" (see text at note 105, supra), the Government is required
to estab lish that the drug is unsafe. See Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 181, and 1960 Hearings.
supra note 2, at 70. In so proving, however, the Government is allowed to use
(2) ... new evidence of clinical experience , not contained in such application or not
available ... until after such application was approved, or tests by methods not
deemed reasonably applicable when such application was approved ...
21 U.S. C.~ 355 (e). This Section has been criticized. See 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 72-73.
Ill. 1900 H earings. supra note 2, at 70.
112. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 179 (court's footnote 4). This case affirmed the Commis·
sioner's final order, issued in December 1961 , suspending all new drug applications for DES im·
plants in poultry. !d. (court's footnote 5).
113. Pub. L. No. 85-929 (1958); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1964).
114. 72 Stat. 1785 (1958); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (b) (1964).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1964).
116. 1d.
117. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 181.
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to permit the continued use of a chemical known to produce cancer
in experimental animals. 11 8

The Delaney clause not only affe~ts the standards applied to test a
"food additive petition," but it also has a bearing on the basic prohibition against "ad ulterated" foods, as mentioned above; "A food shall be
deemed to be adulterated ... if it is, or it bears or contains, any food
additive which is unsafe .. :• 119 Moreover, the Delaney test of "safeness"
was also deemed applicable in determining whether a new drug application should be denied or revoked. 120
The effect of the Delaney clause on DES depended largely on how
the term "food additive" was interpreted. Under the Act, a food additive is defined as including " .. . any substance the intended use of
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . .. ".121 Animal feeds were deemed to be "foods"
within the meaning of the Act, and hence DES, as used in such feeds,
was thought to be a "food additive:' 122 Under the interpretation it appears that the FDA, by applying the Delaney clause, could have banned
the use of DES in cattle feed solely on the ground that the hormone
had been shown to be a carcinogen in animal tests, even though no
residues of the drug were found in the edible parts of the animals fattened on it~ DES implants, however, were not in themselves considered
to be food additives, even though such could certainly be said to "[affect] the characteristics of .. . food:' 124 The FDA took the position that
hormone implants were not additives to food unless residues of the
drug were found to exist in the edible tissues of the treated
animai~ 2 5 Thus, the Delany clause was not deemed applicable to DES
implants unless estrogenic residues were actually detected.
23

11 8. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596 (court's footnote 41)
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
·
·
11 9. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(2)(C) (1964).
120. S ee 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70-71 , and Bell v. Go~da!d, supra note 10. While the
court in Bell v. Goddard seemed to suggest that a new drug application could be revoked on the
basis that the drug is unsafe und er the Delaney test, it does not appear that its decision was based
on that provision. For one thing, the petitioner drug company argued that, since its new drug
application had become effective prior to the enactment of the Delaney clause, to apply that provision in this case would constitute "improper retroactive" legislation . /d. at 181. The fact that the
court never specifically answered this contention seems to indicate that it did not use the Delaney
clause to find that the drug was unsafe.
121. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (s) (1964).
122. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70.
.
.
.
.
123. It does not appear that the FDA ever applied the Delaney clause m t~1s way. As is discussed in the text infra at notes 126-127, the 1962 amendment to the Act effech~ely pre~ented the
use of the Delaney clause to prohibit the use of med1c_ated feeds where no residues of the drug
were detected in the treated animal. See also 1960 Heanngs. supra note 2, at 73.
124. See note 17, supra, and accompanying text to see how DES might be said to affect the
characteristics of food .
125. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70.
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The inconsistent application of the Delaney clause, as between DES
implants and feed additives, was equalized in 1962 when the Act was
again amended~ Unfortunately this was accomplished by creating a
"no residues" exception to the Delaney clause for medicated feeds,
rather than by applying the clause to DES implants irrespective of
residues, as had previously been the case with feed additives. Under
this amendment the Delaney clause was made expressly inapplicable to
drugs used as additives in animal feeds, in the event that the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare were to find:
26

(i) that, under the conditions of use and feeding specified in proposed
labeling and reasonably certain to be followed in practice, such
additives will not adversely affect the animals for which such feed is
intended, and
(ii) that no residue of the additive will be found ... in any edible
portion of such animal after slaughter or in any food yielded or
derived from the living animal ... 12 7

The ostensible effect of this was that an application for the use of
DES in animal feeds could be approved, even though DES had been
shown to be a carcinogen, if both of the above criteria were established.
The Act was amended once more in 1968, and a new regulatory
category was created: "Animal Drugs." 128Both DES implants and feed
additives fall within the scope of this amendment, although they are
actually covered under separate sets of provisions. 129
126. Pub. L. No. 87-781 (1962).
127. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (3)(a) (1964).
128. Pub. L. No. 90-399 (1968); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1971). The basic purpose of this
amendment was to
. .. consolidate into one place in the law all of the principal provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which relate to premarketing clearance of new drugs
for administration to animals, either directly or in their feed and water.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2607, 2608 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968). As has been mentioned above in the text, the regulation of DES as it was used in livestock and poultry was subject
to the "Food," "New Drug," and "Food Additives" provisions of the Act. Thus, this amendment
served to centralize the regulation of animal drugs. (e.g., this amendment altered the definition of
"new drugs" so that it does not apply to animal drugs or animal drugs used in an imal feeds. See
21 U.S.C. § 321 (p), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-399 § 102 (a) and (b) (1968)). The Animal dr.ug
and feed manufacturing industry, by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Agriculture." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.
supra at 2608.
It should also be noted that, under the 1968 Amendment, all actions taken by the FDA to
approve a new animal drug application are to be published in the Federal Register as regulations.
21 u.s.c. § 360b (i) (1971).
129. Implants (as "animal drugs"): 21 U.S.C .... (1971)
a) Standard of "safeness" - § 360b (aX!).
b) Applications for New Animal Drugs - § 360b (b) & (c).
c) Grounds for refusing application - § 360b (d).
e) Revocation & suspension of applications - § 360b (e)-(h).
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Under the 1968 Amendment a "new animal drug" application must
be refused if the drug is found to induce cancer when ingested by
animal or man, unless it is found that .the drug will not adversely affect
the animal for which it is intended, and that no residues of the drug
will be found in any edible portion of the animal after slaughter ~ 30 The
corresponding provisions pertaining to animal feeds do not include a
similar requirement. However, no use of a medicated animal feed is to
be approved unless the drug additive itself has previously been approved.131Thus, no animal feed -mix may be approved unless the drug
additive is non-carcinogenic unless it has no adverse effects on the animal, or unless no residues of the drug will be found in the edible tissues
of an animal administered the mixed feed.
In considering the regulatory history of DES under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, it is important to realize that, from the time it was
first approved for use in the livestock industry, this drug was known to
be a carcinogen. Its approval for use in food animals has therefore
turned on whether such ·uses were deemed to be "safe", and this in turn
has usually depended upon whether any residues of the drug were
found in the edible portions of the animals treated.
While changes in the law have affected the permissible uses of DES,
so too have developments in science and technology. Since the test has
been whether any DES residues are found in meat products, the " safeness" of DES has usually been determined by the ability of science to
effectively detect such residues. This problem is treated in the next
section.
Feed Mixes (as "animal feeds bearin g or containing a new ani mal drug" ): 21 U. S.C. . . .
(1971)
a) Stand ard of " safeness" - § 360b (a)(2).
b) Application for Animal Feeds - § 360b (m)(l) & (2).
c) Grounds for refu sin g application - § 360b (m)(3).
d) Revoca tion & suspension of a ppl ications - § 360b (m)(4).
130. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (d)(l)(H) (1968).
131. 21 U.S .C. §§ 360b (m)(3XA) a nd 360b (i) (1 968). Section 360b (m)(3)(A) provid es that an
~pp l i c a t i o n " for uses of a n animal feed bearing or containing a new anim al drug" may be rejected
tf there is not then in effect a regulation, published pursu ant to § 360b (i), permittin g the use of
such drug in anima l feeds . Section 360b (m) also provides that:
An order under this subsection approving an application with respect to a n anim a l
feed bea ring or containing a new a nim al drug shall be effective only while there is in
effect a regul ation pursuant to subsection (i) . . . , on th ~ basis of which such application ... was approved , relatin g to the use of such drug m or on such feed.
'fhus, if a new drug app lication is suspend ed o ~ rev<?ked (e.g. , because it is found t_o be unsafe as
used), any application for the use of that drug tn amm al feeds wtll also be of no effect. However ,
Mr. Peter B. Hutt, Assista nt General Coun sel for the Department of Hea lth, Ed uca tion, a nd Welfare, has ta ken the position th at the basic new anima l d~ug application must be "d isapproved in
toto, completely, 100 percent" before the use of the drug tn am mal feeds must also be disa pproved.
Aug. 1971 H earings. supra note 13; at 409.
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PROBLEMS IN DETECTION, PROOF, AND ENFORCEMENT

In the five-year period from 1965 to 1969, the Department of Agriculture took random samples from slaughterhouses, and in the following percentages of beef tested, found traces of DES: 2.7% in 1965, 1.1%
32
in 1966, 2.6% in 1967, 0. 7% in 1968, and 0.6% in 1969~ These samples
were taken from cattle whose allowed rate of DES ingestion was 10 mg.
per day.IJJ Although it is arguable that these findings would seem sufficient to take DES feed mixes out of the "no residues" exceptions to the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 34 the FDA nevertheless allowed a 10 mg.
increase in the daily dosage 6f DES in feed as of September 13, 1970.135
In 1971, following earlier reports by the Department of Agriculture
that no residues had been discovered in beef, the agency confirmed that
residues had been found in 10 beef carcasses out of 2,500 samples
36
taken~ The incidence of DES residues in the livers of treated, marketed
cattle was 0.5% for each year from 1968 to 1970.137 USDA testing also
132. Los Angeles Times, pt. I, pg. 26 (Sept. 17, 1970). This report did not indicate the amount
of residues found in edible tissues.
133. /d.
134. See text supra at notes 12S, 127. and 130.
13S. See note 7S, supra. Submitted data indicated that a daily dosage of SO mg. would leave no
residue if a proper withdrawal period (48 hours) were observed . See note 83, supra. See also Los
Angeles Times, supra note 132.
With respect to the FDA's apparent in action regarding the discovery of DES residues in
cattle, Senator Proxmire made this observation:
With a 7-year history of residues, why hasn't the FDA banned DES under the
Delaney Clause?
The answer they gave last wi nter was to insist that there is in theory no reason
for there to be residues. The FDA said its experiements persuaded it that DES, used
in accordance with the regulations, leaves no residue. Therefore, even though there
was no evidence of procedural violations in a number of cases the FDA reported . .. ,
they argued that if there were residues, there must have been procedural violations.
July 1972 Hearing. supra note 80. at 7.
136. Associated Press Bulletin, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12, 1971). The ten positive samples, all
of which were taken from the animals' livers, were discovered in April (2), May (1), Jun e (4) and
July (3) of 1971. This report followed a U.S . Dept. of Agriculture news release, dated May 27, 1971
(No. USDA 1721-71), wh ich includ ed this statement: "Assistant Secretary Lyng emphasized that
no residues have been found in any samples checked for DES in 1971." Note that at least two of
the positive samples reported in the Associated Press Bulletin were discovered prior to the May 27
statement. "The samples were not reported earlier, USDA said, because the responsible laboratory
official considered the results to be preliminary until confirmed by a second procedure."
Associated Press Bulletin. supra. The FDA also reported finding DES residues in four samples of
cattle liver during 1971. Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at 340.
Both the Associated Press Bulletin and the USDA news release, supra, indicated that the
USDA testing program involved the taking of 6,000 samples per year. However. in 1970 alone
3S.086, 700 head of cattle were slaughtered in the United States. Livestock Slaughter 1970, Crop
Reporting Board, Statistical Reporting Service, USDA, April, 1971 release. Such a disproportionate ratio casts grave doubts upon the reliability of USDA pronouncements concerning hormon al
food additives. The statistical validity of USDA testing has been seriously questioned. See letter
from Stern Community Law Firm (1971), as noted in March 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at S14.
137. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 93. The concentration of DES detected in cattle
livers has been reported to be as high as 36 parts per billion. Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at
226. Cf Aug. 1972 Hearings. supra note 13, at 393, where it was stated that concentrations of up
to only 9 parts per billion had been detected.
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confirmed residues in steers seven days after they had received a single
oral dose of 10 mg. of DES. 138
The new drug applications for the.use of DES in the manufact~re of
animal feed for cattle and sheep were finally withdrawn, in part, on
August 4, 1972~ (DES used for feed which had already been manufactured was not immediately affected by this order. Its use was ordered
discontinued as of January 1, 1973~ 40 ) The Commissioner, however,
determined that it was premature to rule on the objections and requests
for a hearing with respect to DES implants, on the basis that: (1) The
new studies did not include implants;141 (2) earlier testing of implanted
animals had not shown detectable residues; and (3) smaller dosage
levels were involved with implants. Although interim data indicated
that DES residues were present from 30 to 60 days after pellet implantation, the FDA concluded that this was not a sufficient basis to withdraw its approval of DES pellets which were marketed under labeling
which called for slaughter no sooner than 120 days after implantation} 42
Perhaps much of the problem in determining whether certain uses
of DES should be disallowed, on the basis of residues found or not
found in animal tissues, has resulted from variations and inherent limitations in the methods of testing used~ Many of the claims that estrogenic residues were not found in test animals were based on a method
of testing having a sensitivity range of 1 microgram per 1.1 pound! 44 If
DES were removed from the animal's feed from between 48 and 72
hours before the animal was killed, the amount of residue was reduced
to such low levels that often it could not be detected by this method~
With respect to DES implants, the FDA has acknowledged the difficulty in effectively testing the low residue levels involved where the animal
was killed 120 days after implantation.146
Because of this limited range of sensitivity in testing, a pound of
meat certified as being free ofDES residues could nonetheless contain
undetected traces of the hormone. This is significant because the actual
scope of danger presented by low levels of DES, especially if a long
39

43

45

138. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747, 15749. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 26307 (1972).
139. 37 FEd. Reg. 15747 (1972).
140. /d. at 15749.
141. Jd. at 15750.
142. S ee 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33, 35 (Dec. 25, 1972). Pending the outcome of further testing, the FDA has proposed the requiring of a 120 day withdrawal period for DES implants. Two
drug manufacturers were told by letter to stop recommending (in the instruction labels to their
products) withdrawal periods of only 21 and 70 days. /d.
143. See B. Vas, Tissu e R esidues of Drugs from the Use of Medicated Feeds. SYMPOSIUM.
supra note 7, at 115, 116.
144. Jd. at 167-169. One microgram (one millionth of a gram) per 1.1 pounds is the equivalent
of0.9 parts per billion . See note 149, infra.
145. See Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note I 5, at 218-219.
146. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Dec. 25, 1972).
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range exposure is involved, is presently unknown. Moreover, it has been
established that minute amounts of DES can in fact cause cancer, at
least in test animals.147 Consequently, the claim that no appreciable
quantities of estrogenic residue could be demonstrated in cattle fed
DES may well have been misleading.148
The fact that in recent years there has been an increase in the number of instances where DES residues have been detected might be attributed in part to the development of better methods of testing (rather
than an actual increase in residues)~ The latest method to be employed
is a chemical technique known as the "GLC (gas-liquid chromatography) Method", which has detected DES residues in a higher percentage of samples taken than had previous methods~ 50 There is some skepticism, though, as to the reliability of this new technique! 51and the FDA
has not as yet officially approved its use! 52
Irrespective of the particular assay methods used, however, the fact
remains that DES residues have been found in beef-cattle,153 and this
alon~ is significant in light of the potential health hazards presented by
the existence of these residues. After reviewing the various methods
49

147. See Dec. 1971 H earings, supra note IS. at 226.
148. See J. Kastelic, RESIDUES PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON FOOD PRODUCTION, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS IN FOOD at 136-137
(C. Ayres , A. Kraft, H. Snyder, H. Walker eds. 1962).
149. At least some proponents of DES have taken this position. See 37 Fed. Reg. 122SI (1972)
in which the FDA intim ated that a recent increase in reported residues was attributable to the
employment of a new testing method . This particular controversy arose in 1971 when residues in
cattle were detected using a new chemical assay technique (see text at note ISO, infra), whereas the
previously used biological assay method had not produced such results. This argument seems to
break down, however, when one considers that the difference in sensitivity between the two
methods does not appear to be significant. The biological method is considered to be " ... sensitive
at a ll times to 2 [parts per billion] and occasiona lly, to a half a part per billion ... " (Dec. 1971
Hea rings. supra note IS. at 17S). The chemical method is said to have a sensitivity of from one to
two parts per billion (Nov. 1971 Hearings, supra note 20, at 54; Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note
IS, at 126, 132, and 317-320). Note; "Superior insensitivity" (of chemical method) was interpreted
to mean that its relative speed and convenience in regulatory program make it "superior" to biological assay method. /d. at 318. See also July 1972 Hearing, supra note 80, at 7.
ISO. See Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at 320-322, and July 1972 Hearing, supra note 80,
at 7.
lSI. Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at 317-321.
IS2. /d. at 341.
IS3. For the purposes of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it may be importa nt to consider
whether these residues were found in an edible portion of the animal. See text at notes 117, 126
and 130. supra. Note that the original approval of the use of DES implants in poultry was premised on the condition that a ll pellets be implanted in the head or neck region of the bird, which
parts were not deemed to be "edible". See note 94, supra. Various investigations have shown
that.if DES residues are present, they are usually found to a greater extent in the kidneys and
livers of the treated animals, rather than in the fat or muscle tissues. See Kastelic, supra note 148,
at 136-137. See also note 138, supra. Although the most popular cuts of beef are probably those
taken from the muscle tissues, it is clear that the liver and kidneys are also "edible" parts of the
anima l. In fact, the FDA has considered (and rejected) the possibility of requiring that these
or~ans, when taken from an animal treated with DES, be destroyed (in order that the rest of the
amma l could be marketed). See 37 Fed. Reg. IS749 (1972).
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used to detect DES residues in beef, the American Medical Association
Council on Foods and Nutrition adopted a report which states in part:
[T]race amounts of estrogen activity n;tay sometimes be found by sensitive assay methods in meat from beef cattle ... treated with the
usual levels of compounds having estrogenic activity. Since such
compounds are not destroyed by cooking, it is possible that a person
eating large amounts of liver, kidney, or other organs from animals
treated with estrogen could consume up to several micrograms of
compounds with estrogenic activity per day. However, based on the
average daily consumption of meat, less than 1 [microgram] of compounds with estrogenic activity would be consumed .154

The inherent dangers arising from the consumption of even these
small quantities of DES, especially if on a continual basis over a long
period of time, have been demonstrated above. It is therefore of great
importance that no meat products be allowed to reach the consumer
which contain any residues of DES, no matter how minute.
CONCLUSION
Diethylstilbestrol has been found to constitute so serious a hazard
to hum an health that at least 21 other nations have completely banned
its use as a growth-stimulant in meat animals.155 The future of DES in
the United States is presently unclear. At the time of this writing, three
drug manufacturers have appealed the FDA ruling which (as of January
1, 1973) prohibited the use of DES treated animal feeds .' 56 Among other
things, these companies have alleged that the residue being found in
animal tissues is not DES, but is a chemically different metabolite of
stilbestrol, known as diethylstilbestrol-monoglucuronide. They argue
that, because this compound is not really DES, its presence in the
animal tissues is not a "residue" within the meaning of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. 157 The appe!Jants also argue that they have . been
denied the due process of law, resulting from the FDA's rejection of
their request for a hearing~ If this argument is successful, it could force
the FDA to conduct a protracted public hearing. Pending the outcome
of such hearing, the reviewing court could still conceivably avoid the
order and reinstate the DES new drug applications.' 59
58

-

154. Briggs. Estrogen Residues in Meat: Public Health Aspects, 164 J. A.M.A. 1473, 147S
0 9S7). The conc lu sion s drawn by Briggs differ from those reached by this writer.
ISS. March f97f Hearings. supra note IS. at Sl4.
IS6. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 2 (Sept. 18, 1972). Case initiated in the District of Columbia
Court o r Appeals on Sept. IS, 1972. !d.
.
IS7. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Sept. 2S. 1972). It ts argued that "resid ues" within the
llleanin g of th e law must be the original substance, biologically unchan ged.
158. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 32 (Nov. 20. 1972).
IS9. See id.

164

Consum er Journal

[Vol. 11:139

The possibility of future legislation withdrawing the present restrictions on the use of DES should also be considered. Congressional
hearings have been scheduled to review the impact of the Delaney
Clause, and it is likely that substantial lobbying will be used in an
effort to have the "no residues" test reduced to one of "no effect levels."160 ln view of the current controversy over rising meat prices, it is
likely that arguments for extending the uses of DES will be seriously
considered .
Mention should also be made of the fact that the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act does not pre-empt similar state regulation, unless the
state law is in direct and positive conflict with the Federal provisions~
Thus, the states might well consider the possibility of enacting laws to
supplement the Federal regulations.

61

The problem of diethylstilbestrol does not lend itself to an easy
solution. The economic benefits obtained through the use of this drug
appear, at least to some, to be a compelling reason in favor of its con tinued use. This argument must be viewed, however, against the evidence which shows DES to be a major threat to the public health.
Perhaps, again to some, this evidence is not sufficiently compelling.
Yet, when dealing with matters of health there can be no allowances for
speculation or compromise. In the words of former Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, ArthurS . Flemming:
Unless and until there is a sound scientific basis for the establishment of tolerance for carcinogens, I believe the government has a
duty to make clear -- in law as well as in administration --that it will
do everything possible to put persons in a position where they will
not unnecessarily be adding residues of carcinogens to their diet.
The population is inadvertently exposed to certain carcinogens.
Ultra-violet light occurs in sunlight. The burning of most fuel produces some minute quantities of chemical compounds that elicit
cancer in experimental animals . .. In view of these facts it becomes
all the more imperative to protect the public from deliberate introduction of additional carcinogenic materials into the human environment . . .
It is clear that if we include in our diet substances that induce
cancer when included in the diet of test animals, we are taking a
risk. In the light of the rising number of cases of cancer, why should
we take that risk? Why shouldn't the government do everything

160. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Dec. 25, 1972).
161. S ee Royal Baking Powd er Co. v. Emerson, 270 F. 429 (8th Cir. 1920), which held that
where a state law is not in conflict with th e National Food and Drug Act, a broad latitude is allowed states in protecting th eir citizens from adulterated or misbranded articles.
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possible to see to it that we do not involuntarily take that risk? The
purpose of our Food and Drug laws, as Justice Frankfurter put it, is
to touch 'phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism are largely beyond self-protection.' And, as Judge Hastie put it, the government may reasonably
decide to take action which will not subject the public to even 'slight
risks'. 162

162. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 61-70.

165

166

Consumer Journal

[Vol. II: 139

APPENDIX

The following article by Daniel Zwerdling appeared in the Los
Angeles Times, May 20, 1973, and is reprinted here with the author's permission. Mr. Zwerdling is a former staff writer for The
New Republic and is now a free-lance writer and researcher in
Washington, D.C. The article discusses the prospective use of new
and potentially harmful. drugs in the cattle industry, to serve as
replacements for the now banned Diethethylstilbestrol.
The Food and Drug Administration finally banned DES, the cancer-causing
growth hormone, from the nation's farms last month, but cattle feeders needn't
fret. They've already started buying other FDA-approved hormone fatteners to
take its place.
It is the consumer who still has reason to worry-because these other hormones, like DES, are also considered cancer-causing agents, or carcinogens, at
least in laboratory animals.
In fact, our beef, hogs, sheep and poultry digest daily doses of at least 16
other drugs which the FDA knows or suspects are cancer-causing. Federal
meat and poultry inspectors at the Department of Agriculture cannot say whether we are or are not eating residues of the potent drugs, because they have
never tested for them . They can't.
For most of the drugs, says Harry Mussman, the department's deputy director for scientific and technical services, "we just don't have the technology."
Some of the risks to ponder:
-The cattle industry expects the major replacement for DES to be Synovex, a compound of the estrogen estradiol benzoate and progesterone. "All estrogens are considered to be carcinogens," according to an FDA memo, "since
all estrogens that have been adequately tested have been shown to be carcinogens in animals." The FDA also considers progesterone, which metabolizes to
estrogen in the body, a "potential" carcinogen.
"Whatever dangers you want to attribute to DES," says Dr. Mortimer Lipsett at the National Institutes of Health, "you can attribute to Synovex."
- Heifers, which accounted for 35% of our beef last year, have been munching feed laced with MGA since 1968. The FDA has been debating for more
than two years now whether MGA (melengestrol acetate) causes cancer-as
animal studies by the Upjohn Co., its manufacturer, suggest may be the case.
Meanwhile, sales of the synthetic hormone are increasing.
-Poultry farmers inject their chickens with estradiol monopalmitate,
another estrogen, which makes them grow fatter faster on less feed-and
which FDA considers, like "all estrogens," cancer-causing. Until very recently,
the FDA also permitted farmers to inject dienestrol diacetate, which scientists
linked along with DES, to rare vaginal cancer in young women. And Thanksgiving turkeys might have eaten dimetridazole or ipronidazole; they aren't hormones but they do induce cancer.
-FDA files hold disturbing evidence suggesting that the popular nitrofuran and sulfa compounds-used on chicken and hog farms across the country
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to promote growth and prevent disease-may be candidates for the cancer roster, too.
Plowing through FDA reports on the~e drugs and interviewing a dozen top
FDA and Agriculture Department officials gives one a troubling sense of deja
vu. The files on the drugs-the scientific warnings, the test procedures and the
sometimes startling rationales the FDA uses to justify their use-could well be
the DES story all over again.
. Consider Synovex. Since Syntex Laboratories, the maker of birth control
pills, brought this cattle fattener on the market in 1956, it's played a poor second to DES. DES is a synthetic estrogen and easy to produce; Synovex, a
natural compound, is harder to manufacture and consequently costs nine times
as much. DES thus captured about 95% of the market.
But "now that DES is off the market," says company spokesman Bill
Spencer, Syntex expects that Synovex "will be fine." Full-page ads have hit the
farm journals, trying to persuade cattle feeders that "1973 could be the year
you surpass your DES gains with Synovex"; they claim that a Synovex implant
can put 37 pounds more on the animals than DES ever could.
"The biggest majority of them (cattle feeders) will probably use Synovex"
or another cattle fattener called Ralgro, predicts Duane Flack, vice president
of the mammoth Montfort Feedlots in Greeley, Colo. James Herrick, the
USDA's top veterinarian in Iowa, estimates that "already 35% to SO% of cattle
feeders across the country" who once used DES have switched to Synovex or
Ralgro.
Few scientists doubt that estradiol benzoate, the chief ingredient in Synovex, induces cancer. "There are literally thousands of studies-well, maybe
hundreds-which show estrogens are carcinogenic," says Richard Lehman,
director of nutritional sciences in the FDA's bureau of veterinary medicine.
Under federal law, the FDA must ban any drug which causes cancer in animals or humans except if "no residue of the additive will be found" in the
meat by test methods "prescribed and approved" by the FDA. Why does the
FDA ban DES but bless Synovex? The government inspectors kept finding
residues of DES, Lehman explains, but "we have no data that show we alter
the amount of estrogen that naturally occurs in the meat" after a Synovex implant.
But the USDA has never inspected the meat we eat for Synovex residues.
And even now that the drug is coming to the farms in a big way, "we aren't
doing any testing and will not be doing any testing for Synovex," says Mussman at the USDA.
If you ask FDA officials where they get their safety data, they'll refer you to
some bioassay tests which Syntex made about 18 years ago under controlled
laboratory conditions, not on a farm . These cumbersome and time-consuming
tests, which Mussman says "just don't work for a regulatory testing program,"
can't measure residues below 2 parts per billion (ppb). Theoretically, there
could be 1.9 ppb in the meat and the test wouldn't show it.
The FDA used the same kind of test when DES was around. Quoting "voluminous" data from the test results, the FDA's director of veterinary medicine
C.D. Van Houweling, assured a House of Representatives subcommittee i~
March, 1971, that "no residue (of DES) would be left" when farmers follow
directions.
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But about six months ago scientists developed a far more sensitive experimt::ntal radioactive tracing technique, which found around 42 parts per trillion
in meat of DES long after there should have been none. Reluctantly, the FDA
banned the hormone from the animal market. The test methods available, it
said, are "not sufficiently sensitive" to assure consumers they're not eating
DES residues in their meat.
With this history in mind, it is difficult for FDA and USDA officials to
.explain how they can guarantee safe use of Synovex, using the same method
that can't protect us from DES. Looking for Synovex residues in meat, in fact,
will be far more difficult because its estrogen-unlike synthetic DES-already
exists naturally in animals.
"So far," says Lehman, "we don't even know what the amounts occurring
naturally are in the meat. The FDA asked Syntex last September to perfect the
new parts-per-trillion method and to start figuring out how to set up a workable testing program. In a year and a half (the deadline) says Van Houweling,
"we'll know a lot more."
Mussman, when asked if he could assure the public that there is no Synovex residue in the meat, answered simply, "No, we cannot."
Whatever the FDA tells you-or can't tell you-about Synovex holds true
for the other cancer-causing hormones on the farms, too. Farmers inject 10milligram pellets of estradiol monopalmitate, from the Mattox & Moore Co.,
in chicken necks; but again, it's a naturally occurring estrogen and the USDA
has no way to measure the residue.
"It's being used very little in relation to the total amount of chicken being
produced," says Mussman. Just how much is being used, however, is the
FDA's and the company's "trade secret."
While consumers wait for the companies to figure out a way to detect
known carcinogens in the meat, FDA scientists are mulling over studies which
suggest that other widely used drugs-also undetectable-may induce cancer.
For example, Van Houweling reported in 1968 that "one of our scientists
has concluded that furazolidone ... is tumorigenic and carcinogenic" - a distressing bit of news, since farmers across the country have been feeding furazolidone and over 40 other nitrofuran compounds to hogs and chickens for
several decades.
The FDA proposed banning four nitrofuran drugs on March 31, 1971-and
since then it has continually postponed a final decision while the Norwich
Pharmacal Co., the manufacturer, bumbles its carcinogenicity tests (at the crucial stage in one round of tests, some heat mechanism went haywire and researchers cooked all the test animals). Results are expected around next October. Residue data: "We haven't tested for them, either," says Mussman.
Or take the sulfa drugs, commonly mixed with low-level antibotics in the
feed of cattle, hogs and poultry. The FDA received test results "two or three
years ago," according to veterinary assistant director Fred Kingma, which
show that these mixtures sometimes produce thyroid tumors-" a goiter effect,"
Kingma says, "which could be easily removed surgically."
Follow-up tests: The FDA has " alerted" manufacturers that it "may ask"
them to start new studies sometime this month. Residue data: surveys of 6,000
random beef carcasses by FDA consultant William Huber of the University of
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Illinois found that "one out of every four pieces of meat you consume contains
antibiotics"-usually a compound of antibiotics and sulfamethazine.
Perhaps two of every five pieces of m«:!at you eat this year will come from
heifers, according to USDA, many of them fattended on MGA, the "female
DES." MGA suppresses estrus-kills their sex drive. "When females are in
heat they're continually jumping around," says FDA veterinarian Robert Gillespie. "It keeps a turmoil going in the fattening lot, and the animals don't eat
as well as they should . With MGA, they'll pay a little more attention to the
feed bunk."
FDA scientists have considered MGA a "potential" carcinogen since Upjohn brought it on the market, since it's a synthetic progesterone. Upjohn studies over two years ago showed that MGA induces a high rate of cancer in one
cancer-prone strain of mice, and the FDA has been interpreting the results
ever since. The National Cancer Institute reviewed the studies, and although it
won't conclude that MGA does induce cancer, it urged last month that the
FDA conduct more tests.
Even if FDA gives MGA its seal of approval (and if it does, scientists on its
own staff are likely to protest) the drug poses other safety problems. Upjohn
followed its mouse studies with dog tests "to prove the product is safe," says
one FDA official, "but it ·didn't quite work out that way." At high doses,
MGA disrupted the dogs' reproductive cycles and damaged the uterus.
''I'm worried," this official said, "that trace residues of the hormone (in
the meat) could disrupt a woman's menstrual cycle." Richard Lehman, in the
FDA's veterinary drug bureau, was asked if the findings worry him. "Quite
honestly," he said, "the reason you put MGA in cattle in the first place is to
suppress the reproductive process. So if it interferes with a dog's reproductive
system, that's what it's supposed to do. Dogs, cattle, humans-it does the
same thing if you get enough there."
"If you monkey around with the natural balance of hormones, something's
going to happen," Lehman said. "You don't have to be a scientist to figure
that out." Now, Van Houweling added in a separate conversation, "the question is whether the amounts in beef are harmful to people. It will be a little
while yet before we reach our conclusions."
The answer becomes more urgent as time goes by because cattle feeders are
increasing the proportion of heifers in the feedlots and increasing the use of
MGA now that DES is gone. USDA officials assured the Congress two years
ago that they had a workable method sensitive to 25 ppb, but now Mussman
concedes that the USDA never used it. "It just hasn't worked well in our
hands," he says.
Upjohn's own experimental data, according .to one FDA veterinary official,
indicate that consumers are eating "a few parts per billion" in the fat marbled
throughout their meat.
The DES debacle, which dragged several years through FDA deliberations,
congressional hearings and the federal courts, came to a close little more than
a month ago. But already the lessons it should have taught the FDA about trying to control cancer-causing drugs on ~he farr:ns <."really a foolhardy undertaking," a former National Cancer Institute scientist warned a congressional
subcommittee) seem to be lost.
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When the FDA insisted that DES residues wouldn't end up in the meat,
for example, it meant that tests showed that there would be no residues of the
drug according to directions "reasonably certain to be followed in practice."
As DES violation files in the FDA's own compliance section show, however,
farmers didn't always obey the label.
Even if the USDA were to test every piece of meat in the market for these
carcinogenic drugs- now, of course, it doesn't test even one--and to report
that it found "no residues ," it would mean only that it found no residues at the
sensitivity level of its tests. "Now, this means that there will be a residue of carcinogens in the meat," FDA assistant general counsel Peter Barton Hutt emphasized recently before the Senate Commerce Committee. "We know that ...
The point is to keep it low enough so that it cannot be detected by current methods."
"Current methods" in 1962 defined 50 ppb as practically zero; this year, the
FDA concludes that 2 ppb "is not sufficiently sensitive." How sensitive is sensitive enough? Cancer researchers have never been able to determine a safe
level for a carcinogen, a quantity so small that it may not cause cancer in
some persons.
Just three weeks ago the FDA banned the chicken growth hormone dienestrol diacetate, No, federal inspectors didn't report any residues in the meat
(they never inspected for them), but, Van Houweling reports, "it would take a
year or longer of intensive investigation" before the manufacturer could develop "a more sensitive test." In his opinion that's "too long."
It's a bewildering show of force: The agency has given the makers of Synovex, for just one example, at least another year and a half for the same purpose. Even as it banishes one carcinogen from the farms, the FDA brings on
another-like Pfizer Laboratories' Carbodox, a new wonder drug for hogs,
which Pfizer tests show causes cancer in animals. It's been on the market
about four months, and already "they've been spending more money advertising that drug than any drug I've ever seen," says a USDA official.
"Of the 330,000 cancer deaths a year in this country," estimates cancer
expert Samuel Epstein, "somewhere in the region of 60o/o to 80o/o of them are
environmental in origin." Some FDA critics like Dr. Roy Hertz are asking:
When the human body already can develop cancer on its own, "what sense
does it make to add an additional load at will?"
Van Houweling, on the other hand, conceives a grand portrait of a greatly
polluted world and paints cancer-causing drugs on the farms as just a tiny
dab. "There are many possible carcinogenic substances in the enviroment that
people can't escape," he said . "Why, even sunlight is definitely hazardous if
you stay in it too long."
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COMMEN T
USURY LAWS:

11/usm:-r Protection for the Necessitous Bm-rou'Pr
"Law grind the poor, and rich men rule the law. " 1
Through the ages, man has often found it necessary to borrow to
meet expenses beyond those normally budgeted for under his regular
income. To meet this need, lending and charging for such service developed as a business. Obviously, as the demand for this service increased,
the price for use of the borrowed funds (i.e. the interest rates on the
loans) did likewise. When these interest rates, as set by trade custom,
became "usurious" 2 they were subjected to governmental regulation.
Usury has been a prohibited practice in civilized nations since the
Babylonian period. 3 Many sections of the Bible, 4 have condemned
usurious practices, saying. " ... take thou no usury of him or his, but fear
thy God ." 5 Presently, all SO states have usury laws on their books
intended to protect borrowers.6 However, as will be shown, these laws
are usually ineffectual insulation for the class of borrower 7 which is
most in need of protection.
The Necessitous Borrower
One who is subject to the pressures of indigency or oppressed by
poverty, and who borrows money to alleviate it, is a necessitous borrower.8 Such an individual will take out a small loan primarily to consolidate or re-finance existing obligations (e.g. taxes, medical expenses,
utility bills, etc.), or to purchase durable goods (e.g. automobiles,household appliances, etc.).9
I. Oliver Goldsmith . The Traveller, line 386.
2. Usury was defined as the taking of exorbitant interest (i.e. 40 percent) under English Common Law, and was punishable as a misdemeanor. 55 AM. JUR. Usury§ 172 (1946).
3. The King had the power to regulate interest rates. CODE OF HAMMURABI § 51 (2 G.R.
DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES , THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 29 (1955)].
4. Deuteronomy 23: 19, 20, Ezekie/18: 5, 13.
5. Leviticus 25: 35, 36, 37.
6. See appendix, for a state-by-state breakdown of statutes and interest rates.
7. J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD, S. MESSINGER, CIVILJUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1967).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (4th ed. 1951).
9. S. BOOTH , FINANCE FACTS YEARBOOK 57 (1970). Note: With respect to the purchase
of durable goods, the consumer may also "borrow" the purchase price by buying the desired item
"on time." The installment sales contract is in effect, a loan of the purchase price of a retail item
extended to th e buyer by his vendor. Such an extension of credit also involves a "finance charge"
rather than "interest", and the maximum rates chargeable may also be regulated by state law. For
exa mple see the Unruh Act of California, [CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1801 et. seq. (West 1973)].

172

Consumer Journal

[Vol. II: 171

Statistically it is assumed that such a borrower earns less than
10
$6,000 annually, and is generally unable to obtain a loan in excess of
$1,000, due to lack of adequate collateral! 1 Besides limiting the amount
of his loan, the necessitous borrower's lack of collateral also limits his
choice of lenders! 2 Since large lending institutions (i.e. banks, and savings and loan companies) are disinclined to take credit risks by extending small unsecured personal loans of the type this borrower requires,
he is forced to deal with the small finance companies which will do so.
As will later be illustrated, such lenders are often immune from the
operation of usury laws and may therefore impose higher ("maximum")
interest rates. ·Thus the necessitous borrower must pay the exceedingly
high rates which they ask for their services, since he cannot readily
obtain these services from other lending institutions.
The pool of necessitous borrowers, in fact, provides a major portion
of the business of small loan companies. It has been assumed that a
necessitous borrower characteristically receives less than $6,000 per
year. Nationally, approximately 26 percent of all families have annual
incomes of less than $6,000. 13 In California, about 20 percent of all
families are in this income bracket.14 Over 70 percent of the unrelated
individuals in both California, and in the entire country are below the
$6,000 annual income level.15 And, nationwide, approximately 40 percent of all loans are taken out by those with less than $6,000 annual
income. 16
Secondly, it has been assumed that a necessitous borrower is limited
to loans of less than $1,000 due to his lack of collateral. National figures
show that the average amount for a small personal loan is approximately $696.17 In 1970, of the California finance company loans under $5,000,
approximately 34 percent were for $500 or less, 18 and 66 percent of such
loans were for less than $1,000.19 Maximum interest rates were charged
I 0. According to the finance industry, approximately 40 percent of the borrowers of finance
companies have annual incomes less than $6,000. BOOTH, supra note 9, at 58.
II. Also, the finance industry has stated that the average size personal loan for 1968 was $696.
BOOTH, supra note 9, at 63. The current trend of rising prices generally will shift the size of the
average loan upward accordi ngly.
12. Comment, Accounts R eceivable Financing and the California Personal Property Brokers
Act, 14 STAN. L. REV. 520, 526 (1962).
13. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
316 (1971).
14. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS-CALIFORNIA 384 (1971).
15. See notes 13 & 14, supra.
16. See note 10, supra.
17. See note 11, supra.
18. 1970 CAL. DEPT OF CORP. ANN. REP., Operations of Licensed Finance Companies,
exhibit D.
19. 1970 CAL. DEPT. OF CORP. ANN . REP., Operations of Licensed Finance Companies,
exhibit C.
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on over 90 percent of the loans in this category (i.e. loans of under
$5,000).20
Hence, it can be seen that the majority of small personal loans, both
in California and nationwide, do not exceed $1,000. It is logical to
assume, then, that the majority of these loans are granted to low income/necessitous borrowers, who do not have enough collateral to
support larger loans. Since maximum interest rates are being charged
on a great majority of such small loans, the necessitous borrower is,
therefore, the one most oppressed by the lack of effective regulation of
these rates.
Structurally, state laws usually do not fulfill their purpose of protecting the necessitous borrower; and, federal regulations (i.e. Truth-InLending laws) require only full disclosure of terms and charges for
loans, but are silent upon the interest rates permitted. 21
Effect of Interest Rates in Selected Jurisdictions
The following table illustrates the vast discrepancies between allowable interest rates on small loans and those rates statutorily designated
as usurious, in a group of states selected either for extremely high or
low interest rates, or as otherwise notable jurisdictions (i.e. New York
and California). For purposes of this comparison, the amount of the
loan will be $500. All interest rates will be expressed in annual percentages.
TABLE
RATE ON $500
STATE
MAX. RATE
USURY
ALASKA 22
36.0%
33.6%
8o/o
lO.Oo/o
lO.Oo/o
ARKANSAS 23
lOo/o
20. ld.
21. 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et. seq. (1968).
22. Max Rate; ALA. STAT. Title 6, ch. 20, § 06.20.230 (Supp. 1971). Usury; ALA . STAT. Title
45, ch . 45, § 45.45.010 (Supp. 1971). Note: The usual practice of the Finance Industry is to fix the
maximum allowable interest rate to each incremental portion of a loan. For instance, in Alaska
the annual rate of interest on a loan of $500 is computed in the following manner:
1) The first $400 bears a maximum interest rate of 36o/o.
2) The additional $100 bears a maximum interest rate of 24%.
3) The actual interest rate on the total amount of the loan may be found by first
multiplying each incremental portion by the applicable interest rates, adding the
resulting figures, and dividing this total by the amount of the loan.
$400 X 36 = $14,400
$100 X 24 = $ 2,400 +
$16,800
$16,800 -;- $500 = 33.6
This same method is used to arrive at the annual rates of interest on $500 in each of
the exam pies set out in the text.
23. Max. Rate; ARK. STAT. ANN. Const. art. 19, § 13 (1947). Usury; ARK. STAT. ANN.
Const. art. 19, § 13 (1947).
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TABLE (CONT.)
STATE

RATE ON $500

MAX. RATE

USURY

24

10%
26.4%
30.0%
CALIFORNIA
25
6%
36.0%
COLORAD0
28.8%
26
6%
16.0%
16.0%
GEORGIA
27
' 25.2%
12%
HAWAII
42.0%
28
7%
24.0%
30.0%
MICHIGAN
29
1
7 12%
22.8%
30.0%
NEW YORK'
30
8%
16.0%
16.0%
OHI0
31
10%
14.0%
18.0%
TEXAS
32
12%
WISCONSIN
18.0%
18.0%
33
U.C.C.C. Alt. A
15.6%
18.0%
N/A
34
30.0%
36.0%
U.C.C.C. Alt. B
N/A
It is readily apparent from the figures cited in the preceding table
that small loans carry the highest rates of interest possible under the
law, despite their exceeding those rates which are deemed to be usurious. Thirty-one states have small loan laws which allow interest rates
of 30 percent or more; 35 and, there are seven states with statutes that
acquiesce to rates of 20 percent or more?6 Few states remain which have
maximum interest rates of 18 percent or lower. So, the low income
borrower has no relief in sight from these exorbitant rates on the small
24. Max. Rate; CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 22451 (West 1968). Usury; CAL. CONST. CODE
ANN. art 20, § 22 (West Supp. 1972).
25. Max. Rate; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 73, art. 3, § 14 (1963). Usury; COLO REV.
STAT. ANN. ch 73, art),§ 1 (S~p.1969).
26. Max. Rate; GA. COD'E ANN. Title 25, § 315 (1971). Usury; GA. CODE ANN. Title 57,§
116 (1971).
27. Max. Rate; HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 409, § 16 (1968). Usury; HAWAII REV. STAT. ch.
478, § 3 (1968).
28. Max. Rate; MICH. STAT. ANN. Title 23, § 667(13) (1971). Usury; MICH. STAT. ANN.
Title 19, § 15(1) (Supp. 1972).
29. Max. Rate; N.Y. BANK LAW§ 352 (McKinney 1971). Usury; N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW§
5-501 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
30. Max. Rate; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1321, § 13 (Supp. 1972). Usury; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. ch. 1343, § 01 (Supp. 1972).
31. Max. Rate; TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 3.15 (1971). Usury; TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art 5069, § 1.02 (1971).
32. Max. Rate; WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 422, § 201(2)(a) (Supp. 1973). Usury; WIS . STAT. ANN.
ch . 138, § 05(1)(a) (Supp. 1973).
33. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Working Draft No.6,§ 3.508, Alt. A (1967).
34. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Working Draft No.6,§ 3.508, Alt. B (1967).
35. See appendix: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, lndmna, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, & Wyoming.
36. See appendix: Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, & South Car,
olina.
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loans necessity forces him to seek. At this point, however, it should be
noted that somewhat higher interest rates are justified on these small
unsecured personal loans because of the credit risks involved. Nonetheless, these risks to the finance companies are not a sufficient rationalization for their charging the exceedingly high rates which they do.
The crux of the problem for the necessitous borrower is that the finance companies do, in fact, use the aforementioned rationalization to
charge burdensome interest rates, and are allowed to do so in that most
of them are exempted from having to comply with usury law interest
rate limitations imposed by their respective states. Even if loans are
made that are usurious, the penalties are generally nominal~ 7 Only the
State of Arkansas effectively enforces its usury law, by imposing a 10
percent interest ceiling across the board, with no exemptions for any
lenders.38
To put the problems occasioned by such lack of effective legislative
control in sharper perspective we will look to the history of a single
state which typifies the situation in most other jurisdictions.
History of Usury in California
Prior to 1909, there was no general usury law in California.39 In that
year regulations were first imposed on personal property brokers. 40 Personal property brokers, including small loan or finance companies are
those engaged in lending money with personal property being all or
part of the security for the loan.41 They developed as a special class of
lenders, who would loan money for short terms on collateral that was
thought of as unacceptable to banks.42 This was a reaction to the evolution of a special class of borrowers who were poor in comparison to the
traditional bank clientele. Such brokers were permitted to charge up to
S percent per month on a loan, 43 or 60 percent a year. When it became
obvious that the new class of borrowers was being subjected to this
usurious practice, the voting population of California passed an initiative to curtail it. 44
This statute was intended to cover all lenders, and put a maximum
annual interest rate at 12 percent.45 The enforcement section provided

-

37. See note 7, supra.
38. See text accompanying note 23, supra. See generally Comment, Usury and Conflicts, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 123, 178 (1967).
39. S ee note 12, supra.
40. Cal. Stats. 1909, ch. 634, §§ 1, 2, at %9. See Comment, supra note 12.
41. CAL. FIN. CODE ANN.§ 22009 (West 1968).
42. See Comment, supra note 12.
43. See note 40, supra and accompanying text.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1916-1 et. seq. (West Supp. 1973).
45. W. Warren, California House Financing, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 555, 565 (1%1).
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for forfeiture of his loan by any personal property broker found in violation of the statute.46 Further, it was intended to repeal all previous
regulations for lenders,47 including personal property brokers.48 Court
decisions in the following decade extended the application of the Usury
Law to forbearances,49 and to re-financing of the originalloan.50
Unfortunately, this trend of further extending protection against
usurious practices was soon' reversed. In 1934, a legislative referendum
to amend the State Constitution was presented to the California voters.51
The effect of its acceptance was to exempt almost every lending institution from the interest rate regulations.52 Obstensibly, the amendment's
lowering of the interest rate ceiling on all loans from 12 percent to 10
percent annually was advantageous to the necessitous borrower. However, this is not an accurate picture of the amendment's true effect; in
reality, the exemptions negate this apparent benefit. Since almost all
lending institutions are exempt from the lowered rate, the necessitous
borrower is subjected to the independent regulations set up by these
institutions themselves. Even though further legislation has been presented, to the state lawmakers, as recently as 1971, it has not been
accepted.53 Hence, the State of California does not presently have an
effective usury law with respect to small loans.
Conclusion

What is needed is a promulgation of new and viable Consumer
Protection legislation similar to that in effect in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin act lowers the maximum rate of interest on small loans from 30
percent to 18 percent annually.54 In California, another logical alternative would be to amend the State Constitution to eliminate the existing
exemptions, and to allow for strict enforcement of the present 10
percent interest ceiling on all loans. Such effective protection has yet to
materialize. in any but two of the fifty United States.55 Lacking these
46. In re Washer, 200 Cal. 598, 254 P. 951 (1927).
47. Recent Decision, Usury: Personal Property Brokers: Pawnbrokers, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 213
(1931).
48. Crooks v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 1 Cal. Supp. 86, 292 P. 1065, 1067 (1930).
49. "Forbearance" is defined as an "Act by which creditor waits for payment of debt due him
by debtor after it becomes due." BLACK'S LAW DICfiONARY 733 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), (citing
Upton v. Gould, 64 Cal. App. 2d 814, 149 P.2d 731 , 733 (1944)).
SO. Aitken v. Southwest Fin. Corp. of Cal., 131 Cal. App. 95, 104,20 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1933).
51. W. Warren , California Housing Financing, supra note 45, at 562.
52. CAL. CONST. CODE ANN. art 20, ~ 20 (West Supp. 1972). This section includes:
Building and Loan Associations, Credit Unions, Pawnbrokers, Personal Property Brokers, Banks,
and Agricultural Cooperatives.
53. California Senate Bill 738, which would have enforced the Usury Law, died in committee.
Cal. Final Calendar of Legislative Business, 1971 Sess. 249. The Senate Judiciary Committee is at
present studying the U.C.C.C. as modified by the usage of Personal Property Brokers interest
rates. Cal. Sen. J. 1971 Sess. 1617.
54. WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 422, § 201 (Supp. 1972).
55. The two exceptions are Arkansas and Wisconsin, supra notes 38 & 54 respectively.
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necessary prophylactic devices, the necessitous borrower will bury himself further in debt.
Due to the general inflationary trend in our society, one pays more
to buy less. Hence, those of low income must borrow more or more
often to meet their present needs, as well as to alleviate their prior
indebtedness. Ironically, the exorbitant interest rates which the finance
companies force them to pay, on the very money they borrow to extricate themselves, actually compounds their plight. Obviously, then, without potent regulation of the finance companies' lending practices, the
situation of the poor who turn to them for help can only get worse. This
in turn may tend to cause a greater economic stratification of our society, a result which is obviously undesirable.

-ERIC R. YAMAMOTO
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the descrepancies between the usury rate (maximum contractual rate of interest for a loan)
and the maximum rate of interest permissible by the small loan acts of
the 50 states. For uniformity, all of the interest rates will be expressed
·
in annual percentage.

STATE

USURY

MAXIMUM RATES

ALABAMA

Over 8%

36%
24%

ALA. CODE
(Michie Co.)
ALASKA

9 § 60
(Supp. 1971)
Over 8%

290
5§
(Supp. 1971)
36% 0 to $400
24o/o $400 to $800
12% $800 to $1,500

ALAS . STAT.
(Michie Co.)
ARIZONA

45.45.010
(Supp. 1971)
Over 10%

06.20.230
(Supp. 1971)
36% 0 to $300
24% $300 to $600

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.
(West)
ARKANSAS

44-1201
(Supp. 1972)
Over 10%

0 to $200
$200 to $300

6-622
(Supp. 1972)
10%

ARK. STAT. ANN.
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.)
CALIFORNIA

Const. Art. XIX § 13 I d.
(1947)
30%
Over 10%
24%
18%
12%

CAL. CODE ANN.
(West)

Const. Art. XX § 22 Fin. § 22451
(Supp. 1972)
(Supp. 1972)

0 to $200
$200 to $500
$500 to $700
$700 to $1,500
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STATE

USURY

MAXIMUM RATE

COLORADO

Over 6%

36%
18%
12%

COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.
(Bradford-Robinson Co.)
CONNECTICUT

CONN. STAT. ANN.
(West)
DELAWARE

DEL. CODE ANN.
(West)
FLORIDA

FLA. STAT. ANN.
(West)
GEORGIA
GA. CODE ANN.
(Harrison Co.)
HAWAII

HAWAII REV. STAT.
(State printer)
IDAHO

IDAHO CODE
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.)

73-1-1
(Supp. 1969)
Over 12%

37 § 4
(1958)
Over 9%

6 § 2301
(Supp. 1970)
Over 10%

687.02
(1966)
Over 6%

·§ 57-116
(1971)
Over 12%
478-3
(1968)
Over 10%

28-22-105
(Supp. 1972)

0 to $300
$300 to $500
$500 to $1,500

73-3-14
(1963)
17% 0 to $300
. 11% $300 to $1,800
36 § 233
(Supp. 1972)
7o/o
2%
5%

interest
service fee
late fine

5 § 2108
(Supp. 1970)
36% 0 to $300
24% $300 to $600
516.14
(1972)
16% 0 to $600
12% $600+

§ 25-315
(1971)
42% 0 to $100
30% $100 to $300
409-16
(1968)
36%
21%
15%

0 to $300
$300 to $1,000
$1 ,000 to $1,500

28-33-508
(Supp. 1972)
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STATE

USURY

MAXIMUM RATE

ILLINOIS

Over 8%

36% 0 to $150
24% $150 to $300
12% $300 to $800

ILL. STAT. ANN.
(West)
INDIANA

74 § 4
(Supp. 1972)
Over 8%

IND. STAT. ANN.
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.)

Const. Art. 11 § 9
(1955)

IOWA

lOW A CODE ANN.
(West)
KANSAS

Over 9%

535.2
(Supp. 1972)
Over 10%

74 § 31
(Supp. 1972)
36% 0 to $300
21% $300 to $1,000
15% $1,000 to $1,500
19-23-508
(Supp. 1972)
36% 0 to $150
24% $150 to $300
18% $300 to $700
12% $700+
536.13
(Supp. 1972)
36% 0 to $300
10% $300+

KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN.
(State Printer)
KENTUCKY

(Supp. 1961)
Over 6%

(Supp. 1961)
20% 0 to $300
16% $300 to $800
13% $800 to $1,200

KY. REV. STAT.
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.)
LOUISIANA

360.010
(Supp. 1972)
Over 8%

288.530
(1972)
36% 0 to $800
27% $800 to $2,000
21 o/o $2,000 to $3,500
15% $3,500 and above

LA. STAT. ANN.
(West)

16-202

Civ. Code§ 2924
(Supp. 1972)

16-410

9:3519
(Supp. 1972)
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STATE

USURY

MAINE

Over 12%

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
(West)
MARYLAND

MD. CODE ANN.
(Michie Co.)

9 § 3086
(Supp. 1972)
Over 8%

49 § 3
(Supp. 1972)

181

MAXIMUM RATE
30%
18%

0 to $300
$300+

9 § 3081
(Supp. 1972)
36%
24%

0 to $300
$300 to $500

58A § 16
(1972)

MASSACHUSETTS

Over 6%

MASS . GEN. LAWS
ANN.
(West)
MICHIGAN

107 § 3
(1958)
Over 7%

MICH. STAT. ANN.
(Callaghan & Co.)
MINNESOTA

19:15 (1)
(Supp. 1972)
Over 8%

MINN. STAT. ANN.
(West)
MISSISSIPPI

334.01
(1966)
Over 8%

MISS. CODE ANN.
(Harrison Co.)
MISSOURI

§ 36
(Supp. 1971)
Over 8%

§ 5591-09
(Supp. 1971)
15% 0 to $500
8% $500+

MO. STAT. ANN.
(West)

408.030
(Supp. 1972)

408.100
(Supp. 1972)

18%

$1,000 or less

140 § 90
(1958)
30% 0 to $300
15% $300 to $1,000
23:667 (13)
(1971)
33% 0 to $300
18% $300 to $600
15% $600 to $900
56.13
(1970)
24% $100+
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USURY

MAXIMUM RATE

Over 10%

20% 0 to $300
16% $300 to $500
12% $500 to $1,000

MONT. REV. CODE
ANN.
(Allen Smith Co.)
NEBRASKA

(1961)
Over 9%

(Supp. 1971)
30% 0 to $300
24% $300 to $500
18% $500 to $1,000
12% $1,000 to $3,000

NEB. REV. STAT.
(Dennis & Co.)
NEVADA

45-101
(1968)
Over 12%

45-137
(1968)
9% 0 to $1,000
8% $1,000 to $2,500
12% 0 to $200 service
fee
6% $200 to $400 service fee

NEV. REV. STAT.
(State Printer)
NEW HAMPSHIRE

99.050
(1970)
Over 6%

675.290
(1970)
24% 0 to $600
18% $600 to $1,500
18% $1,500+

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN.
(Equity Publishing Co.)
NEW JERSEY

47-125

336:1

47-210

399-A:3

(1966)
Over 6%

(1968)
24% 0 to $500
22% $500 to $1,000

N.J. STAT. ANN.
(West)
NEW MEXICO

31:1-1
(Supp. 1972)
Over 12%

17:10-14
(Supp. 1972)
36% 0 to $150
30% $150 to $300
12% $300 to $1,000

N.M. STAT. ANN.
(Allen Smith Co.)

50-6-5
(1962)

48-17-43
(1966)
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STATE
NEW YORK

N.Y. LAWS (McKinney)
(West)
NORTH CAROLINA

USURY
Over 7 112o/o

Gen. Oblg. 5-501
(Supp. 1972)
Over 7o/o

N.C. GEN. STAT.
(Michie Co.)

24-1
(Supp. 1971)

NORTH DAKOTA

Over 7o/o

N.D. CODE ANN.
(Allen Smith Co.)

47-14-09
(Supp. 1971)

183

MAXIMUM RATE
30o/o
24o/o
18o/o
15o/o

0 to $100
$100 to $300
$300 to $900
$900 to $1,400

Bank 352
(1971)
18o/o
10o/o
8o/o

0 to $300
$300 to $600
$600 to $900

53-173
(Supp. 1971)
30o/o 0 to $250
24o/o $250 to $500
21 o/o $500 to $750
18o/o $750 to $1,000
13-03-14
(1971)

OHIO

Over 8o/o

16o/o
9o/o
7o/o

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN.
(Anderson Co.)
OKLAHOMA

1343.01

1321.13

(Supp. 1971)
Over 10o/o

(Supp. 1971)
30o/o 0 to $300
21 o/o $300 to $1,000
15o/o $1,000+

OKLA. STAT. ANN.
(West)
OREGON

Const. Art. 14 § 2
(Supp. 1972) ·
Over 10o/o

14A § 2-201
(Supp. 1972)
36o/o 0 to $300
24o/o $300 to $500
12o/o $500 to $1,500

ORE. REV. STAT.
(Binsford & Mort Pub.)

82.010
(1971)

0 to $500
$500 to $1,000
$1,000 to $2,000

725.340
(1971)
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STATE

USURY

MAXIMUM RATE

PENNSYLVANIA

Over 6%

36% 0 to $150
24% $150 to $300
12% $300 to $600

PA. STAT. ANN.
(West)
RHODE ISLAND

41 § 3
(1971)
Over 21%

7 § 6152
(1967)
36% 0 to $300
30% $300 to $800
24% $800 to $2,500

R.I. GEN. LAWS
(Bobbs-Merrill Co.)
SOUTH CAROLINA

6-27-4
(Supp. 1971)
Over 8%

19-25-25
(1968)
20% 0 to $100
18% $100 to $300
9% $300 to $1,000

S.C. CODE LAWS
(Michie Co.)
SOUTH DAKOTA

§ 8-3
(Supp. 1971)
Over 10%

§ 8-800.10

S.D. LAWS ANN.
(Allen Smith Co.)
TENNESEE

54-3-7
(Supp. 1972)
Over 6%

54-6-2
(Supp. 1972)
6% interest
12% service fee

TENN. CODE ANN.
(Bobbs-Merrill Co.)
TEXAS

47-14-104
(Supp. 1972)
Over 10%

45-2113
(1964)
18% 0 to $300
8% $300 to $2,500

TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN.
(West)
UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN.
(Allen Smith Co.)

(Supp. 1971)
30% 0 to $300
24% $300 to $600
18o/o $600 to $1,200
12% $1,200 to $2,500

5069-1.02

5069-3.15

(1971)
Over 6%

(1971)
36% 0 to $300
21% $300 to $1,000
15% $1,000+

15-1-1
(1953)

70B-3-508
(Supp. 1971)
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STATE
VERMONT
VT. STAT. ANN.
(Equity Publishing Co.)

USURY
Over 7th%
9 § 41
(1971)

VIRGINIA

Over 8%

VA. CODE
(Michie Co.)

§ 6.1-319
(Supp. 1972)

WASHINGTON

Over 12%

19.52.020
WASH. REV. CODE
ANN.
(West & Bancroft-Whitney (Supp. 1971)
Over 8%
WEST VIRGINIA

W.VA. CODE
(Michie Co.)
WISCONSIN

§ 47-6-5
(Supp. 1972)
Over 12%
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MAXIMUM RATE
14%

0 to $1,500

8 § 2223
(1971)
30%
18%

0 to $300
$300 to $1 ,000

§ 6.1-272
(Supp. 1972)
36%
18%
12%

0 to $300
$300 to $500
$500 to $1,000

31.08.160
(1961)
36% 0 to $200
24% $200 to $600
18% $600 to $800

§ 47-7A-13
(1966)
18%
12%

0 to $500
$500+

WIS. STAT. ANN.
(West)
WYOMING

138.05
(Supp. 1972)
Over 7o/o

422.201
(Supp. 1972)
36% 0 to $300
21% $300 to $1,000
15% $1,000+

WYO. STAT. ANN.
(Michie Co.)

§ 13-477
(supp. 1971)

§ 40-3-508

UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE

NIA

(Supp. 1971)
18% 0 to $300
12%
8%

Working Draft No. 6 (1967)

$300 to $1,000 ·
$1,000+

§ 3.508 Alt. A
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MAXIMUM RATE
36% 0 to $300
21%
15%

Working Draft No.6 (1967)

$300 to $1,000
$1,000+

§ 3.508 Alt. B
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Modern technology has made it possible to redistribute and intensify
the natural sources of radiation found in the earth's crust. At the same
time, it is now possible to produce devices that constitute new sources
of radiation, and often such products are intended for use in the home.
As a result, man (in fact, all life on earth) continually risks exposure to
levels of radiation significantly higher than those that occur naturally.
In testimony before the Senate, Dr. William H. Stewart, former
Surgeon General of the United States, appropriately quoted the remarks
of Dr. Donald Chadwick of the U.S. Public Health Service:
Our knowledge of the biological effects of radiation has many
gaps, but enough is known that practitioners ·Of medicine, dentistry,
and public health should make every feasible effort to prevent or reduce all unnecessary radiation exposures. The size of the population
at risk and the possible consequences of failure to take appropriate
action are too great.'

Dr. Stewart also offered the words of former Surgeon General Burney:
In law the suspect is innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the protection of human health, such absolute
proof often comes late.
To wait for it is to invite disaster, or to suffer unnecessarily
through long periods of time!

Dr. Stewart himself went on to say:
The principal objective of the Public Health Service and other
public and private organizations interested in radiation protection is
to prevent exposure of the population to unnecessary radiation and
to reduce to a minimum the exposures that may be necessary for
medical and other beneficial ,applications:3

This comment is presented in the belief that no one can, or should,
seriously question that there are severe consequences attached to any
significant increases in the radiation levels of our environment, and
that as a general principle, zealous efforts are in order to insure that
mankind, individually and collectively, is not exposed to radiation levels
significantly higher than those found in nature.

I. Hearings o11 S. 2067 B efore the S e11ate Com~ . 011 Comm erce, ';lOth Cong .•. l.st Sess., pt. t, at
83 (1%7), [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate H eartn!JS]. Dr. Chadwtck had ortgmally made this
statement while addressing the 1%4 Congress _of Environmental Health. .
2. !d. This statement was originally made m an address to the 1958 Nattonal Pollution Conference.
3. ld.
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As its title suggests, this comment is directed primarily to an examination of the legal controls on the emission of X-rays from television
receivers~ There are, of course other electronic products produced for
use in the home that emit radiation of one kind or another. However, of
all the electronic products considered capable of emitting hazardous
radiation, television receivers are the most widespread and represent
the greatest potential source of exposure for the public in this Country.
This is made evident by noting that there were about 24,000,000 color
television receivers alone in use in this country by 1970, a number representing eight times the total of all other such products "selected" for
counting by the Bureau of Radiological Health:
It should further be noted that the 24 million television sets produced before January 15, 1970 were not subject to Federal radiation
emission controls. These sets were particularly susceptible to maladjustment, both by the user and by slipshod repairmen, that could result in
excessive emissions. Moreover, it will be shown that sets produced subsequently under Federal controls, while not as susceptible to misadjustment, are still capable of emitting excessive radiation as a result of
component failures or modifications by unwary servicemen. Thus, it is
appropriate to consider the effectiveness of federal controls, and the
need for similar state legislation in order to insure the complete protection of the public from electronic product radiation.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

In November, 1966, the "discovery" that color television sets manufactured by General Electric were emitting significant levels of X-radia. tion received widespread publicity.6 Considerable alarm was generated
by this discovery, but the alarm was typically short-lived, and it abated
soon after "health authorities" assured the public that no hazards to
the public were presented by the situation?
Ultimately, General Electric "corrected" approximately 90,000 sets
already in use by the public. While the levels of radiation emitted by
these sets were not widely publicized, the conclusion that General Electric thought the levels at least moderately dangerous seems inescapable

4. The problem of radiation from television receivers first surfaced in connection with color
receivers; however, as will be discussed below in the text, black-and -white sets may also be capable
of emitting X-radiation.
5. M essage From th e President of the United S tates Transmitting the First Annual R eport on
the Administration of th e Radiation Control for H ealth and Safety A ct of 1968, H.R. Doc. No.
91 -126, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 40 (1969).
6. 1967 S enate H earings. su pra note I , at 3.
7. /d.
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in view of the fact that General Electric corrected these sets at a cost to
- itself of "several million dollars.'18 In testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Mr. Ralph
Nader stated that he considered it "gross negligence at the very least"
that General Electric had subjected assembly line technicians to excessive radiation from these sets during their manufacture?
. Is it likely, then, that television receivers are capable of emitting
radiation which might in fact be harmful to human health?
A. A

BIRIEF TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

It has long been known as a general principle of physics that electromagnetic radiation is emitted by any process involving the acceleration of charged particles~ 0 The frequency (and energy level) of radiation
thus produced depends on the acceleration imparted to the particles;
i.e., the greater the acceleration, the greater the intensity and range of
possible frequencies of the resulting radiation.
Vacuum tubes operate on the principle that electrons (negatively
charged particles) are accelerated from one element, the cathode, to
another element, the anode. The process of accelerating the electrons
from the cathode produces some radiation, but the acceleration at this
point is relatively gradual; the resulting radiation is of fairly low frequency, and consequently is of little significance. On the other hand,
when the electrons reach the anode they are abruptly decelerated. In
effect, this deceleration also represents a rapid acceleration, in the
opposite direction. If the voltage applied between the cathode and the
anode is increased, the electrons will be made to travel at a greater rate
of speed, and hence will decelerate to a greater extent upon striking the
anode. Thus, the higher the voltage applied, the more likely it will be
that radiation will be produced.
In a general sense, then, X-radiation may be produced wher~ electrons, accelerated at a sufficiently high voltage, strike the surface of any
material which causes them to quickly decelerate. The anode of a vacuum tube is usually made of metal and, if approximately 30,000 volts
or more are applied, the electrons striking this metal surface could
cause the tube to emit X-radiation.
8. Letter to Senator E.L. Bartlett from General Electric Co., dated May 31, 1968; reported in

Hearings 011 S. 2067, S. 3211, a11d H.R. 10~90 Befo~e the Se11ate Comm. 011 Commerce, 90th

Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 936, 937 (1 968), [heremafter c1ted as 1968 Senate H earings ].
9. /d. at 753.
10. The material herein may be authenticated by referring toR. EISBERG, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MODERN PHYSICS, Ch. 14, "X-R~ys" {1961_); See App~ndix T-:vo for a brief glossary of technical term s used in this comment. Al so mcl uded m Appendi x Two IS a short note on the nature
and various forms of electromagnetic radiation.
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High intensity X-rays, of a narrow frequency band, may also be
produced by a second, more complicated, process. This process depends
largely on the type of material which acts to decelerate the moving electrons. For instance, the use of particular types of metal in making vacuum tube anodes could result in their emitting radiation of this sort.
Most television receivers utilize a number of vacuum tubes. Indeed,
the picture tube is a type of vacuum tube although it has no anode, at
least not in the same sense as have other tubes. Instead, the electrons
projected in a picture tube are decelerated when they strike the inside
surface of the picture screen (which is a glass surface coated with phosphors that emit light when struck by the electron beam). Nonetheless,
the basic process is the same in all tubes, and picture tubes have the
same potential capability of producing X-rays as do tubes with metal
anodes.
A picture tube normally operates at a relatively high voltage and, in
order to provide it with the level of power it requires to function, the
television must include a special high-voltage supply circuit. This circuit
typically includes other tubes which also operate at high voltage levels
(e.g., the high-voltage rectifier tube and the high-voltage shunt regulator tube). In black-and-white receivers, the voltage applied to the picture tube ranges from approximately 12,000 to 24,000 volts, while in
color sets it ranges from around 24,000 volts to 32,000 volts.
The high-voltage power supplies in many television sets are capable
of being adjusted- or, perhaps, misadjusted. Such adjustment is often
made possible by design, by incorporating variable resistors in the highvoltage circuit. Misadjustment of a black-and-white television can raise
the picture tube voltage to around 30,000, and in color sets, misadjustment can result in much higher voltage levels, well within the range
sufficient to cause the emission of X-rays.
Since black-and-white televisions would have to be grossly misadjusted before the picture tube supply voltage could reach the 30,000
volt range, hazardous radiation from these sets, while possible in theory,
is not at all likely. In fact no instances have been reported where this
has occurred. In color sets, however, the high-voltage circuit may operate normally within this range, and potentially hazardous X-radiation,
emitted from both picture tubes and other high-voltage tubes, has been
detected on a number of occasions.I 1 This has often been due to misadjustment or defective components in the high-voltage circuit.

11. Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 10790 Before the Subcomm. on Public H ealth and Welfare
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 17-19
(1968), [hereinafter cited as 1968 Supplemental Hearings].
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It is interesting to note that Roentgen discovered X-radiation in
1895 while experimenting with a d.evice similar to a picture tube (in
which electrons were decelerated by striking a glass surface). Knowing
this, television manufacturers should certainly have been aware of the
potential X-ray producing capabilities of their products at an early
stage in their development. This should have led the manufacturers to
ascertain the extent of possible hazards, especially insofar as misadjustment and componant malfunctions were readily foreseeable.
It is important to recognize that whether or not X-rays are emitted
under certain conditions may depend on a number of other factors
besides the voltage used to accelerate electrons, and the nature of the
material which they strike. For the purposes of this discussion, however,
it must be kept in mind that the use of particular materials and higher
voltage levels in television tubes may substantially increase the likelihood that they will emit X-radiation.

B.

THE NATURE OF THE 1HAZARD

In order to assess the potential hazards created by the emission of
X-rays from television receivers, it is necessary to consider briefly ·the
biological effects of exposure to various levels of radiation. In 1959, the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)I 2
recommended that the emission rate at a distance of 5 em (about two
inches) from any outer surface of a home television receiver should not
13
exceed 0.5 milliroentgen (mr) per hour. A maximum annual exposure
to members of the general public of 500mr has also been recognized as
an acceptable standard for the protection of health! 4

12. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) was established
in 1929 as the result of a cooperative effort between the radiological and medical organizations
existing at the time, and the National Bureau of S~andards . The NC:RP is a private, non-profit
organization similar to the National_Academy of Sc1e~ces_. but operatl_ng on ~ smaller scale. It is
certified by Federal Charter. For a hst of NCRP publications concernmg vanous problems involving radiation, see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 385, 386 . .
13. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1, at 363; 1968 Senate Heanngs, supra note 8, at 675-678.
The roentgen (r) is a basic unit of radi_atio!l which is defined in_ te:rns of the energy lost by . radiation as it passes through air. When cons1den_ng the effects of rad1a~10~ on human health a different measure is often used, the roentgen equ1valent man (rem). Th1s IS defined as the amount of
any type of radiation which, when absorbed by ~an, will produc~ the s_ame biol~gica~ effects as the
absorption of one roentgen of gamma or X-rad1at1on. When d1scussmg the bwlog1cal effects of
X-rays, then, these two measures would be equivalent. (To avoid co~f~siof!. only the roentgen measure will be used in this discussion.) The rate of exposure to radmtwn 1s usually considered by
using the standard roentgens per hour (r/ hr). See A. MELISSINOS, EXPERIMENTS IN MODERN PHYSICS at 143 (1966).
14. Hearings on the Administration of the Radia~ion Control For Health and Safety Act of 1968
(public Law 90·602) Before the Subcomm. on Puhilc Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 283 0969), [hereinafter cited as 1969
House Hearings).
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Imagine a hypothetical viewer who watches three hours of television
a day from a set held in his lap. If the set conforms to the NCRP standard, our viewer will receive about SSOmr of radiation in a year. Of
course, such a viewer would obviously represent a very small portion of
the population. Most people presumably watch from a distance of at
least three feet, so the dosages received should be much smaller on the
average than that incurred ,by our hypothetical viewer. Thus, the standard at 5 em is set on the assumption that dosages at greater distances
would be safe.
Nevertheless, It is interesting (if not frightening) to note that in one
experiment in which a General Electric color television was operated
with a defective high-voltage shunt regulator tube (but otherwise under
normal conditions), the following X-ray emission levels were measured:
1. 640 mr/ hr at a distance of 331;2 inches (85 em.) below the
anode of the shunt regulator tube, after passing through a simulated
apartment floor and ceiling, and
2. 83,200 mr/hr at the surface of the floor, 12114 inches (31 em.)
below the tube anode.
3. Calculations show that the exposure rate near the underside
of the receiver at the ventilating louvers would be at least 800,000
mr/ hr, 4 inches (10 em.) below the tube anode.15

This last figure indicates an exposure of a whopping 800 roentgens
per hour! A dose of from 450 to 600 roentgens to the whole body will in
most cases cause serious injury or death within a few weeks, if the exposure was received within a short period of time! 6 Symptoms such as
nausea and vomiting usually occur within 24 hours. These may be followed by a feeling of well-being lasting a few days, then severe prostration, diarrhea, fever, loss of hair, and tachycardia (rapid heartbeat)
which may last for weeks.
Even if the person recovers, new symptoms (such as cancer) may
occur at a later date! 7 Transient effects would occur with much lower
8
doses of SO to 100 roentgens delivered within a short period of time~
Chronic low dosage over a long period of time, such as one might
receive from a television receiver, produces less dramatic results! 9
·
IS. 1967 Senate H earings. supra note 1, at 189. 198-200.
16. A. MELISSINOS, EXPERIMENTS IN MODERN PHYSICS at 147 (1966).
17. See G. HUTTON. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ON IONIZING RADIATION at 26 (1966).
18. /d. at 27.
19. Chronic low radiation dosages may produce unusu ally dry skin, chapping, loss ·of hair,
warts. slow healing of skin injuries, brittle fin gernails, blurred or blunted fingerprints, cataracts ?f
the eye, sterility, changes in blood composition (the most common being leukemia), and genetic
defects. /d. at 27, 28.
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Under certain conditions, a clear relationship has been demonstrated between leukemia and prior radiation exposure. For example,
leukemia has occurred after acute exposures of 100 to 500 roentgens to
the whole body; after acute doses, possibly as low as 2 to 5 roentgens, to
the fetus; and after doses greater than 100 roentgens to the neck region
of children:0
The biological inheritance mechanism is probably the most sensitive
to radiation because human genes are affected by almost any radiation
that reaches the reproductive cells, causing mutations which are passed
onto succeeding generations. Because all of us are subjected to natural
background radiation, an unavoidable number of so-called "spontaneous" mutations occur continually. Anything that adds radiation
above this background level, though, may be considered genetically
harmful. There is no minimum level of exposure which must be exceeded before some damage will result. Any amount of radiation that
reaches the reproductive cells can cause a corresponding number of
mutations; the more radiation the more mutations~' Moreover, the
effects of radiation are cumulative, and the amount of organic damage
continues to build up as more radiation is received.
Taking the population as a whole, a little radiation to a lot ofpeople
over a long time span can be considered more harmful than a lot of
radiation to a few. While the total number of mutant genes may be the
same in both cases, they are more likely to survive and affect future
generations in the former. This is because a lot of radiation may either
kill directly those exposed, or it may cause such serious mutations that
their offspring will not survive, and hence the mutant inheritance line
will quickly die out.22
It is certainly possible that some individuals could receive dangerously large doses of X-radiati<;>n from television sets. Suppose, for example, that a child sleeps in the upper bunk of a bunk bed, and· that a
color set with a defective high-voltage shunt regulator tube is located
directly above on the next floor. If the child goes to bed at 8:00 p.m.
and the television is operated nightly between 8:00 and 11:00 p.m., it is
conceivable, from the results of the experiment cited above, that the
child would be exposed to almost 2 roentgens in a single evening. This
would amount to over 700 roentgens in the course of a year. Remember
that the recognized health standard is set at a maximum exposure of
20. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1, at 375.
21. The average exposure to the gonads over a thirty year period would be about 4.3 r from
background radiation, 3 r from medical X-rays and tluroscopy, and O.J r from the residual radiation from nuclear weapons tests. The average dental X-ray causes an exposure to the gonads of
about 1/ 5,000 r. See id. at 381.
22. /d. at 380, 381.
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only 500 mil/iroentgens, or only one-half of a roentgen per year. The·
sleeping child has thus been exposed to 1,400 times the amount of radiation which is considered safe.
Nonetheless, it has been argued by a number of independent experts
that no hazard exists with radiation from color TV sets. For example,
Dr. Hanson Blatt, director of Radiological Control, New York City
Health Department, in April of 1969 stated:
... X-radiation is 'trivial' from color TV sets ... ; ... field testing of
color TV sets for X-radiation would make about as much sense as
pulling the Beligian stone blocks out of certain roads in the Bronx.
[These blocks] emit 25 millirontge12s [sic] [of radiation] per year.23

These remarks are typically conclusory. No analysis to support the conclusion is provided. (One might hote that radiation of 25 mr/year corresponds to approximately 0.003 mr/hour, a rate hardly comparable to
the 0.5 mr/hr NCRP standard.)
In 1968 Dr. V.P. Bond, Associate Director of the Brookhaven
National Laboratory, had this to say:
... [W]hile it is prudent to control and severely limit exposure to radiation, . .. it is quite clear that the probability of significant or even
detectable medical effects from X-rays emitted by faulty color television receivers is vanishingly smalJ.24

Dr. Robert D. Mosely, Jr., of the University of Chicago, also observed:
... [T]he biological risk of radiation from color television receivers is
negligible . .. [B]ecause the quality of this radiation is such that it is
absorbed in the first few millimeters of the skin and therefore is
markedly or completely attenuated before it reaches the depth of the
critical organs [gonads and bone marrowV5

It thus appears that some experts do not agree that television sets
present a potential radiation hazard, and they seem quite willing to
adopt a "wait and see" approach, or discount the matter entirely. But
it has been established that X-radiation is potentially dangerous to
health, and it seems reasonable to assume that X-radiation from TV
23. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 282.
24. Excerpt from a letter dated February 20, 1968, written by Dr. V.P. Bond, Associate Direc·
tor. Brookhaven National Laboratory, reproduced in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at. 678.
25. Excerpt from a letter dated May 3, 1968, written by Dr. Robert D. Mosely, Jr. , Professor
and Chairman of the Department of Radiology, University of Chicago, reproduced in 1968 Senate
Hearings. supra note 8, at 680.
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sets may present some hazard. It seems foolhardy then, to adopt such
an attitude when the consequences may be so grave, and while the solu·
tion may be quite simple.
II.

RADIATION CONTROL FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT
OF 1968

Subsequent to the General Electric episode in 1966, a study was
conducted by the Suffolk County Department of Health in New York~6
This study, conducted in 1967, surveyed approximately 5,000 color television sets, and found that 20% of these were emitting radiation in excess of the 0.5 mr/hr standard established by the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements. The study was widely publicized, and it quickly aroused the interest of the Federal Government.
The first bill submitted to Congress concerning this problem was introduced on July 10, 1967 by Senator Bartlett of Alaska~ Subsequently
two other bills were introduced, one in each House.28
A series of hearings. was conducted in both the House and the Senate.Z9 Testimony was heard from members of the Federal, state, and
local governments, the scientific community, the electronics industry,
professional trade associations, labor unions, and from other individuals. The purpose of the hearings, in the words of Senator Bartlett,
was to
7

. .. gain an overview of the wide and growing range of devices which
utilize or give off ionizing or other types of radiation, to learn what
health hazards might be involved, and to devise an effective program
for surveillance and control:W
On October 18, 1968, Congress enacted the Radiation Control for
Health and Safety Act of 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)? 1
A.

PROVISIONS OF THE A'CT

The declared purpose of the Act is to insure " ... that the public
health and safety . . . be protected from the dangers of electronic product radiation." 32
26. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 276.
27. S. 2067, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
28. S. 3211, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 10790, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (1967) . .
29. 1967 S enate H earings. supra note 1; 1968 Senate Heanngs. supra note 8; Heanngs on H .R.
10790 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House C?mm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. , 1st Sess., (1967); 1968 Supplem ental H eanngs, supra note 11.
30. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1.
31. The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1%8, Pub. L. No. 90-602; 82 Stat. 1173
(1 %8); cod ified at 42 U.S.C. !;\263b et seq.
32. 42 u.s.c. § 263b (1971).
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The Act defines an "electronic product" as:
(A) any manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and (ii) emits
(or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit)
electronic product radiation, or
(B) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for
use as a component, part, or accessory of a product described in
clause (A) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of
effective shielding or other controls would emit) such rad iation? 3
This definition clearly includes not only television receivers, microwave ovens, and X-ray machines used in medicine and science, but
would also encompass all products which might purposefully or incidently emit radiation, including those which may be introduced in the
future.
"Electronic product radiation" is defined as "any ionizing or nonionizing electromagnetic or particulate radiation" and as "any sonic,
infrasonic or ultrasonic radiation . . . . " 34
The Act directs the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) to establish and carry out an
electronic product radiation control program . Under this program, the
Secretary is to "plan, conduct, coordinate, and support research, development, tra ining and operational activities to minimize the emissions
of ... unn ecessary electronic product radiation ... " 35
In hearings before the House Subcommitte on Public Health and
Welare, which was considering the administration of t he Act, the Director of the Bureau of Radiological Health reported on the Bureau's "XRadi ation Control Programs in the Color Television Industry." 36 This
report states that under the program's objectives, factory visits by
Burea u staff members gave them the opportunity to " . .. review efforts
being made in the design of current and future models of receivers for
the reduction of X-ray emissions .. . [and] to review servicing procedures
recommend ed by the manufacturer for receivers currently on the market .... " 37During these hearings several witnesses were questioned about
the possibilities of developing "fail-safe" systems to prevent dangerous
component malfunctions and of eliminating any need for repairmen to
8
"adjust" the high voltage circuits in television receivers: It is apparent
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

42 U.S.C. § 263c(2) (1 97 1).
42 U.S.C. § 263c(l) (1971); See Glossary, Append ix Two.
42 U.S.C. § 263d(a)(2) (1971).
1969 Hous e Hearings. supra note 14, at 23.
/d. at 25.
/d. at 286-289.
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that these legislators considered component failures and shoddy repair
practices to be major causes of hazardous television emissions. It is
thus also apparent that the Act was intended to encompass these problems.
Under the Act, the Secretary is also required to report to Congress
the results of various studies conducted from time to time as he may
find necessary, with recommendations for appropriate legislation~ 9 The
Secretary is also required to conduct studies into the feasibility of entering
. .. into arrangements with individual States or groups of States to
define their respective functions and responsibilities for the control
of electronic product radiation and other ionizing radiation .. . . 40
Furthermore, the Secretary is to prescribe radiation level "performance standards" for electronic products (presumably on a product-byproduct basis) when deemed necessary for the protection of public
health and safety (the first such standard was to be set prior to January
1' 1970).41
Electronic products intended solely for export are exempted from
such performance standards so long as they meet the standards--if
any--of the importing country.42
The Act also provides for the judicial review of the performance
standards imposed in the case of an "actual controversy." 43
Every electronic product marketed in the United States which is
subject to such a performance standard must bear a written certification that it conforms to that standard. This certification by the manufacturer must be based on either (1) a test of the individual item, or (2)
a testing program " ... which ,is in accord with good manufac~uring
practice and which hasjnotjbeenjdisapprovedjbyJthe JSecretary . . . .'' 44 1The
obvious purpose of such certification is to insure that no television receiver or other product is sold which emits radiation in excess of the
prescribed standard.

39. 42 U.S.C. § 263e{a) {1971).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 263e{a){1){F) {1971).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(a){1) {1971). These pe~form a nce standards are to be imposed .in the form of
Federal Regulations, and they may be found m 42.C.F.R. § 78 et seq .. The Act requtres the Secretary to appoint a 15 member "Technical Electrontc Product Safety Standards Committee" and to
consult this Committee before prescribing any new performance standards. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(f).
This Committee is to be composed of five m~mbe rs from each of; 1) governmental agencies, 2) the
electronics industry, and 3) the general publtc. /d.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(a){3) {1971).
43. 42 u.s.c. § 263f(d){l) {1971).
44_ 42 u.s.c. § 263f{h) {1971).
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In the event that a manufacturer discovers a radiation defect in a
product after it leaves his possession, which defect would indicate noncompliance with the performance standard, he is required to notify
immediately the Secretary of such, as well as any distributor, dealer, or
consumer to whom the product has been delivered~ However, the Secretary may exempt the manufacturer from his duty to notify distributors, dealers, and consumers if the defect is deemed not to create a
"significant" risk of injury to any person~6 Of course, the Secretary may
determine from his own investigation that certain products do not meet
the established standards.
Failure to comply with these provisions may subject the manufacturer to several liabilities:17 For one thing, he is required to correct or
replace, at his own expense, any items sold which do not conform to the
performance standards~ 8 This would not apply, however, with respect to
products manufactured prior to the effecitve date of the Act. 49
All imported products are subject to the same performance standards as are domestic products, and must likewise bear a certification
of compliance.50 Nonconforming products can be denied entry into the
United States.
1
Furthermore, it is unlawful to violate any provision of the Ace and
offenders are subject to a civil penalty of not . more than $1,000 per
violation, the maximum penalty being $300,000 for a series of related
5

45. 42 u.s.c. § 263g (1971).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(aXI) (1971).
47. In theory at least, the manufacturer of an electronic product that emits harmful radiation
could be held civilly liable in tort for any injury caused to a user of the product. Depending on the
jurisdiction in which such an action is brought, the manufacturer might be sued on theories of
strict liability for defective product (see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2d, § 402 A), negligence,
breach of warranty, or, if the product failed to conform to a performance standard applicable to
it, negligence per se. See generally PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 19, at 658-696 (3d Ed.,
1964). Whatever theory is used, however, the injured party will have to show some causal link between the radiation defect in the product and the physical harm suffered. In that the effects of
chronic low-level exposures to radiation are typically long range, and may not manifest themselves
for years, the aggrieved party will bear an almost impossible burden in showing that his injury was
caused by this product, and not by some other source of radiation. Moreover, he will likely have to
show that the radiation defect existed in the product at the time it left the manufacturer's possession. The manufacturer will surely argue that the radiation was caused by a component that just
"wore out", or by improper servicing of the product.
In short, it seems unlikely that the manufacturer would be exposed to civil liability as a practical matter. As will be seen shortly, though, the manufacturer may well be subject to civil pernalties
imposed by the Act.
48. 42 u.s.c. § 263g(O (1971);
49. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(g) (1971). While the Act became effective on October 18, 1968, (the date of
its enactment), the Secretary did not begin prescribing performance standards until later. (The
first set of standards were published on Dec. 25, 1969; 34 Fed. Reg. 20274.) Items manufactured
after the effective date of the Act, but prior to the prescription of the performance standard applicable to it, would obviously not have to conform to such standard.
so. 42 u.s.c. § 263h (1971).
51. 42 u.s.c. § 263j (1971).
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violations~ Moreover, it does not appear that a violation must have been
2

committed willfully or intentionally; ,the offender may be held strictly
accountable for his conduct. Finally, the Federal District Courts are
authorized to issue injunctions to restrain the distribution or sale of
products which do not conform to the applicable performance
standards.53
Mention should also be made of one other potentially significant
provision of the Act. As will be discussed below, the effective control of
electronic product radiation may depend largely on state involvement.
While the Act expressly precludes states from promulgating their own
performance standards,54 it does authorize the Secretary
to accept from State and local authorities engaged in activities
related to health or safety or consumer protection ... any assistance
in the administration and enforcement of this (Act) which he may
request and which they may be able and willing to provide ....55
In short, the Act establishes a broad basis for Federal -State cooperation.
B.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT

The Act states its basic purpose as being, in broad terms, to protect
the public health and safety from the dangers of electronic product
radiation.56 In order to assess the effectiveness of the Act in achieving
this purpose, particularly with respect to television receivers, it may be
helpful to discuss its provisions in terms of specific objectives.
From the material presented above, the major objectives of the Act
might be restated as being:
1. to establish reasonable and safe standards for the maximum
allowable radiation from electronic products;
2. to prevent the sale or distribution in this Country, by domestic
or foreign manufacturers, of electronic products that emit radiation in
excess of the established standards;

52. 42 u.s.c. § 263k(b)(I)(I97J).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 263k(a) (1971).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 263n (1971). The sta tes are allowed to in;p<?se their own performance standards,
but only if such are idelltical to the Federal standards ..It ts Important to note, however, that the
setting of performance standards is the only ~atter whtch Congress has expressly sought to pre·
empt. Obstensibly, then, the states are left free to regulate other matters concerning electronic
product radiation; e.g., repair practices.
55. 42 U.S.C. §263m (1971).
56. Note 32, supra.
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3. to prevent electronic products in use by consumers from radiating in excess of the standards as the result of componant malfunction;
and
4. to prevent electronic products in use by consumers from radiating in excess of the standard as the result of improper repairs performed on such products.
C.

'THE EXPECTED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT

1. The First Objective
Presumably, the first objective is being accomplished by the Secretary's promulgation of performance standards for the various types of
electronic products covered by the Act.57 The standard which has been
applied to television receivers is the same as was recommended by the
NCRP in 1959; 0.5 mr per hour at 5 em from any surface of the receiver.58 Apparently this standard was generally considered to be adequate
at the time the Act was passed.59 However, evidence was introduced
during the hearings on the Act which indicated that any given television
receiver could be "corrected" in the home so that the radiation emitted
by the set would be indistinguishable from the natural background
radiation .60
It might, then, be argued that while the NCRP standard is generally·
accepted as a reasonable safety limit, it is still too high because it may
be possible to eliminate virtually all X-radiation from television sets.
Moreover, since the corrections could be made in the home, industry
would seem hard-pressed in any efforts to resist a "no-more-than-blackground" standard at the time a set leaves the factory, and it would
hardly be unreasonable to impose such a standard.

57. The performance standards are published in the Code of Federal Regulations; see 42 C.F.R.
§ 78.210 et. seq.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 78.210(c) (1972).
59. During the course of the hearings on the Act the NCRP standard was discussed on numerous occasions. For the most part, comments critical of the standard tended to indicate that it is, if
anything, too stringent. See, e.g., letter by Dr. V.P. Bond, supra note 24, and 1968 Senate Hearings. supra note 8, at 670. It was apparently never suggested that this standard is inadequate as a
measure of safety, although Ralph Nader did hint that the NCRP standard pertaining to X-ray
machines might be weak. !d. at 736.
60. In hearings before the House Subcommitte on Public Health and Welfare, Mr. Seymour
Becker, Chief of the Radiation Control Unit of the Suffolk County (New York) Department of
Health, discussed a door-to-door testing program conducted by his Unit. Home televisions were
tested for excessive radiation and, when one was found to emit X-rays, a repairman was ca ll ed in
to correct the set. Mr. Becker testified that:
. .. when correcting the thousand sets, of that 5,000 that we surveyed, we were able
to bring the levels of radiation down to natural background radiation . In other
words, we didn't bring it down to 0.5 mr/ hr; we brought it down even furth er.
/969 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 277, 278.
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It should also be noted that, while the Act speaks generally about
protection of the public from the dangers of electronic product radiation, it also speaks about minimizing the exposure of people to "unnecessary electronic product radiation." 61This language seems to reflect the
testimony of several witnesses at the hearings who suggested that any
unnecessary exposure to radiation should be prevented.62 It is at least
arguable, then, that Congress intended the Secretary to prescribe performance standards which would prohibit any electronic product radiation that is deemed to be "unnecessary", even though such is not likely
to be hazardous. Assuming this to have been the case, the first objective
of the Act can then be interpreted to mean that (1) if all radiation cannot be (practicably) eliminated from a product, the amount radiated
must be non-hazardous; and (2) if all the radiation from a product can
be eliminated (or reduced to the level of background radiation), any
detectable amount of radiation emitted by the product is therefore "unnecessary" and should not be allowed.

Under this interpretation , the first objective, as it applies to television sets, may not have been achieved . If the evidence referred to above
(at note 59) is accepted as being true, it is apparent that the performance standard presently in effect for televisions does permit the marketing of sets which emit "unnecessary" radiation, because such radiation can be easily eliminated.
2. The Second Objective
Presumably the second objective of the Act has also been accomplished. As mentioned before, the Act requires that every electronic
product manufactured for sale in this County bear a label or tag certi fying that it conforms to the established standard ~ The basis of such
certification is, again, either the individual testing of each item produced, or" ... a testing program which is in accord with good manufac"64
.
.
t urmg practtce ....
In reviewing the testimony given during the hearings on the Act
concerning the problem of assuring that each item sold meets the standard, it is difficult not to conclude that the legislators gave too little
attention to this problem, and that the witnesses (usually representing
3

61. 42 U.S.C. § 263d(a)(2) (1971). (emphasis added)
62. See. e.g .. language quoted in the text at notes 1 and 3, supra.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 263flh) (1971); See also the corresponding regulations at 42 C.F.R. § 78.201
(1972).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 263flh) (1971); Note, as mentioned above at notes 27 and 28, three bills were
submitted to Congress during 1967 and 1968 ~m the prob_le~ <;Jf elec_tromc product radiation . One
of these. S. 32 11, would have requi red the testm& of eac~ mdtvtdualttem manufactured which was
subject to a performance standard . No alternative tes~mg program would have been authorized.
(The text of S. 3211 is reproduced in 1968 Se!wte Hearmgs. supra note 8, at 410-417. The relevant
provision is§ 357 (e), id. at 412). The Btll ultun ately enacted was H.R. 10790.
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industry) made little effort to explain the problem clearly. For example,
prior to the promulgation of the standards (but after the Act had been
passed), the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare held
hearings on the administration of the Act.65 Testifying on the methods
by which manufacturers would make certain that all items produced in
an assembly line meet the standards, Mr. Edward Day, a lawyer representing the industry, described the "quality control procedure" used by
manufacturers as a
... random sampling, ... by established scientific methods ... whereby what has been determined to be a proper and adequate sample is
withdrawn at the end of the manufacturing process and is checked
very thoroughly ... .66
This seemed to imply that a random sampling will suffice to insure that
all items from a production line will be within the standard.
The Subcommittee seemed to accept the sufficiency of "quality control testing" of the end product as portrayed by Mr. Day, in spite of the
fact that this method was criticized in a written report submitted to the
Subcommittee by the Bureau of Radiological Health earlier in the hearing.67 No one raised this point in oral testimony before the Subcommittee.
It is submitted that the concept of quality control techniques as
presented is less than completely clear. As a rule, random sampling
techniques are not applied to assembled functional units (i.e., units that
consist of many parts and are at a stage of assembly at which they can
be operated).68 Generally, random sampling techniques are applied only
to component parts as a means of increasing the likelihood that, upon
assembly, the functional unit (into which the parts are installed) will
operate satisfactorily for a predetermined period of time.69 It is clear,
however, that if it is intended that none of the assembled television receivers radiate in excess of the standard, this goal should be considered
as part of the operating criteria of the television receiver, and each set
should thus be tested for radiation, just as each set is tested to see if the
volume control, picture tube, etc., operate properly. Otherwise, the certification means no more than that within a certain probability a given
television receiver conforms to the standard.
65. 1969 House H ea rings. supra note 14.
66. /d. at 290.
67. /d. at 30.
68. Mil -H-2 17, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. MILITARY STANDARDIZATION HANDBOOK, RELIABILITY STRESS AND FAILURE RATE DATA FOR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. at I (1962).
.
69. /d.
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One might argue that the civil penalty imposed for selling a set not
in conformance with the standard wii.I deter manufacturers from selling
such receivers?0 However, it might be suggested that as the testing procedures used by a manufacturer must be approved by the Secretary (or
at least "not disapproved")/ 1 the manufacturer may argue that nonculpability in a given case may be established by this governmental
'~approval".

Thus it is possible that a manufacturer could employ an "approved "
system of random sample testing which might insulate him from civil
penalties, yet might nonetheless result in the production and sale of
products which do not conform to the established standard. To this
extent, then, the second objective is not achieved , in that potentially
dangerous items could conceivably still be marketed.
3. The Third and Fourth Objectives
The third and fourth objectives of the Act, eliminating radiation in
excess of the standard resulting from component failure and from the
improper repair of television receivers, will be quite difficult to achieve
because these objectives are inherently tied to the regulation of the repair industry. The Act itself has no provision pertaining to these problems. However, the radiation control programs required under the Act
(undertaken by the Bureau of Radiological Health) do address themselves to the problem of television repair.72 So far these programs have
taken the approach that the manufacturer is responsible for the general
service practices employed in repairing his product. The tendency has
been to assume that the manufacturer, by controlling the design of the
product and by disseminating the information needed by repairmen,
can in effect control the activities of the repair industry.73
On the other hand, perhaps the nature of the problem was not fully
perceived by those conducting the hearings, and the witnesses may have
been willing to allow the legislators to proceed on skimpy knowledge. In
discussing the omission of variable resistors from high-voltage circuits
as a means of preventing television repairmen from adjusting the voltage above the design limits (and thereby increasing radiation from the
70. See text at note 52, supra.
71. 42 u.s.c. § 263f(h) (1971).
72. Such programs are required under Section 356 of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 263d), and are to be
undertaken by th e Secretary of Hea lth, Education, and Welfare: In initiating su~h programs , the
Bureau of Radiological Health (an agency of the Department of Health, EducatiOn and Welfare)
set out a number of objectives, one of which was to " .. . (6) review servicing procedures recom mended by the manufacturer for receivers currently on the market, ... ." 1969 House Hearings.
supra note 14, at 25.
73. See, X-RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM IN THE COLOR TELEVISION INDUSTRY-SUMMARY REPORT ON VISITS TO MANUFACTURERS, MAY 1968- DECEMBER
1968, 1969 House H earings. supra note 14, at 30-32 ("Observations" ).
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set), the Committe members seemed to accept the notion that by simply
eliminating the variable resistors the problem would be solved.74 They
seemed to miss the significance of a brief statement made by an industry representative to the effect that any repairman could easily replace a
fixed resistor in order to change the voltage to the picture tube? 5 In fact,
a television serviceman can, and may actually, replace almost any component of a receiver and thereby alter its preformance characteristics.
It should be noted in this connection that the 24,000,000 color television sets produced prior to 1970 76 are not subject to the performance
standards promulgated by the Secretary.77 Moreover, it is very likely that
many of these have by now seen numerous repairs. It cannot be overemphasized that the repair of television sets, especially those not manufactured under the requirements of the Act, should be closely regulated.
The problem, of course, is how to regulate such repairs effectively.
As has been seen, the regulation of television manufacturers may have
little effect in most cases on repair activities. The apparent solution,
then, wou ld seem to be the regulation of the repair industry itself.
Unlike the manufacturers, however, repairmen are not to be found in a
few central locations where they can easily be watched over and communicated with. Instead, they are well dispersed throughout the entire
Country and, as such, are not particularly good subjects for a nationally
centralized regulatory program. As will be seen, however, the solution
to this problem may be found at the state level of government.
With respect to the problem of component malfunctions, similar
considerations are involved. Unless a component is defective when it
leaves the factory, it would seem that the repairman is in the best position to recognize and replace a part that has gone bad. Again, this suggests some form of regulation of the repair industry. This notion will be
further developed in the following sections.
III.

CALIFORNIA LAWS RELATING TO RADIATION AND
ELECTRONIC REPAIR DEALERS 78
The foregoing material provides compelling reasons for concluding

that the Act, in order to be effective, must be supplemented by programs at the state level. Congress recognized this and provided that the
74. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 286, 287.
75. /d. at 287. line 9. It should be pointed out that, by increasi ng the voltage to the picture tube,
a better quality picture can often be ac hieved. Thus , repairmen may be inclined to perform such
adjustments, rather than telling their customers that they need a new picture tube.
76. See text at note 5, supra.
77. 42 C.F.R. § 78.210 (a) (1972).
78. The laws of this State wi ll be exami ned in order to depict the desired role of every state in
helping to achieve the Federal objectives.
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Federal agency administering the Act can accept assistance from state
and local agencies in its administration and enforcement?9 Moreover,
the studies required under the Act are to give attention to the feasibility
of authorizing the Secretary
. .. to enter into arrangements with individual states or groups of
states to define their respective functions and responsibilities for the
control of electronic product radiation ... .so
Such agreements are not only authorized, but in a sense are also required by the Act.
California has enacted two laws, both of which touch upon the areas
covered by the Act. However, in their present form, these laws do not
complement this Federal law.
In 1961, California enacted the Radiation Control Law,81 which was
intended to supplement the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.82 Then in
1963, California passed the Electronic Repair Dealer Registration LaJ3
which was designed to regulate business practices in the electronic
repair industry.
A. The Radiation Control Law
The Radiation Control Law basically provides for a regulatory program to control ionizing radiation. The purpose of the Radiation Control Law is to create _progr~ms that:
(a) Effectively regulate sources of ionizing radiation for the protection
of the occupational and public health and safety.
(b) Promote an orderly regulatory pattern within the State, among
the states, and between the Federal government and the State, and
facilitate inter-governmental co-operation with respect to use and
regulation of sources of ionizing radiation to the end that duplication
of regulation may be minimized .
(c) Establish procedures for assumption and performance of certain
regulatory responsibilities with respect to byproduct, source, and
special nuclear materials.
(d) Permit maximum utilization of sources of ionizing radiation consistent with the health and safety of the public.84
Ionizing radiation is defined by this law as meaning " ... gamma
rays and X-rays; alpha and beta particles, high-speed electrons,
79.
80.
8 1.
82.
83.
84.

See notes 40 and 55, supra, and accompanying text.
Note 40, supra.
Cal. Stats. 1961. c. 17 11; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25800 etseq. (West 1967).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25802 (West 1967), and§ 25856 (West Supp. 1973).
Cal. Stats. 1963, c. 1492; CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE§ 9800 et seq. (West 1964).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25802 (West 1967).
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neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles; but not sound or radio
waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light." 85 A spearate definition of
non -ionizing radiation is not provided, nor is there any provision for its
regulation.
The administration of this law is assigned to the State Department
of Health and Safety 86 (hereinafter referred to as the Department). Note
that subsections (b) and (c). of the above quoted provision indicate that
the State should engage in co-operative programs with other states and
the Federal Government, and assume certain regulatory responsibilities which might be delegated to it by the Federal Government. It is
,provided that the Governor has the authority to enter into such agreements with Federal agencies, but the agreements must be ratified by
law.87 The Department is also authorized to agree with the Federal
Government, as well as with other states and interstate agencies, to develop co-operative programs of inspection (of potential sources of radiation).88 At the present time this law contains the provisions of an agreement between California and the Atomic Energy Commission under
which certain regulatory functions of the AEC are taken over by the
State.89
The Radiation Control Law further authorizes the institution of
training programs by the Department or other State agencies, in order
to secure qualified personnel to carry out the provisions of the law.
Such trained personnel may be made available for use by the Federal
Government, other states, or interstate agencies?<> The significance of
this will be discussed in a later section.
A number of rules are imposed by the Radiation Control Law for
regulating sources of ionizing radiation. For the purposes of this discussion, though, these rules need not be considered in detail. It is important to note, however, that this law pertains only to ionizing radiation .
Since X-rays produced by television receivers are a form of ionizing
radiation, it is possible that this law would apply to such products if it
were to be construed along certain lines.91 It would not apply, however,
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25805(b) (West Supp. 1973); See Glossary, Appendix
Two.
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25810, 25811 (West Supp. 1973).
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25830 (West 1967).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25835 (West 1967).
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25875,25876 (West 1967).
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25836 (West 1967).
91. As mentioned previously in the text at note 82, supra, this law was intended to supplement
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This would seem to indicate that its primary intended purpose
was to control ionizing radiation produced by radioactive materials. This mi~ht explain in part
why sources of non -ionizing radiation are not covered . In any event, no mention of televisions is
made in this law (although this may be due to the fact that the problem of television emissions was
not recognized until a few years after this law was enacted), but the law's reference to the "sources"
of ionizing radiation does seem broad enough to include television sets.
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to many potentially hazardous sources of non-ionizing radiation, such
as microwave ovens,92 for example. It might be interesting to recall that
the Federal Act does purport to regulate sources of non-ionizing radiation?3
It will be suggested below how a state law, similar to California's
Radiation Control Law, might be amended so as to provide more effective protection from hazardous radiation, and thereby also help to
achieve the objectives of the Federal Act.
B. Th e Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law
The Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law was enacted primarily for the purpose of regulating business practices in the repair industry. Under this law, a repair or "service dealer" is defined as any
... person who, for compensation, engages in the business of repairing, servicing, or maintaining television, radio, or audio or video
recorders or playback equipment normally used or sold for use in the
home or in private motor vehicles. 94
The administration and enforcement of this law is assigned to the
Director of the Bureau of Repair Services (hereinafter referred to respectively as the Director and the Bureau), which is itself within the
California Department of Consumer Affairs.95
The Director is vested with the authority to establish regulations for
the conduct of service dealers, for the administration of the law, and for
the general protection of the public from improper business practices?<'
The Director is also required to prepare an annual roster of all registered service dealers. Copies of this roster are to be made available to
the public?7 Every service dealer in the State is required to register with
the Bureau;8 and a failure to do so may be punished as a misdemeanor;'l
The Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law makes no provision
for regulating repair practices which might affect a given product's
capability of emitting harmful radiation. The possibility of amending
this law to cover such problems will be discussed below.

92. See Microwave Ovens: Not R ecommended, CONSUMER'S REPORTS, April 1973, at 221.
93. See the definition of "electronic product radiation" used by the Federal Act, in the text at
note 34. supra.
94. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 980l(g) (West Supp. 1973); Note: effective June 30, 1973,
this provision will also include persons who repair, etc. "any appliances". Cal. Stats. 1972, c. 1288,
p. . § 2.5.
95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9810 (West Supp. 1973).
96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9814 (West 1964).
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9815 (West 1964).
98. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9830 (West Supp. 1973).
99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§§ 9840, 9850 (West 1964).
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IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE LAWS
State laws similar to the two described above could very likely provide a suitable basis for extending the purpose and effect of the Federal
Act. Under California's Radiation Control Law, the State Department
of Public Health should by now have achieved some expertise in evaluating radiation hazards; and under the Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law, repair practices have been brought under direct State control. Appendix One to this comment contains proposals for amending
these laws so that they will conform to and supplement the Federal Act,
and help to accomplish the objectives of protecting the public from
electronic product radiation resulting from faulty components and improper repair practices. These laws, as they appear in their proposed
forms, might serve as models for other states which presently have no
similar legislation.
Under the proposed amendments, electronic product radiation, as
defined in the Federal Act, would be brought under the control of the
State Public Health Department. The Department would be required to
establish programs, possibly in co-operation with the State Bureau of
Electronic Repair Dealer Registration, for the regu lation of electronic
product radiation. Such programs should, following the precepts of the
Federal Act, include the promulgation of rules or regulations to be
observed by electronic repair dealers in servicing electronic products
capable of emitting radiation. The program should also include the
compilation and dissemination of information regarding potentially
hazardous or defective components available on the market or already
in use by consumers.
The adopted rules or regulations could be published and enforced
by the Bureau of Electronic Repair Dealer Registration. In the repair of
television sets, for example, repairmen could be required to:
1. Check the high-voltage, and if necessary adjust or reset it to its
prescribed level;

2. Check certain components (such as the high-voltage shunt regulator and rectifier tubes) to assure that any parts known to be hazardous, as indicated by manufacturers' bulletins and those of the State
Department of Public Health or of the Federal Government, are immediately replaced (at manufacturer's cost, as required by the Federal Act)
with non-hazardous components; and
3. Check that all shielding on the set is in place as required by
the manufacturer.
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The program would also include the establishment of facilities and
procedures for assuring that the equipment used by electronic repair
dealers is properly maintained and calibrated.
Such a scheme, properly administered, could easily result in the
effective reduction of radiation hazards in electronic products resulting
from component failures, or from improper repairs of these products.
It should be noted that under the Federal Act, the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare is allowed to make grants to public
agencies in order to " . . . plan, conduct, coordinate, and support ... "
the training of personnel, and to "develop, test, and evaluate the effec.tiveness of procedures and techniques for minimizing the exposure to
electronic product radiation .... "HXlJn 1971, $1,200,000 were allocated
under twenty-four grants for the training of 120 specialists and 110
technicians in the field of electronic product radiation! 01 Funding requests for the fiscal year 1972 were at the same Ievel.102
In implementing the type of program discussed above, a state might
well obtain a substantial grant from the Federal Government. It might
be recalled that California has already laid the foundation for the insti103
tution of personnel training programs and other programs for the detection and control of certain radiation hazards.l 04 If the proposed
amendments were to be adopted by this State, the acquisition of a Federal grant would certainly help to defray the additional expenses involved in expanding these programs to conform to the new provisions.

CONCLUSION
The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 attempts
to eliminate public exposure to unnecessary radiation, establishes performance standards for maximum emission of radiation by electronic
products, attempts to prevent 'the sale in this country of electronic products that emit radiation in excess of these standards, and also attempts
to prevent the emission of radiation in excess of these standards by
electronic products as a result of component failure or improper repair
of the product.
The performance standard established under the Act for television
sets, 0.5 mr per hour at 5 em, is detectable above the background
radiation. Since virtually all radiation can be eliminated this represents
v.

.100.
101.
tions,
102.
103.
104.

42 u.s.c. § 263d(b)(2) 0971).
.
.
Hearings on H .R. /0061 Before a Subcommttlee of the Senate Committee
92nd Cong .. 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 3440 0971).
!d.
S ee text at note 90, supra.
See text at note 84, supra.
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unnecessary radiation, and it can therefore be argued that the existing
standard does not meet the objectives of the Act. The standard should
be: no radiation detectable above the background level.
To prevent the sale in this country of products that emit radiation ·
in excess of the standards, manufacturers are to certify that each unit
produced meets the existing standard for the particular product. However, under the Act; certification may be based on a testing program
that ultimately involves testing only a predetermined portion of all the
units produced. Such testing programs can, at best, assure only that a
certain (presumably small) percent of the units sold will fail to meet the
standard. Testing of each unit is not an unreasonable requirement. It
can be argued that by not testing each unit, some units will be sold that
do not meet the standards, and thus the objectives of the Act are not
met. The Act should require the testing of every unit manufactured.
It is admittedly difficult to regulate the electronic repair industry at
the national level. While the Act attempts to eliminate electronic product radiation that might occur after a product is sold, it contains no
specific provisions for regulation of the electronic repair ind ustry. The
Act does, however, provide for programs to control electronic product
radiation through joint Federal, state, and local efforts. In a sense the
Act requires such programs, although it does not, of course, purport to
compel state legislation. Clearly there is a need, though, to establish
more controls through state legislation coupled specifically to the provisions of the Act.
The amendments to the California laws proposed in Appendix One
present a feasible means of establishing more effective controls. Under
these amendments, two State agencies already in existence would be
able to control the practices of the electronic repair industry as they
relate to electronic product radiation.
Revising the Federal Act and establishing state laws (as suggested
by the proposed California amendments) would provide the greatest
possible measure of assurance to consumers that their homes will be
free from unnecessary radiation.
- J. J. CHAVEZ
- J. C. PIERSON
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APPENDIX ONE

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA RADIATION
CONTROL LAW*
Section 25801 should be amended as follows:
Sect. 25801. Policy. It is the policy of the State of California, in furtherance
of its responsibility to protect the public health and safety, to institute and
maintain [a] regulatory programs for sources of ionizing radiation andfor electronic product radiation so as to provide for: (a) compatibility with the standards and regulatory programs of the federal government, (b) an integrated
system of regul ation within the State, and (c) a system consonant insofar as
possible with those of other states.
Section 25802 should be amended as follows:
I.

Sect. 25802. Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter to effectuate the
policies set forth in Section 25801 by providing for programs to:
(a) Effectively regulate sources of ionizing radiation and electronic product
radiation for the protection of the occupational and public health and safety.
(b) Promote an orderly regulatory pattern within the State, among the sates,
and between the federal government and the State, and facilitate inter-govern mental co-operation with · respect to use and regulation of sources of ionizing
radiation and electronic product radiation to the end that duplication of regulation may be minimized.
(c) Establish procedures for assumption and performance of certain regulatory
responsibilities with respect to byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials, and with respect to electronic product radiation.
(d) Permit maximum utilization of sources of ionizing radiation and electronic
product radiation consistent with the health and safety of the public.
Section 25805 should be amended by adding new subsections as follows:
Section 25805. Definitions as used in this Chapter: (Subsections (a) through
(i) remain unchanged)
(j) "Electronic product radiation·· means any ionizing or non-ionizing electromagnetic or particulate radiation or any sonic. infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave
which is emitted from an electronic product as the result of the operation of an
electronic circuit in such product.
(k) "Electronic product" means (A) any manufactured or assembled product
which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit
and (ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would
emit) electronic product radiation, or (B) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as a component, part, or accessory of a product
described in clause (A) and which when inooperatiom emits (or in the absence
of effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation.
Section 25811 should be amended as follows:
Section 25811. Duties of Department. The Department shall, for the protection of public Health and Safety;
(a) Develop programs for evaluation of hazards associated with use of sources
of ionizing radiation.
(b) D evelop programs for evaluation of hazards associated with electronic
product radiation.
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APPENDIX TWO
I.

GLOSSARY:
A) Electronic Product:* "Electronic product" means
(1) any manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation,
(i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and
(ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls
would emit) electronic product radiation, or
(2) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as
a component, part, or accessory of a product described in subparagraph (1) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of
effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation.
B) Electronic Product Radiation * "Electronic product radiation" means-(1) Any ionizing or nonionizing electromagnetic or particulate radiation, or
(2) Any sonic, infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave, which is emitted from an
electronic product as the result of the operation of an electronic
circuit in such product.
C) ,:;Lectromagnetic Radiation:* "Electromagnetic radiation" includes the
entire electromagnetic spectrum of radiation of any wavelength. The .
electromagnetic spectrum (See diagram below) includes, but is not limited to, gamma rays, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, microwave,
radiowave and low frequency radiations.
D) Ionizing Radiation: "Ionizing radiation" is radiation of sufficient energy to dislodge one or more electrons (negatively charged sub-atomic
particles) from a material upon which it impinges. Such material may
thus be left in an "ionized" state; that is, lacking electrons, it takes on
a positive electrical charge. Ionizing radiation may also cause the material which it strikes to itself produce radiation (£.g., X-rays, gamma
rays).
E) Non-Ionizing Radiation: "Non-ionizing radiation" is radiation of insufficient energy to dislodge electrons from materials which it strikes. Nonionizing radiation may, however, produce a "mechanical agitation"
within certain materials, and this can result in the generation of heat
(e.g., microwaves, as used to heat foods in a microwave oven).
F) Particulate Radiation:* "Particulate radiation" is defined as charged
particles such as protons, electrons, alpha particles, heavy particles,
etc., which have sufficient kinetic energy to produce ionization or
atomic or electron excitation by collision, electrical attractions or electrical repulsion of uncharged particles such as neutrons, which can initiate a nuclear transformation or liberate charged particles having
sufficient kinetic energy to produce ionization or atomic or electron
excitation by collision (e.g., particles emitted by the decay of radioactive
materials).
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(c) Develop programs, with due regard to compatibility with federal programs, for licensing and regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear .
materials.
(d) Develop programs, with due regard to compatibility with f ederal programs, for controlling electronic product radiation, including (I) Establishmer,t of a program in cooperation with the Bureau of Electronic Repair Dealers Registration, as authorized under article 8 (section 25836) of this chapter
for the training of Bureau personnel, if necessary, in order that such Bureau
personnel may determine that such procedures and equipment used in the
repair of electronic products that affect the emission of electronic product radiation are effectively utilized so as to assure that electronic products repaired
by electronic repair dealers are maintained in accordance with federally established standards relating to electronic product radiation. (2) The establishment
of a program to collect and diseminate, in cooperation with the Bureau of
Electronic Repair Dealers, information on electronic products as defined under
subsection (j) (B) of Section 25805 that are determined by manufacturers, the
federal government, or the Department, to be capable of emitting electronic
product radiation in excess of federally established standards relating to
electronic product radiation and are (i) available on the market as replacement
items in the repair of electronic products or (ii) known to have been installed in
electronic products in use by consumers.
(e) Formulate, adopt, and promulgate rules and regulations relating to control of electronic product radiation. (Re-letter present subsections (c) and (d)
accordingly.)

II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ELECTRONIC REPAIR DEALERS REGISTRATION LAW.
Section 9801 should be amended as follows:
(Subsection (a) through (f) remain unchanged.)
(g) "Service dealer" means a person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of repairing, servicing, or maintaining {A) any manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, contains or acts as part of an
electronic circuit or normally used or sold for use in the home, (B) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as a component, part,
or accessory of a product described in clause (A) (Subsection (h) remains unchanged.)
Section 9814 should be amended as follows:
Section 9814. Establishment and enforcement of Regulations. The director.
may in the protection of the public shall establish and enforce such regulations
as may be reasonable for the conduct of service dealers and for the general
enforcement of the various provisions of this chapter and of the provisions of
Chapter 7.6 (commencing with section 25800) of Division 20 of the Health and
Safety Code as they relate to eleCtronic products [in the protection of the public].
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G) Sonic Waves:* "Infrasonic, sonic (or audible) and ultrasonic waves"
refer to energy transmitted as an alteration (pressure, particle displacement or density) in a property of an elastic medium (gas, liquid or solid)
that can be detected by an instrument or listener.
*Note; Those definitions above indicated by an asterisk(*) are taken from the
Federal Regulations pertaining to the Radiation Control Act, its enforcement
and interpretation (42 C.P.R. §78.100). The other definitions are provided by
the authors. See generally EISBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
PHYSICS (1961).
II. ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION: X-Rays are a form of radiant energy similar in nature to radio waves, visible light and microwaves, etc. These
are all part of the "electromagnetic spectrum", diagrammed below. The
characteristics of each distinguishable form of electromagnetic radiation
depend on its frequency (cycles-per-second or hertz) which is inversely proportional to its wavelength (measured in meters). Sound waves ("sonic radiation") and particulate radiation are not forms of electromagnetic radiation
and are not found on the electromagnetic spectrum.

THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
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Note; The lines used to differentiate between the various categories of radiation
are only approximated in this diagram. In reality there are no sharp lines of
distinction; each type of electromagnetic radiation merges imperceptibly into
each adjoining category.

